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THROUGH SCIENCE AND TOLERANCE, TO COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

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SEALS OF THE KHOTYN COUNTY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD. HISTORICAL AND SPHRAGISTIC ANALYSIS

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Abstract. *In the article, the authors have made a detailed sphragistic and historical analysis of the matrix seals that were found on the territories of the former Khotyn County (Northern Bessarabia). Most of them are made of bronze and belong to the interwar period when the region was part of the Kingdom of Romania.*

The material under consideration has a significant factual and illustrative potential, especially in museum work. It testifies that the interwar activities of many organizations and institutions in the Khotyn County remain insufficiently studied or have not become the object of scientific research at all, which poses the issue in a new light.

Keywords: Khotyn County, Hotin, Kingdom of Romania, interwar, sphragistics, matrix seals, organizations, institutions.

Rezumat: *Sigilii din județul Hotin în perioada interbelică: analiză istorică și sfragistică. Autorii oferă o analiză sfragistică și istorică detaliată a unor matrice de sigilii găsite pe teritoriul fostului județ Hotin din Basarabia de Nord. Majoritatea acestora sunt confecționate din bronz și datează din perioada interbelică, atunci când județul făcea parte din Regatul României. Materialul descris are un potențial faptic și ilustrativ semnificativ, în special în domeniul muzeografic, ce denotă faptul că activitățile multor organizații și instituții din județul Hotin al perioadei interbelice rămân insuficient studiate sau nu au constituit, în general, un subiect independent de cercetare științifică, ceea ce actualizează problematica precizată.*

INTRODUCTION

The Khotyn (in Romanian: Hotin) area is a historical region between the Middle Dniester and the Prut River, which is also often identified with the northern part of Bessarabia. It started to form in the Middle Ages and crystallized completely in the Modern Period and, in terms of present-day territorial-administrative division, it covers the Dnistrovskiyi *raion* (district), part of the Chernivtsi *raion* (both in the Chernivtsi *oblast* (region) of Ukraine), as well as the northern border lands of the Republic of Moldova.

A special layer of historical information about the past of the Khotyn area contains sphragistic relics. Born in the 18th century, sphragistics is a special (auxiliary) historical discipline that studies seals and their prints on various materials. Matrices were special stamps of various shapes and sizes, as well as hems, rings-seals, scarabs, among others. Besides the traditional, most well-known and widespread prints now in the field of sphragistics, there are also ceramic marks, stamps on metal products, bulls, and lead seals.¹ All this variety is united by a common functional purpose – to confirm something, to certify: the person, authority, documents, quality, place and time of output manufacturing, etc. At the junction of sphragistics and heraldry, epigraphy, numismatics, prosopography, and genealogy, unknown and little-known facts of history, individual figures, clans, and institutions of power often appear.

In recent years, the interest in the Khotyn area's sphragistic relics has intensified among scientists. Thus, a considerable layer of sphragistic material is significant among the archaeological ancientry of the region, dating since the Antiquity to the Modern Period. Particular attention was given to the identification of the round lead seal-matrix of Bogdan I the Founder (1359–1365), the voivode of the Principality of Moldavia, and the mid-fourteenth century hanging trade seals of the Flemish city of Tournai, which were discovered on the hillfort of Teiul Verde to the west of Khotyn.² Western European textile seals of the 16th and 17th centuries have

¹ Vitaliy Havrylenko, *Shliakh do sfrahistyky* [The Way to Sphragistics], Kyiv-Lviv, 2014, 328 p.

² Liubomyr Mykhailyna, Oleh Odnorozhenko, Serhii Pyvovarov, *Pechatka voievody Bohdana. Sfrahistychni znakhidky z horodyshcha XIV st. v s. Zelena Lypa ta yikh znachennia dlia vyvchennia istorii formuvannia derzhavnoi heraldyky Moldavskoho hospodarstva* [The Seal of Voivode Bohdan. Sphragistic Findings from the Settlement of the 14th Century in the Village of Zelena Lypa and Their Significance for Studying the History of Formation of the State Heraldry of the Moldavian Principality], in "Sfrahistychnyi shchorichnyk" [Sphragistic Yearbook], Vol. IV, 2013, pp. 119-142; Maksym Mordovin, Ihor Prokhnenko, *Tovarna tekstylna plomba mista Turne z okolyts*

been identified in the Noua Suliță area: Zwickau, Zgorzelec, Grünberg, Poznań, and Gdańsk.³ A bronze personal seal with an arabographic inscription of the 17th century from the Kelmentsi area, where Khotyn is mentioned,⁴ seals of the Khotyn county *starosta* (elder) 1918⁵ and of the Council of Workers' Deputies of Khotyn of Bessarabian Governorate are also described.⁶

In addition to the above-mentioned findings, discovered either during archaeological research or accidentally, there are also a dozen new sphragistic relics of the 19th and 20th centuries that are related to the Khotyn area and still need to be studied and made available to the scientific community. Several dozen seals were collected on the initiative and assistance of Mykola Holovlov – Mayor of Khotyn (2014–2020) in order to open a specialized museum in the future. Seals were either collected from the local population or received from the Sheremetiev Museum in Kyiv. Most of the matrices known today relate to the interwar period when the region was part of Romania. This scientific research is aimed at describing and analysing them, as well as at defining their historical context. This sample, which is still relatively small, partly fills a chronological and spatial gap. As far as the territory of neighbouring Bukovina is concerned, imprints of the seals of rural communities at the end of the 18th and 19th centuries have long been collected.⁷

s. *Zelena Lypa* [Commodity Textile Seal of the City of Tournai from the Outskirts of the Village Zelena Lypa], in *Arkheolohiia Bukovyny: zdobutky ta perspektyvy* [Archaeology of Bukovina: Achievements and Prospects], Chernivtsi, Tekhnodruk, 2018, pp. 55-58.

³ Maksym Mordovin, Ihor Prokhnenko, *Zakhidnoievropeiski tekstylni plomby XVI-XVII st. z Novoselytskoho r-nu Chernivetskoï oblasti* [Western European Textile Seals of the 16th–17th Centuries from the Novoselytskyi District of the Chernivtsi Region], in *Arkheolohiia Bukovyny: zdobutky ta perspektyvy* [Archaeology of Bukovina: Achievements and Prospects], Chernivtsi, Tekhnodruk, 2020, p. 116-121.

⁴ Yuliia Mysko, Serhii Frantsuzov, *Turetska pechatka z Khotynshchyny (poperednie pov-idomlennia)* [The Turkish Seal from the Khotyn Area (Previous Message)], in “Novi doslidzhennia pamiatok kozatskoi doby v Ukraini” [New Research on the Monuments of the Cossack Era in Ukraine], 2015, Vol. 24, p. 568-570; Mykola Ilkiv, *Portatyvnyi soniachnyi hodnynyk iz Khotynskoi fortetsi: atrybutsiia, osoblyvosti vykorystannia, pro-storovo-chasovyi kontekst* [A Portable Sundial from the Khotyn Fortress: Attribution, Usage Features, Space-Time Context], Chernivtsi, Tekhnodruk, 2019, p. 159-160.

⁵ Oleksandr Rusnak, Mykola Ilkiv, Mykola Holovlov, *New Seal of District Chief: to the Centenary of Ukrainian Authority in the Khotyn Region*, in “History Journal of Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University”, 2018, No. 48, p. 38-49.

⁶ Oleksandr Rusnak, Mykola Ilkiv, Mykola Holovlov, *Pechatka rady robitnychykh deputativ m. Khotyn Bessarabskoi hubernii* [The Seal of the Council of the Khotyn City Workers Deputies of the Bessarabian Province], in *Arkheolohiia Bukovyny: zdobutky ta perspektyvy* [Archaeology of Bukovina: Achievements and Prospects], Chernivtsi, Tekhnodruk, 2020, p. 167-169.

⁷ Nicolai Grămadă, *Vechile peceti sătești Bucovinene 1783-1900* [The Old Bukovinian Vil-

Separate surveys have also been published, focusing on seals of the interwar period from neighbouring regions, for example: Galicia,⁸ Podillia,⁹ Transcarpathia,¹⁰ or the Odessa area.¹¹ At that time, these Ukrainian lands were part of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Although the method of processing sphragistic material has been carefully developed,¹² its systematization and introduction into scientific circulation is extremely limited. It is also worth noting that the majority of thematic publications are based almost exclusively on matrix prints, which limits research opportunities to some extent. Therefore, we believe that, in the future, the accumulation of a presentable database will make it possible to carry out a comparative analysis of this category of historical material, particularly within the framework of archival and museological studies.

THE SEAL OF THE RESTEA ATACI VILLAGE PARISH OF THE KHOTYN COUNTY

Round bronze seal. Cylindrical body, 3.8 cm in diameter and 0.5 cm in height; pyramidal core with rectangular base of 0.6×0.7 cm; overall height of the object: 2.3 cm; weight: 53.8 g. In the centre of the seal, there is a large coat of arms of the Kingdom of Romania. The shield with the crown is divided into quarters: the first shows an eagle (symbol of Wallachia), the second shows a bison head (symbol of Moldova), the third shows a lion (symbol of Oltenia), and the fourth shows dolphins (symbol of Dobrudja). Above the shield lies the coat of arms of the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen ruling dynasty. Under the base of the

lage Seals 1783–1900], in “Codrul Cosminului”, Cernăuți, 1940, Vol. X, pp. 217–268.

⁸ Andrii Sova, *Z istorii pechatok tovarystv “Sich” Sniatynshchyny pershoi chverti XX stolittia* [From the History of the Seals of “Sich” Societies of Sniatyn Area in the First Quarter of the 20th Century], in “Sniatyn” [Sniatyn], 2016, Vol. 14, pp. 67–74.

⁹ A. B. Zadorozhniuk, *Podilski pechatky kintsia XVIII – seredyny XX st. (za materialamy sfrahistychnoi koleksii Muzeiu Sheremetievykh)* [Podillian Seals of the Late 18th–Mid 20th Cent. (Based on the Materials of the Sphragistic Collection of the Sheremetiev Museum)], Kyiv, 2010, 268 p.

¹⁰ H. I. Siartova, *Pechatky Zakarpatskoi kraiovoi orhanizatsii komunistychnoi partii Cherkhoslovachchyny* [Seals of the Transcarpathian and Regional Organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], in *Istorychni dzherela ta yikh vykorystannia* [Historical Sources and Their Use], Vol. II, 1966, pp. 247–255.

¹¹ I. S. Berezhnoi, *Pechatky revoliutsiinykh ustanov Odeschchyny* [Seals of the Revolutionary Institutions of Odessa Area], in *Istorychni dzherela ta yikh vykorystannia* [Historical Sources and Their Use], Vol. II, 1966, pp. 238–256.

¹² See for example: Dominika Pruszczyńska (Ed.), *Opracowanie materiałów sfragistycznych w archiwach* [Elaboration of Sphragistic Materials in Archives], Warszawa, Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, 2020, 220 p.

shield, the motto scroll displays an inscription in Latin: "NIHIL SINE DEO" (NOTHING WITHOUT GOD). On both sides, the shield is supported by lions. The whole lies under a purple mantle with fringe and ermine and is surmounted by a royal crown. The inscription in the circle: "PAROHIA RESTEA ATACI JUD. HOTIN 1918 ROMANIA" (PARISH RESTEA ATACI. COUNT. KHOTYN 1918 ROMANIA) (fig. 1.1). Thus, the dating of the seal falls during the reign of Ferdinand I of Romania (1914–1927), while the pattern of the coat of arms is characteristic of the period of his predecessor Carol I of Romania (1866–1914).¹³

The seal refers to the modern village of Dnistrivca of Kelmentsi area, known from written sources since the 18th century as Restev, Resteu, and Vârstova. To the north, at the crossing of the Dniester River, lay the settlement of Atachi. They were united into one settlement, Dnistrivca, in 1948. In 1981, the corner of the village Dnistrivca Atachi was flooded by the waters of the Dniester reservoir.

According to the census, at the beginning of the Romanian rule, 2078 people lived in the village of Restea Ataci. There were 532 households; there was a landlord's estate, a consumer cooperative "Riga", 16 water mills, 10 windmills, 3 oil mills, and 2 inns. There was a mixed elementary school, a gendarmerie station, a village post office, a telephone box, a village hall, and an Orthodox church. The materials of the first interwar Romanian census indicate that the ancient village church (which had already existed before the beginning of the 17th century) was destroyed in 1884 and, at the same time, a new wooden church of "The Protection of the Holy Virgin"¹⁴ was built at the expense of Konstantin Lishin¹⁵ (honorary citizen of Khotyn, General-Major). Obviously, it was this building that welcomed parishioners throughout the Romanian period.

Until 1925, Restea Ataci was part of Chelminețu (Kelmentsi) *volost* of the Lipcani *plasă*, of the Khotyn County.¹⁶ After the administrative reform, it be-

¹³ Constantin Moisil, *Stema României. Originea și evoluția ei istorică și heraldică* [Romania's Coat of Arms. Its Historical and Heraldic Origin and Evolution], in "Boabe de Grâu. Revista de cultură" [Wheat Grains. Culture Magazine], II, 1931, Nr. 2, p. 82-84.

¹⁴ *Dicționarul statistic al Basarabiei: întocmit pe baza recensământului populației din anul 1902, corectat prin datele actuale, statistice ale primăriilor și prin tabelele biurourilor de populație centralizate în 1922/1923* [Statistical Dictionary of Bessarabia: Compiled on the Basis of the 1902 Population Census, Corrected by Current Data, Mayoral Statistics, and by Tables of Population Bureaus Centralized in 1922/1923], Chișinău, Tip. societății anonime "Glassul țării", 1923, p. 336-337.

¹⁵ *Episcopia Hotinului. Date istorice și statistice: 1923-1925* [Episcopate of Khotyn. Historical and Statistical Data: 1923-1925], Chișinău, Tipografia Eparhială "Cartea Românească", 1925, p. 128.

¹⁶ *Împărțirea administrativă a teritoriilor alipite pe județe, plăși, voloste, notariate și comune* [Administrative Division of the Attached Territories by Counties, Plăși, Volosts,

longed to the *plasă* of Kelmentsi of the Khotyn County.¹⁷ Despite the fact that, as a part of Bessarabia, the Khotyn County had been subordinated to Chişinău since 1918 and that the pole of influence moved to Chernivtsi only in 1938, when, according to the Romanian constitution, Northern Bukovina and the Khotyn area were embodied into a single administrative-territorial unit – Ținutul (district) Suceava¹⁸ –, in religious matters, it changed its affiliation almost immediately.

As of 1922, the Khotyn area became part of the archdiocese of Chişinău and Khotyn, which included 1090 churches and chapels with 1104 priests, 20 monasteries with 882 monks and nuns.¹⁹ By the law of March 10, 1923, two new dioceses were established in Bessarabia: Khotyn (with a residence in Bălţi) and Cetatea Albă (with a residence in Ismail). The diocese of Khotyn covered parishes from Bălţi, Khotyn and Soroca Counties.²⁰ Also, in March 1923, Visarion Puiu became Bishop of Khotyn.²¹ In total, there were 6 deaneries in the diocese, which had 144 parishes and 163 churches.²²

However, on March 24, 1925, the Law for the Organization of the Romanian Orthodox Church proclaimed the Bessarabian Church a Metropolis with two dioceses: the Chişinău Archdiocese and the Cetatea Albă Diocese. The Khotyn diocese was subordinated to the Bukovina Metropolis with a residence in Cernăuţi. Such a change in governance raised the complaints of the Bessarabian clergy.²³

In the 1920s, the Restea Ataci parish was part of the 4th deanery, the arch-priest of which was Epifanie Bolboşenco (Briceni parish) and sub-priests were Vasile Jereghie (Noua Suliţă parish) and Vasile Nazarevici (Restea Ataci parish). Vasile Nazarevici also held the position of the deanery clergyman.²⁴ By the mid-1920s, the Restea Ataci parish had already covered 540 households. The same wooden church of “The Protection of the Holy Virgin” remained, above-mentioned Vasile Nazarevici (born on April 26, 1879) having been a prior of which since 1915 and Teodor Friptu (born March 22, 1897) a deacon since Feb-

Notaries and Communes], Bucureşti, Imprimeria Statului, 1921, p. 74.

¹⁷ *Enciclopedia României: Țara românească* [Encyclopedia of Romania: The Romanian Country], Bucureşti, 1938, Vol. 2, p. 217.

¹⁸ Ion Nistor, *Istoria Bucovinei* [The History of Bukovina], Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1991, p. 415.

¹⁹ Ştefan Ciobanu, *Basarabia: monografie* [Bessarabia: Monograph], Chişinău, Universitas, 1993, p. 301-302.

²⁰ Anatol Petrencu (Ed.), *O istorie a Basarabiei* [A History of Bessarabia], Chişinău, Serebia, 2015, p. 231.

²¹ *Episcopia Hotinului. Date istorice...*, p. 25.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 111.

²³ Anatol Petrencu (Ed.), *O istorie...*, p. 231.

²⁴ *Episcopia Hotinului. Date istorice...*, p. 125.

ruary 1, 1923. Both had previously studied at a theological seminary.²⁵

THE SEAL OF THE KHOTYN GENDARME COMPANY

Round bronze seal. Low cylinder body, 3.02–3.08 cm in diameter and 1.03 cm in height; low rod with rectangular cross section (0.77×0.71 cm); total height of the object: 1.68 cm; weight: 38.5 g. The surface of the product is badly damaged but, in the centre of the seal field, a large coat of arms of the Kingdom of Romania can be seen (as in the previous case), and the engraved inscription in the circle reads: "ROMANIA * COMPANIA JANDARMI HOTIN *" (ROMANIA * COMPANY GENDARMERIE KHOTYN *) (fig. 1.2). Due to the state of preservation of the seal, it is premature to state whether the shield on the coat of arms has insets between the third and fourth quarters or not.

The gendarmerie is a special kind of state police, organized on military bases. In the Middle Ages, nobles who served in the Leibgarde of French kings were called gendarmes. In the 15th century, the word "gendarme" replaced the former term "knight" and extended to all well-armed riders, whether they were nobles or commoners. A corps of gendarmes was formed for the first time in France in 1791, to monitor the maintenance of order in the army and within the state. They were supposed to assist in the detention and escort of vagrants, prisoners, smugglers, as well as in recruitment. Whenever necessary, gendarmes provided armed assistance to local authorities in carrying out government orders. In the armies, there were special gendarmerie teams, which performed the duties of military police, and during combat they were on the battle lines to collect and send the wounded and to return those who were suitable for battle to service. Gradually, the name "gendarme" started to be used in other countries, displacing the former names of Zemsky huntsmen, Zemsky cavalryman, police hussars, police dragoons, etc. Thus, the gendarmerie became a special kind of state troops and cavalry police that featured military organization.²⁶

The Romanian gendarmerie was established on April 3, 1850, when prince Grigore Alexandru Ghica signed the Law for Reformation of Servants' Corps into Gendarmes. This law established the legal status of the gendarmerie and set the principles of its organization and operation.²⁷

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

²⁶ *Zhandarmy* [Gendarmes], in *Enciklopedicheskiy slovar' Brokgauza i Efrona* [Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary], Sankt-Peterburg, Vol. XI (A), 1894, p. 717.

²⁷ *Jandarmeria Română. 161 ani de istorie. În slujba legii, ordinii și siguranței publice* [Romanian Gendarmerie. 161 Years of History. In the Service of Law, Order, and Pub-



Fig. 1. *The Seal of the Restea Ataci Village Parish of the Khotyn County (1) and the Seal of the Khotyn Gendarme Company (2).*

In the Khotyn area, Romanian gendarmes appeared after the establishment of the Romanian authorities, no earlier than the end of 1918, and remained in effect until 1940. The process of creation and deployment of the gendarmerie in the Khotyn County was regulated by royal decree No. 1198 of June 1, 1918, "The Law for the Organization of Rural Gendarmerie", according to which the structure of the Romanian Gendarmerie Corps (following the military model) included brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, sections, and gendarme stations.²⁸ Apparently, at that time the gendarmerie company was organized in Khotyn. After the creation of the 10th Chernivtsi Gendarme Regiment on November 15, 1920, among others, it included a company of gendarmes in Khotyn.²⁹

Taking into consideration the experience of European countries, on March 23, 1929, the Romanian Parliament adopted a new Law for the Organization of Rural Gendarmerie.³⁰ According to this and the Rural Gendarmerie Statute of July 20, 1929, the rural gendarmerie was defined as: "a military-organized corps, designed to oversee public safety in rural communities and fulfil other statutory responsibilities as subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, as well as local authorities in certain cases."³¹ Like the military, gendarmes were also controlled by the Ministry of War (later renamed the Ministry of National Security). This law also created a new organizational unit for gendarmerie management with headquarters in Bucharest – the General Inspectorate of Gendarmerie.³² The gendarme brigades and regiments were terminated, and the companies were renamed gendarme legions.³³ In November 1941, for example, Major Tr. Dragulescu was the commander of the Khotyn Gendarme Legion.³⁴ Therefore, the gendarmerie company in Khotyn had to be operational no later than 1929. Thus,

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁹ Vasile Bobocescu, *Momente din istoria Ministerului de Interne: 1821-1944* [Moments from the History of the Ministry of the Interior: 1821–1944], București, Editura Ministerului de Interne, Vol. I, 1996, pp. 144, 153.

³⁰ Ivan Toronchuk, *Rumunska zhandarmeriia na Bukovyni u mizhvoiennyi period (1918-1940 rr.)* [Romanian Gendarmerie in Bukovina in the Interwar Period (1918–1940)], in "Naukovyi visnyk Chernivetskoho universytetu" [Scientific Bulletin of Chernivtsi University], 2011, Vol. 578, p. 31.

³¹ Vasile Mihalache, Ioan Suciu, *Din istoria legislației Jandarmeriei Române* [On the History of the Romanian Gendarmerie Legislation], București, Editura Societății Tempus, 1995, p. 353.

³² Anghel Andreescu, Neculai Munteanu, Octavian Burcin, Viorel Andronic, *Istoria jandarmeriei Române* [The History of the Romanian Gendarmerie], București, 2005, p. 52-53.

³³ Ivan Toronchuk, *Rumunska zhandarmeriia...*, p. 31.

³⁴ *Hotinskoe vosstanie (Sbornik dokumentov i materialov)* [The Khotyn Uprising (Collection of Documents and Materials)], Kishinev, Shtiintsa, 1976, p. 159.

the seal was used approximately between 1918 and 1929.

The materials of the Romanian census in Bessarabia show that, at the beginning of the interwar period, 59 gendarmes served in the rural part of the Khotyn County, one at a time in the following settlements: Balamutovca, Bălăsinesti, Bălkăuți, Bedragii Vechi, Briceni-Târg, Burlănești, Buzovița, Chelmineț (Chelmenți), Cipileuți, Clișcăuți, Cobâlceni, Colicăuți, Corjeuți, Cormani, Coteleu, Crestinești, Dăncăuți, Dinăuți, Dolineni, Drepcăuți, Edința, Hlina, Grămești (nowadays, Rzhavyntsi), Grimești, Grozinți, Grușovița, Hrinouți (nowadays, Grinăuți-Moldova), Ianouți (nowadays, Ivanivtsi), Larga, Lencouți, Lipcani-Târg, Lomacina, Lopatnic, Mămăliga, Mihalcovo, Nădărauți, Neporotovo, Nesfoia, Noua-Suliță-sat, Noua-Suliță-târg, Ocnița, Pererâta, Rașcu, Rângaci, Româncăuți, Rucșin, Săncăuți, Secureni-Târg, Seliște, Stălinești, Șebutinți, Șirouți de Jos, Tărăsăuți, Trânca, Trebisăuți, Văscăuți, Vârstova, Zarojani, Zelena.³⁵

Gendarmerie units in the Khotyn area had to deal with the agents of “Zakordot” (short for Russian “foreign department”) – a deeply conspiratorial department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, similar in function to the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.³⁶ “The Extract from the Report on the Work of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine in July–August 1921” states that, in the Khotyn County, “many raids were carried out on gendarme stations, *volost* administrations, on individual agents of Siguranța”, etc.³⁷ Romanian researchers confirm the attack on July 29, 1921, by a group of about 60 armed people, who fired on the stations of the Khotyn gendarmerie (one of them in Dăncăuți). In this fight, soldier Ion Șorodoc was killed. A similar case occurred on January 23–24, 1922, when the Gendarme Station in Dinăuți (also the Company of Khotyn Gendarmes) was attacked. Corporal Istrate Gheorghe died. In June 1922, the Bolsheviks who crossed the Dniester killed Lieutenant Filip Emilian – a commander of the platoon of gendarmes in Noua-Suliță (Company of Khotyn Gendarmes) – and, on September 22, 1922, the squad of L. Cojuharu defeated the Secureni Gendarmerie Station.³⁸

³⁵ *Dicționarul statistic...*, p. 360-365.

³⁶ “Zakordot” v systemi spetssluzhb radianskoi Ukrainy: Zbirnyk dokumentiv [‘Zakordot’ in the System of Special Services of Soviet Ukraine], Kyiv, NA SBU, 2000, p. 3-4; Liubov Shpakovskyi, *Romania in the Soviet Secret Policy of the Early 1920s*, in “Codrul Cosminului”, XXIV, 2018, No. 1, p. 214-218.

³⁷ “Zakordot” v systemi..., p. 146.

³⁸ *Narysy z istorii Pivnichnoi Bukovyny* [Essays on the History of Northern Bukovina], Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 1980, p. 180.

More often, however, the gendarmes dealt with the local population, helping fiscal authorities to collect taxes, and often used violence.³⁹ On several occasions, the Company of Khotyn Gendarmes was used by the Romanian government to suppress peasant revolts in the region. In particular, we have examples of 1929–1930 in the villages of Noua-Suliță (now Dnistrovskiy district, Chernivtsi region), Neporotovo, and Rukhotin.⁴⁰

THE STAMP OF THE KHOTYN SIGURANȚA BRIGADE

Rectangular-trapezoidal bronze stamp. Matrix dimensions: 6.1×5.9 cm; thickness: 0.7–0.8 cm; weight: 163.1 g. Truncated-conic rod (0.8×0.8 cm); overall height: 3 cm. The upper narrow part of the stamp shows the middle coat of arms of the Kingdom of Romania, which differs from previous copies by the absence of a mantle with a royal crown. A quartered shield is placed above an eagle. Between the third and fourth quarters of the shield, a conical insert is visible, which was added to the coat of arms in 1922 after Transylvania joined Romania. The inscription over the coat of arms reads: “REGATUL ROMANIEI” (ROMANIAN KINGDOM); the inscription under the coat of arms: “MINISTERUL de INTERNE” (MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR) / DIRECȚIA POLIȚIEI și SIGURANȚEI 6^{le} (DIRECTORATE POLICE and SIGURANȚA 6th) / BRIGADA de SIGURANȚA (BRIGADE of SIGURANȚA) / HOTIN (KHOTYN) / N^o_ / 192_Luna_Ziua_ (192_Month_Day) (fig. 2.3).

Siguranța – secret political police service in the Kingdom of Romania, a special security service that operated in Romania during 1907–1940 (the beginnings of its creation date back to 1892). It originated after the peasant uprising in Romania in 1907, but the corresponding “Law for the Establishment of the Police Directorate and General Siguranța” was published on March 25, 1908.⁴¹

As Bessarabia entered Romania at the end of 1918, the Khotyn area⁴² also came under the jurisdiction of Siguranța. For Bessarabia, the Sub-inspectorate of General Siguranța (later transformed in the Inspectorate) started to operate in Chișinău. Its tasks were: to ensure internal order; to prevent and expose terrorist acts against Romanian military men, national movement leaders, and administration officials; to counteract the activities of hostile spies; and, above all, to

³⁹ *Hotinskoe vosstanie...*, pp. 58, 90–92.

⁴⁰ Oleksandr Dobrzhanskyi, Yurii Makar, Oleksandr Masan, *Khotynshchyna: Istorychnyi narys* [The Khotyn Area. Historical Essay], Chernivtsi, Molodyi bukovynets, 2002, p. 215.

⁴¹ Vasile Bobocescu, *Momente din...*, p. 84.

⁴² Ludmila Rotari, *Mișcarea subversivă din Basarabia în anii 1918–1924* [The Subversive Movement in Bessarabia in 1918–1924], București, 2004, p. 59.

destroy communist and irredentist propaganda that undermined the activities of the Romanian state.⁴³

The Sub-inspectorate of General Siguranța of Bessarabia (with its local crews and services) was subordinated to the Directorate of Police and General Siguranța in Bucharest (Ministry of the Interior) and the Internal Affairs Directorate of Bessarabia.⁴⁴ The organizer and the first head of Bessarabian Siguranța was Romulus P. Voinescu – the former head of Siguranța in Bucharest.⁴⁵ In 1919, this position was taken over by Dumitru Zahiu, in 1920, by Zaharia (Zinovie) Husărescu, and, between 1930 and 1940, it was held by Constantin Maimuca.⁴⁶

After new laws were adopted on June 22 and September 18, 1919, the structure of the Ministry of Interior was reorganized. In particular, the last decree divided it into central bodies (Technical Police Service, Control and Inspection Service, Directorate of Administration and Personnel, Directorate of Security Police) and external or territorial ones (Prefecture of the Capital-City Police, Regional Inspectorates of Police and Siguranța, County-Town Police Quaestorships (headquarters), Brigades or City Services of Siguranța and Police of Non-county Cities, Ports, Stations and Border Stations).⁴⁷ Accordingly, the subdivisions of Siguranța – brigades and services – were established in all counties of Bessarabia, including in Khotyn.⁴⁸ In January 1921, the Khotyn Brigade of Siguranța amounted to 14 employees under the leadership of Em. Catană.⁴⁹

At the end of 1928, the question of further reorganization of police bodies was raised. The Romanian government, led by Iuliu Maniu, aimed to reduce their expenses and, at the same time, make their work more efficient. In pursuit of this goal, before the reform, he had the number of civil servants reduced by minimizing required staff in the structure of Siguranța.⁵⁰ After the public debates on the reform of the Ministry of the Interior, the Government adopted "The Law for the Organization

⁴³ Vasile Bobocescu, *Momente...*, pp. 133, 151.

⁴⁴ Arhiva Națională a Republicii Moldova, Chișinău (ANRM) [National Archive of the Republic of Moldova, Chișinău], Fund 680, Inv. 1, File 2055, f. 23.

⁴⁵ Mihai Pelin, *Un veac de spionaj, contraspionaj și poliție politică: dicționar alfabetic* [A Century of Espionage, Counterintelligence, and Political Police: An Alphabetical Dictionary], București, 2003, p. 301-302.

⁴⁶ Pavel Moraru, *Organizarea și activitatea serviciilor de informații și siguranță românești din Basarabia în perioada anilor 1918-1944. Teză de doctor habilitat în istorie* [The Organization and Activity of the Romanian Intelligence and Security Services in Bessarabia During the Years 1918–1944. Doctoral Thesis in History], Chișinău, 2016, p. 62.

⁴⁷ Pavel Moraru, *Organizarea și activitatea...*, p. 62.

⁴⁸ ANRM, Fond 706, inv. 2, dosar 2, ff. 243, 245.

⁴⁹ ANRM, Fond 680, inv. 1, dosar 18, f. 129.

⁵⁰ ANRM, Fond 680, inv. 1, dosar 51, f. 3.

of the General State Police”, published in “Monitorul Oficial al României” on July 21, 1929 (Issue 159). Siguranța was united with other police structures.⁵¹ Thus, the stamp of the Khotyn Siguranța Brigade was used between 1922 and 1929.



Fig. 2. The Stamp of the Khotyn Siguranța Brigade (3) and the Seal of the Jewish Culture League (Kultur Lige) in Khotyn (4).

THE SEAL OF THE JEWISH CULTURE LEAGUE (KULTUR LIGE) IN KHOTYN

Round bronze seal. Straight cylinder body, 3.56 cm in diameter and 0.71–0.82 cm in height; elongated conical rod, octahedral in cross section (0.66×0.72 cm); overall height of the object: 2.56 cm; weight: 64.5 g. The protruding inscrip-

⁵¹ Pavel Moraru, *Organizarea și activitatea...*, p. 66.

tion in the circle: "LIGA CULTURALA EVREEASCA HOTIN x" (LEAGUE CULTURE JEWISH KHOTYN); horizontal inscription of three lines in the centre (fig. 2.4).

Jewish Culture League is the common name for a number of cultural and social organizations, formed during the interwar period in Eastern Europe, as well as in some countries in Western Europe and America. In Romania, the first branches appeared during 1919–1920, mainly in Bessarabia and Bukovina. In Bessarabia, the Culture League was established in 1919 on the basis of the former International Jewish Labour Bund. It became the largest national-cultural Jewish society in the region.

Bund (General Jewish Labour Bund in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia) was the Jewish socialist party in the Russian Empire, later in Poland and the USA. It was formed in 1897 at the illegal founding congress of Jewish social democratic groups in Vilnius. At the beginning of the 20th century, Bund was distinguished by its well-developed party structure. Bund Committees were operating within the major cities and there were primary centres in a number of cities and towns to ensure the operation of the lower levels of the party structure. Bund organizations had a rather extensive and well-established system of delivery for smuggling literature and weapons to Russia, as well as for transferring revolutionaries, which ran through Khotyn and Kamianets-Podilskyi, among others. In the local Jewish cemetery in the village of Stroești of the Khotyn County, Russian customs officers discovered a "pit" for the temporary storage of revolutionary literature, which was "run" by the cemetery guard. In Khotyn and Kamianets-Podilskyi, there were secret centres, which supplied revolutionaries with false documents to cross the border illegally.⁵²

It is not by accident that, when Bessarabia became part of Romania and Bund was reorganized into a Jewish Culture League, a whole network of the new structure emerged in Khotyn. The founder of the Khotyn Jewish League was Dr. Joseph Brickman, from Tighina, a former member of Bund, who participated in the formation of the League in Chișinău. In fact, he was a Soviet spy, member of the so-called Matius group. After its exposure he managed to escape to Ukraine, where he worked for the Kharkiv State Political Directorate (GPU), under the code name Tamin.

Like other Jewish societies, according to the statute, the Culture League was aimed at spreading the Hebrew language in all settlements where Jews

⁵² Aleksandr Bezarov, *K voprosu o meste i roli Bunda v processakh Pervoj russkoj revolyucii* [On the Question of the Place and Role of Bund in the Processes of the First Russian Revolution], in "Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Istoriya" [Bulletin of Saint-Petersburg University. History], Sankt-Peterburg, 2018, Vol. 63, no. 4, p. 1086-1088.

lived, at developing Jewish culture, and offering mutual assistance in various matters. To achieve these goals, it was decided to open kindergartens, public schools, public universities, hospitals, etc. However, a lot of suggestions were not made. At the same time, the activities of Jewish societies contributed to the communization of Bessarabia. Each Jewish cultural organization was ruled by a committee headed by a president. The management committees consisted mainly of revolutionaries, usually former members of Bund. The basis of these organizations was Jewish youth, as well as representatives of other ethnic groups, dissatisfied with the situation in interwar Bessarabia. There were also many women among the members of Jewish societies and in some organizations entire families were active. In general, Jew-communists were important figures in the communist movement in the region and often worked to bring Bessarabia back to – at that time Soviet – Russia.

In each section of Jewish cultural organizations there was a library, the premises of which served as a meeting place for local members or a meeting place with Bolshevik couriers from behind the Dniester. According to the information of Siguranța, the holdings of the libraries mostly had communist literature from abroad: Lviv, Warsaw, Prague, Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Riga, and even New York. Jewish cultural organizations in Bessarabia were connected with the international communist movement, supported by “Bolshevik bankers” in Europe and America. Under the guise of a national-cultural institution, the Jewish Culture League concealed subversive ideas, plans, and actions. Siguranța traced this in almost all the acts of terrorist and communist exposure that took place in Bessarabia over 9 years.⁵³

In 1922, in Chișinău, the United Bessarabian Federation of Culture League was established. The All-Romanian Culture League was founded in Bucharest in 1931. However, the organization was never very active there and, as before, genuine cultural work was carried out mainly in the provinces. In the late 1930s a series of anti-Semitic laws led to the banning of the Culture League in Romania.

THE SEAL OF NEDĂBĂUȚI VILLAGE HALL

Round bronze seal. The body of the seal is cylindrical. The rod is cylindrical. In the centre, there is a coat of arms in the form of a French shield with a stylized image of a castle with three towers. The spire of the middle tower is

⁵³ Viorica Nicolenco, *Extrema dreaptă în Basarabia (1923-1940)* [The Extreme Right in Bessarabia (1923–1940)], Chișinău, Civitas, 1999, p. 48-49.

crowned with a crescent, and the other two are crowned with flags or *bunchuks*. Above the castle, there are two crossed sabres and, above them, an equal-armed cross. The base of the shield under the castle is covered with horizontal strokes, which apparently symbolize the surface of water. The inscription above the coat of arms: "COM. RUCŞIN" (COM. RUCŞIN). Inscription in the circle: "PRIMARIA SAT. NEDABAUTI JUD. HOTIN * ROMANIA *" (HALL VILL. NEDĂBĂUȚI COUNT. KHOTYN * ROMANIA *) (fig. 3.5).

Until 1925, Nedăbăuți (Nedibăuți or Nedoboivtsi) administratively belonged to the Rucşin *volost* of the Khotyn County⁵⁴ and, after the reform, to Clișcăuți (Klishkivtsi) *plasă* of the Khotyn County.⁵⁵ Since the seal does not reflect the affiliation to the Rucşin *volost* but the commune (community), this gives grounds to assume that the seal was made and used after 1925.⁵⁶ Obviously, the coat of arms of the city of Khotyn as the administrative centre of the entire district is displayed on the shield, which had been used since the 19th century. If this opinion is correct, then the upper chronological limit of the artefact should be limited to 1930, when the new coat of arms of the city of Khotyn was approved.

According to the census, at the beginning of the Romanian rule, 4750 people lived in the village of Nedăbăuți. There were 530 households, a landlord's house (destroyed), a village cooperative, 7 water mills, 4 windmills, and 2 inns. There was a mixed primary school, a village post office, a tax collection agency, a village hall, and an Orthodox church. The materials of the first Romanian inter-war census indicate that the village stone church "The Assumption of the Holy Virgin" was built in 1838 at the expense of General Ermolinski's wife.⁵⁷ Apparently, this building received parishioners throughout the Romanian period.

According to the Bessarabian business catalogue of 1924–1925, in Nedăbăuți Simkha Feldman, Simon Sternberg and Simkha Satovski traded in groceries and snacks, and Fraico Goldenberg and Leiba Iacher kept inns. During 1918–1940, the village of Nedăbăuți was repeatedly mentioned in archival documents in the context of road repairs, the condition of which was one of the worst in the country,⁵⁸ and the emergence of bus routes.

⁵⁴ *Împărțirea administrativă...*, p. 74.

⁵⁵ *Enciclopedia României...*, p. 217.

⁵⁶ Oleksandr Rusnak, Mykola Holovlov, *Pechatka pryarii sela Nedoboivtsi hromady Rukshyn Khotynskoho povitu* [The Seal of the Mayor's Office of the Village of Nedoboivtsi, Rukshyn Community, Khotyn District], in *Arkheolohiia Bukovyny: zdobutky ta perspektyvy* [Archaeology of Bukovina: Achievements and Prospects], Chernivtsi, Tekhnodruk, 2019, p. 122–124.

⁵⁷ *Dicționarul statistic...*, p. 322–323.

⁵⁸ Oleksandr Dobrzhanskyi, Yurii Makar, Oleksandr Masan, *Khotynshchyna...*, p. 214.



Fig. 3. The Seal of the Nedăbăuți Village Hall (5) and the Seal of Notary S. Dobroselschi from Secureni of the Khotyn County (6).

For example, in the Khotyn County in the 1930s, the Khotyn–Clișcăuți–Cernăuți surfaced road⁵⁹ (via Nedăbăuți) was repaired. In 1938, the Khotyn prefecture allocated almost 0.5 million lei for the repair of Noua-Suliță–Nedăbăuți road.⁶⁰ In the Khotyn County, there were bus services on the following routes: Khotyn–Noua-Suliță (via Nedăbăuți and Cristinești), Khotyn–Cernăuți (via Nedăbăuți, Clișcăuți, Bocicăuți and Colincăuți).⁶¹

THE SEAL OF NOTARY S. DOBROSELSCHI FROM SECURENI OF THE KHOTYN COUNTY

Round bronze seal. Straight cylinder body, 3.49 cm in diameter and 0.99 cm in height; cylindrical-conical rod, 0.71 cm in diameter with horizontal opening at the top (0.37 cm in diameter); total height of the object: 2.54 cm; weight: 79.9 g. The small coat of arms of the Kingdom of Romania is schematically depicted in the centre of the seal field. That is, a crowned shield is represented with an eagle inside, which holds a cross in its beak. Above the eagle, there is a quartered shield without details. The engraved inscription in the circle reads: “ROMANIA BASARABIA” (ROMANIA BESSARABIA); in the circle outside: “NOTARUL PUBLIC S. DOBROSELSCHI SECURENI j. HOTIN +” (NOTARY PUBLIC S. DOBROSELSCHI SECURENI c. KHOTYN +) (fig. 3.6).

During the Romanian rule, there was an institution of public notaries in the Khotyn area. Notaries dealt with the certification of legal documents, official and private agreements, copies of documents, storage of documents, and securities. The materials of 9 notaries from the Khotyn County of the interwar period, including one from Secureni (Vasilescu Ștefan) have been kept in the repository of the State Archive of the Chernivtsi Region.⁶² This seal substantially supplements information about the notary corps of the region, since so far public notary S. Dobroselschi from Secureni has not been mentioned in specialized literature.

At the end of 1918, Khotyn and the whole of Bessarabia joined Romania, leading to further integration of the united provinces.⁶³ It was accompanied by

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Chernivetskoi oblasti (DACHO) [State Archive of the Chernivtsi Region], Fund 19, Inv. 1, File 59, f. 4.

⁶¹ DACHO, Fund 26, Inv. 2, File 384, f. 7.

⁶² *Derzhavnyi arkhiv Chernivetskoi oblasti. Putivnyk. T. 1: Fondy doradianskoho periodu* [State Archive of the Chernivtsi Region. Guidebook. Vol. 1: Repository of the Pre-Soviet Period], Kyiv-Chernivtsi, 2006, p. 189-192.

⁶³ Ioan-Aurel Pop, Ioan Bolovan (Coords.) *Istoriya Rumynii* [History of Romania], Moskva, Ves Mir, 2005, p. 354; Anatol Petrencu (Ed.), *O istorie...*, p. 193.

legislative-institutional unification, a process that could not be carried out suddenly, but the Romanian authorities gradually tried to extend the legislation of the Romanian Old Kingdom into new territories.

Due to the previous organization of Bessarabia's legal system according to the Russian model, the Russian notary system was not abolished immediately, but it underwent certain changes: writing documents in Romanian and employing secretaries who spoke the language, taking an oath of allegiance to the Romanian state no later than 3 months after confirmation by notaries, etc.

CONCLUSIONS

An important source on the history of the Khotyn area (Northern Bessarabia) is represented by sphragistic relics, which have not yet been the subject of a separate scientific study. Despite the large number of prints on documents, until recently, the actual matrices were practically unknown. Many of the seals found today date back to the interwar period, when the region was part of Romania.

In particular, thanks to the research of local-lore experts, it was possible to identify and process: the seal of Restea Ataci Village Parish of the Khotyn County (1918), the seal of the Khotyn Gendarme Company (1918–1929), the stamp of the Khotyn Siguranța Brigade (1922–1929), the seal of the Jewish Culture League (Kultur Lige) in Khotyn (from 1919 on), the seal of the Nedăbăuți Village Hall (1925–1930), the seal of notary S. Dobroselschi from Securenii of the Khotyn County. The material under scrutiny has a significant factual and illustrative potential, especially in museum work. It testifies that the activities of many organizations and institutions in the Khotyn area in the interwar period remain insufficiently studied or have not become the object of scientific research at all.

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FROM SILENCE TO FINDING A VOICE: EUROPE MOVING FROM RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE TO FREEDOM OF BELIEF

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Abstract: *This article will explore the problem of religious tolerance and freedom of belief through the opinions and thoughts of William Penn and analyse European peace as a proposed solution to these problems. Although Penn's analysis of the problem is positioned in its historical context and constitutes a solution model to the problems of his region and historical period, this analysis can also be tackled independently from its historical context, and it can shed light on solution proposals to certain problems of today. This study will discuss these problems based on Penn's evaluations of tolerance and freedom of belief, and because of these evaluations, a philosophical analysis of the ideal of European peace and European integration will be offered as a model by this author.*

Keywords: *William Penn, Europe, Peace, European Parliament, Religion*

Rezumat: *De la Tăcere la găsirea Vocii: Europa de la toleranța religioasă la libertatea de credință. Articolul explorează problema toleranței religioase și a libertății de credință, prin prisma opiniilor și gândurilor lui William Penn, propunându-și să analizeze ideea de Pace europeană. Deși analiza lui William Penn asupra chestiunii toleranței și libertății religioase se poziționează în acord cu un anumit context istoric, constituind un model de soluționare specific, abordarea sa poate constitui un model și pentru soluționarea problematicii contemporane. Articolul analizează sintetic problemele expuse, pe baza evaluărilor lui Penn privind toleranța și libertatea de credință. Pe baza respectivelor aprecieri, este efectuată o analiză filosofică a idealului păcii europene și al integrării europene, în viziunea acestui autor.*

INTRODUCTION

Philosophers and political philosophers have been trying to find an answer to the problem of what kind of connection there should be between religion, the state, religious toleration, and freedom of belief.¹ This study will benefit from Penn's opinions and thoughts, as one of the thinkers laying the ideational foundations of the Enlightenment philosophy, in analysing how this connection should be and what the proposed solution should be. There are different reasons for choosing Penn in this study. He defined religious belief as a person's relationship with God, freeing this concept from other reactions and endeavouring to guarantee freedom of belief as a "natural right". In addition, he either directly or indirectly studied the political philosophy of English philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), one of the philosophers who systematically dealt with the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the approach of "secularism",² his contemporary scholar Thomas Hobbes's (1598–1679) interpretation of combining religion and the state,³ as well as Spinoza's (1632–1677) and his successor Jean Jacques Rousseau's (1712–1778) idea that religion should be kept under the supervision and control of political power,⁴ and taking this into account, it becomes clear that Penn was a philosopher who had visionary, libertarian, and progressive ideas going beyond his era.

Penn's views and thoughts in question cannot be considered independently of the circumstances of the period in which he lived and his own life story. He lived in 17th- and 18th-century Britain, ruled by religious radicalism and sectarian conflicts. In George Wilhelm F. Hegel's (1770–1831) words, every philosopher is a "child of his time",⁵ reflecting the *Zeitgeist* of their era in some respects and, in this case, it becomes obvious that Penn's thoughts cannot be considered independently of the historical context in which he lived. In this regard, his views can be read as a practical solution model beyond a theoretical analysis of what or how the relationship between religion, the state, religious tolerance, and freedom of

¹ E. Gregory Wallace, *Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition*, in "Dickinson Law Review", Vol. 114, 2009, No. 2, pp. 485-570.

² John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University, 1988, p. 31.

³ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 253.

⁴ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and First and Second Discourses*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 180.

⁵ George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 36.

belief should be. This argument can be better understood in Penn's work, *The People's Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted, in the Trial of William Penn and William Mead* (1670),⁶ where he analyses this relationship as well as the sectarian conflicts and religious intolerance in England, on the one hand, and, on the other, his two other works titled *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace in Europe* (1693) and *Some Fruits of Solitude*, the study he wrote during his years of prison, persecution, and exile, indicating that not only political but also religious motives underlay what he had to endure.⁷

However, his views in question are not texts that can be evaluated solely and merely in their historical context. From this perspective, the abovementioned texts will be tackled as a historical record of both the historical period when Penn lived, in other words, 17th-century Continental Europe and particularly England, and as a source going beyond its historical and geographical contexts. Besides, one can read the opinions and thoughts in the texts to produce solutions to today's problems. For example, when Patrick Romanell utters that the first sign of a great work is that it can be read and understood without explaining specific historical conditions, he seems to point out the philosophical and intellectual importance of Penn's texts.⁸

Penn's philosophical, religious, and political views are directly related to his social background. This study will briefly investigate Penn's biography, the relationship he established between religion and knowledge, or between faith and reason, freedom of belief, religious tolerance and his political views opening the doors of European peace. It will be concluded that the idea of the European Parliament, which Penn put forward as a proposal, is related to Penn's personal characteristics, faith, and his view of religion and life.

A BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT FROM SILENCE TO FINDING A VOICE

William Penn was born in 1644, in London. His father was an Admiral. Although Admiral William Penn fought for the Parliament during the English Civil War (1642–1649), marked by divergence between two groups as the King's

⁶ Mary Maples Dunn, 'The Personality of William Penn', ed. Mary Maples Dunn-Richard S. Dunn, *The World of William Penn*, in "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society", Vol. 127, 1983, No. 5, pp. 316-321.

⁷ Marc Thommen, *William Penn-The Idea of Institutional Peacekeeping*, Cambridge, Trinity Hall, 2005, p. 24-25.

⁸ Patrick Romanell, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, New York, The Boss-Morril Company, 1955, p. 5.

supporters and the Parliament's followers, he changed sides and joined the ranks of King Charles II. Admiral Penn made sure that the soldiers under his command fight for King Charles II and thus the latter knighted him in 1660 and appointed him Vice-Admiral of England. England was transforming into a new Puritan England when William Penn was five years old. Although he was not old enough to comprehend those formations in detail, he noticed the developments and incidents taking place during the Civil War and evaluated them in the context of his own world.⁹

When he was nine years old, Penn started to study classical Greek and Latin. This education would later have a great impact on his thoughts and his writings.¹⁰ Later, for further studies, he enrolled in Moses Amyraunt's Protestant Academy in Saumur, France. It can be deduced that the education he received at the Academy for two years, the close relations of the sects in Saumur, the pluralistic approaches to religious issues, and the conversations, discussions, surveys, and his works during that time would have a lasting impact on Penn's efforts towards religious tolerance. However, Penn had to discontinue this education since London was infected with the Great Plague shortly after.¹¹ In the subsequent year, Penn joined the English in the fight against the Dutch under the command of Charles II. He helped his father on a battleship belonging to the English; and in 1667, he accompanied his comrade Lord Arran to suppress the rebellion in Carrickfergus, thus witnessing the war environment.¹² Meanwhile, he showed composure and courage in battle, and as a relic of this experience, he embroidered his picture on his armour.¹³

Penn went to Ireland in 1667 to manage his family estates. During this period, Penn attended a sermon by Thomas Loe in Cork, Ireland, and then converted to Quakerism.¹⁴

An Anglo-Saxon lawyer and poet, Penn was recognized as a Quaker leader

⁹ Charles H. Firth, *Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England*, Oxford, Fellow of Balliol College, 2018, p. 402.

¹⁰ Howard M. Jenkins, *The Family of William Penn*, in "The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography", Vol. 20, 1896, No. 2, p. 160.

¹¹ Kenneth R. Morris, *Theological Sources of William Penn's Concept of Religious Toleration*, in "Journal of Church and State", Vol. 35, 1993, No. 1, p. 83-111.

¹² Caroline Robbins, *The Papers of William Penn*, in "The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography", Vol. 93, 1969, No.1, p. 3-12.

¹³ Catherine Peare, *William Penn*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1956, p. 22.

¹⁴ Mary Maples Dunn, *The Personality of William Penn*, in "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society", Vol. 127, 1983, No. 5, p. 317.

who built a centre of moderate Christianity in Pennsylvania for Quakers emerging as a reformist movement against the Catholic Christian thought and other Christian minorities. Penn, who often accompanied Fox on his travels, is known for being an advocate of the Quakers' movement in both speech and writing, as well as the first Quaker theologian.¹⁵

Both Penn's personal spiritual experiences and a social revolt against his father, a Vice-Admiral Knight and member of English upper-class society, underlay Penn's decision to convert to Quakerism. Those and similar impositions of the class in question would later lay the groundwork for the fundamental ideas of Quakerism, and Penn's thoughts on religious tolerance, freedom of belief, and peacebuilding.

In 1669, Penn wrote a pamphlet articulating a critical approach to the belief in the Trinity in Christianity and for this reason he was arrested and imprisoned for the first time. The seven-month imprisonment in the Tower of London constituted the first step for him to develop an attitude prone to religious tolerance, freedom of conscience, and acting as a peace ambassador.¹⁶ This traumatic process, which deprived him of freedom, conduced him to write his masterpiece, *No Cross, No Crown*, and his work titled *Innocency with her Open Face*. Besides, in a letter he wrote to the Earl of Orrery, he stated that he had been arrested since a mayor could not tolerate his fundamental ideas for religious tolerance, freedom of belief and social peace, and it was not fair.¹⁷

In 1670, the repressions against Quakers were increased based on the "Conventicle Article".¹⁸ In this regard, authorities closed the meeting house belonging to Quakers on Gracechurch Street, London. In 1670, Penn and William Mead, a Quaker, were arrested for "holding unlawful meetings and disturbing the public peace" for preaching publicly in front of the meeting house on Gracechurch Street.¹⁹ The trial at the Old Bailey is described as a turning point for the history

¹⁵ Rupert S. Holland, *William Penn*, New York, Macmillan Company, 1915, p. 16.

¹⁶ Arlin M. Adams, Charles J. Emmerich, *William Penn and the American Heritage of Religious Liberty*, in "Journal of Law and Religion", Vol. 8, 1990, No.1-2, pp. 57-70.

¹⁷ Edmund S. Morgan, *The World and William Penn*, in "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society", Vol. 127, 1983, No. 5, pp. 291-315.

¹⁸ The Conventicle Article is an article enacted by the British Parliament that imposes a fine for attending religious meetings in a monastery outside the Church of England. John Noorthouck, *A New History of London Including Westminster and Southwark*, London, British History Online, 1773, p. 245.

¹⁹ Claudia Wair, *How Will "Liberal" Quakerism Face the 21st Century?*, in "Friends Journal", Vol. 43, 1997, No. 1, p. 12.

of English law. At this hearing, Penn contested the indictment with the support of his lawyer and friend, Thomas Rudyard. As a result of his objection, he convinced the jury that he and his friend, Mead, were innocent and that freedom of expression and religious tolerance were essential and they were acquitted by the jury.²⁰ However, the judges rejected the jury's verdict, found the two Quakers guilty, and even had the jury jailed. Nevertheless, the two Quakers and the Jury were found innocent on appeal, and King's Bench ruled that no jury could be punished for a decision not approved by the judges and that the imprisonment of the jury in this case was unlawful.²¹ Despite the tensions and the ongoing struggle, his father did not approve of his son's religious beliefs and political opinions.²² Written during that time, Penn's article entitled *The People's Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted in the Trial of William Penn and William Mead* (1670) revealed that "the procedures and decisions of the court were arbitrary". A year later, in 1671, Penn was again imprisoned for preaching to the people. He was imprisoned three more times between 1673 and 1678. As with previous arrests, these were related to religious tolerance.²³ In 1672, Penn married his first wife, Gulielma Springet. She died in 1694 and Penn married his second wife, Hannah Callowhill, a year and a half later, in March 1696.²⁴

One of the important developments that contributed to Penn's turning his thoughts into practice was the establishment of the American Colony of Pennsylvania. In 1680, he demanded land in America from King Charles II to cover Charles's debt to his father. In return, Penn was allocated a large piece of land in the northwest of Delaware in 1681 and King Charles II appointed him the supreme governor of this territory (Pennsylvania).²⁵ His main idea was to provide an overseas refuge based on religious tolerance, freedom of belief, and peace, for people like the Quakers who had been oppressed and persecuted for a long time.²⁶

²⁰ Arlin M. Adams, *William Penn and the American Heritage of Religious Liberty*, in "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society", Vol. 137, 1993, No. 4, pp. 516-523.

²¹ Kathryn Parke, *Sigrid Helliesen Lund on Quakerism, Adapted from Her Autobiography, Alltid Underveis*, in "Friends Journal", 1997, Vol. 43, No.1, p. 14.

²² Samuel M. Koenigsberg, *Jury Freedom and the Trial of Penn and Mead*, in "Friends Journal", Vol. 43, 1997, No.1, p. 17.

²³ Benedictus Spinoza, *Theologico-Political Treatise*, New York, Dover Publications, 2004, p. 207.

²⁴ Howard M. Jenkins, *The Family of William Penn: William Penn's First Marriage*, in "The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography", Vol. 20, 1896, No. 3, pp. 370-390.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 380.

²⁶ James William Frost, *Wear the Sword as Long as Canst: William Penn in Myth and History*,

The Pennsylvania Constitution provided democracy and rule of law, which were later essential for the European peace process. In order to establish the government and laws of this province and base them on solid foundations, it ordained the formation of a General Assembly consisting of free people elected for one year. According to the limits of the law, the government would consist of a Governor, free persons, a City Council, and the General Assembly that would perform all legislative actions, elect the incumbents, and handle executive public affairs.²⁷ Thus, the residents of Pennsylvania were granted comprehensive rights and freedoms guaranteed by law, such as religious tolerance, freedom of belief, and the rule of law. In addition, Penn's draft constitution was based on a strict rule of law, underlying the absence of arbitrary judicial decisions, procedural injustices, or gender discrimination (ensured by the delivery of a copy of the complaint to the defendant). In addition, no money or goods could be collected or paid by any of the people of the province through public taxes, customs, or contributions. To ensure this, it was necessary to pass a new law.²⁸ The provisions on restrictions on tax collection depended on a comprehensive understanding of the rule of law.²⁹ In this vein, Penn's liberal political views, understanding of tolerance, freedom of expression and belief were widely accepted. As evidence of this, it is worth noting what French philosopher Voltaire said: "William Penn might, with reason, boast of having brought down upon earth the Golden Age, which in all probability, never had any real existence but in his dominions".³⁰ The liberal principles and institutional provisions laid down for the Pennsylvania State System were later embodied in Penn's plan for European Peace.³¹ Indeed, it is possible to argue that those liberal principles that Penn advocated for laid the groundwork for later fundamental developments such as the social contract, freedom in the modern era, the right to be represented by legal and political institutions, the proprietary right defined broadly to include property, life and freedom, and the right to legal action in due form.³²

in "Explorations in Early American Culture", 2000, Vol. 4, p. 31.

²⁷ Howard M. Jenkins, *The Family of William Penn: William Penn's Second Marriage*, in "The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography", 1896, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 435-455.

²⁸ Marc Thommen, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³⁰ Isaac Sharpless, *The Quakers in the Revolution*, Philadelphia, Leach & Company, 1990, p. 49.

³¹ William Wistar Comfort, *William Penn's Religious Background*, in "The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography", Vol. 68, 1944, No. 4, p. 341.

³² Andrew R. Murphy, *Liberty, Conscience and Toleration: The Political Thought of William Penn*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 158.

He was accused of treason three times due to his relations with the former Crown.³³ In 1693, his former companions Lord Romney and Henry Sidney intervened, and he was finally proven innocent. He temporarily lost his status of Governor of Pennsylvania from 1692 to 1694 but was reinstated two years later.³⁴ More specifically, Penn wrote his works, *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace in Europe* (1693) and *Some Fruits of Solitude* during that period. Those and some other works by Penn were published anonymously due to some of his thoughts and his association with the former King. Penn died on July 30, 1718.³⁵

Based on Penn's biography, it is essential to investigate what he understood from religion/faith, to tackle the problem of what kind of relationship he established between faith and reason, and what sort of solution he proposed to this problem, to reveal the philosophical foundations of his ideas of religious tolerance, freedom of faith, and political liberty – which formed his world of thought.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PEACE: THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF REASON AND FAITH

In order to comprehend the philosophical foundations of Penn's views on religious tolerance, freedom of belief and politics, it is imperative to reveal his views on the essence of faith and the relationship he established between faith and reason. As part of those ideas, Penn referred to the concepts of heart and reason. Rather than denying the functionality of reason or adopting an irrational attitude towards it, he implied that reason was a faculty serving faith, putting faith, or heart, in the first place and reason in the second place in the relationship between reason and faith. In other words, he adopted a theological and philosophical approach arguing that metaphysical elements and truths could only be perceived and internalized through the heart rather than the mind. Penn's approach constituted the basis of religious epistemology, which formed his world of thought. His religious epistemology corresponds to moderate fideism, which is one of the prominent concepts in the philosophy of religion. In his understanding of moderate fideism, while reason performs its unique functions, the main function of faith is to comprehend the metaphysical elements. According to him, reason alone cannot perceive the metaphysical field. However, it is reason that can reveal the need

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

³⁴ John Pollock, *The Popish Plot: A study in the history of the reign of Charles II*, London, Duckworth and Co, 1903, p. 224.

³⁵ William Penn, *Some Fruits of Solitude*, London, Headley Brothers Printers, 1905, p. 511.

for reasonable grounds for the heart, that is, faith.³⁶

At the present stage, it is possible to say that Penn's discourses on religious faith are a fideist faith.³⁷ His belief was a supra-belief, beyond an act of belief contrary to reason. In his world of thought, faith is the testimony of God, who reveals a plan. In other words, faith is the most fundamental ability determining what a person should believe in and why. In addition, although reason is an important and valuable ability when it comes to knowledge, the most competent tool is faith. Faith is a result of revelation, and pure reason cannot override it. Therefore, Penn accepted revelation as a source of knowledge and prioritized faith in its relationship with reason. Concurrently, faith is the central concept when it comes to religion.³⁸

As it can be seen, Penn opens the door to a religious epistemology with philosophical foundations and pillars. In this context, Penn attached importance and value to freedom, implying the classical liberal political philosophy that expresses freedom as a right. Thus, his understanding of faith never ignored or denied freedom. In his opinion, faith cannot be characterized as completely independent of the concepts of reason and will. As a matter of fact, although it is the most important ability, faith is ultimately an approval of reason and an act of will. At this stage, will should not be subjected to any obligation. And this is one of the prerequisites of freedom. Compulsion and pressure for any acceptance are neither religiously acceptable nor mentally reasonable. Therefore, faith is not an activity beyond reason or will. A person's faith is associated with his decisions and a fundamental and natural area of freedom in which he will make this decision.³⁹ It is inevitable that this theoretical understanding will have a reflection in practice. In Penn's ideology, this is reflected as follows: one of the strongest elements that can move people to go from silence to freedom, from selfishness to altruism, is faith or freedom of conscience. In this respect, it is emphasized that both religious and political pressures should be removed in order to guarantee a person's faith. In his opinion, when it comes to reason and faith, the main concepts discussed are religious tolerance and freedom of belief. According to him, tolerance is the main motive that guarantees freedom of belief and lies in the background of his political opinion.⁴⁰

³⁶ William Penn, *No Cross No Crown*, Ohio, Market Street Fellowship, 2017, pp. 7-9, 24-33.

³⁷ For fideism, see Thomas Carroll, *The Traditions of Fideism*, in "Religious Studies", Vol. 44, 2008, No. 1, pp. 1-22.; Eleanor Helms, *The Objectivity of Faith Kierkegaard's Critique of Fideism*, in "Res Philosophica", Vol. 90, 2013, No. 4, pp. 439-460.

³⁸ William Penn, *op. cit.*, pp.18-52, 85-87.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 98, 107, 330.

⁴⁰ Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *The Atlantic in World History*, Oxford, Oxford University

THE DOOR TO EUROPEAN PEACE: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND FREEDOM OF BELIEF

Penn played an important role in the recognition of freedom of belief and religious tolerance as fundamental elements of early modern political thought. Its influence constantly increased and gained wide acceptance from a philosophical and sociological point of view.⁴¹ In this regard, what underlies his understanding of freedom of faith is a number of principles: to make sure individuals or groups perform their divine services, to create an area of freedom in order to resolve issues emerging in the public sphere via conscientious methods, and, in the same vein, to create tangible principles for civil and religious freedom. Penn both established and experienced the relationship between the theoretical principles and the practice of freedom of faith. From this perspective, it can be stated that he went beyond evaluating freedom of faith and religious tolerance based on the rights of individual conscience. Penn built his thoughts in this regard through an established government. The fact that he produced his philosophical and political theories in England and performed his public duties or the theoretical application of his theories in America both sheds light on the Transatlantic context of early modern political thought and reveals his originality. Penn's Atlantic perspective helps to make sense of his sophisticated political thinking and his interaction with the exercise of this political power.⁴²

The colony that Penn founded in Pennsylvania was home to a variety of religious beliefs and forms of worship practiced by settlers of various ethnic and linguistic groups. The broad religious and cultural coexistence here, as well as tolerance, can be expressed because of Penn's philosophical and political thoughts.⁴³ This new and different perspective formed the ideological basis for pluralistic understanding. Underlying Penn's view of religious tolerance and freedom of belief, this understanding also paved the way for the peace perspective in Europe. As a matter of fact, freedom of belief and the humanistic approach to faith and practice that he envisioned in the colony in question were shaped around the tolerating

Press, 2012, p. 38.

⁴¹ Andrew R. Murphy, *The Emergence of William Penn, 1668–1671*, in "Journal of Church and State", Vol. 57, 2015, No. 2, pp. 333-359.

⁴² Andrew R. Murphy, *William Penn Political Writings*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021, p. 3-6.

⁴³ Sally Schwartz, *Society and Culture in the Seventeenth Century Delaware Valley*, in "Delaware History", 1982, Vol. 20, p. 98-122.

approach of different nations to each other and the role of the state in these matters.

Penn claimed that individuals constituted “the great principle of God in man” and “the root and fountain of the divine substance” without the means of priests, preachers or liturgies and that they could themselves comprehend and feel God.⁴⁴ In his opinion, the knowledge of God is individual and cannot be judged by someone else. In this respect, he emphasized that every individual, being aware of his own responsibilities, can find the way of salvation and the Truth as a result of a free individual search. Penn draws attention to one of the basic characteristics of religious tolerance and freedom of belief by stating that every individual has the right to live or worship according to their style of belief. This understanding emerged as a result of the persecutions that Penn and his Quaker friends were subjected to, as well as their religious views.⁴⁵

In the pamphlets written especially after 1670, Penn put forward this theme in a strong and emphatic way. In these works, he propounded his arguments in a more sophisticated manner. He strived to highlight the philosophical, theological, and moral foundations of tolerance and freedom of belief, as well as historical examples that demonstrated the wisdom of respecting individual beliefs. He discussed these thoughts in his works such as *The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience* (1670), *England's Present Interest* (1675), *An Address to Protestants of All Persuasions* (1679), and *A Persuasive to Moderation* (1686).⁴⁶ In these works, Penn criticized the English government's harsh treatment of Quakers and underlined the need that the government should cease labelling only a certain group as “the most Christian or reasonable” and, instead, adopt a prudent attitude and tolerate everyone at the same level. In this context, he defined freedom of faith as follows: beyond an ideational freedom that is about whether to believe in a principle and tenet or not, freedom of belief is a theoretical background to realize a way of worship, where the individual can be at peace, happy and free. Referring to a relationship between reason and faith centered upon faith, Penn criticized impositions such as “coercion, restriction and persecution” with regard to philosophical, theological and moral issues⁴⁷ and attitudes such as punishing those who do not

⁴⁴ Clarence-Rufus J. Rivers, *Freeing the Spirit: Very Personal Reflections on One Man's Search for the Spirit in Worship*, in “U. S. Catholic Historian”, Vol. 19, 2001, No. 2, pp. 95-143.

⁴⁵ Sally Schwartz, *William Penn and Toleration: Foundations of Colonial Pennsylvania*, in “Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies”, Vol. 50, 1983, No. 4, p. 284-285.

⁴⁶ William C. Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*, London, MacMillan, 1912, p. 44.

⁴⁷ Sally Schwartz, *William Penn and Toleration*, p. 285.

believe in some desired doctrine. Penn's argument clearly reveals that imposition is contrary to reason, nature, and morality. According to him, the state should not assume the responsibility or imperative to form the divine prerogative, beliefs, or forms of worship. This coercion would create deep wounds in areas such as justice, tolerance, freedom of belief, and peace. The reason for this, as he argued, is that coercion contradicts reason, spirit, and conscience.⁴⁸

Grounded on his thoughts shaped around the concepts of reason, faith and conscience, Penn criticized some of the principles and practices of the Roman Catholic Church. Since the teachings and practices of the Church formed a whole connected to a uniform structure and all those teachings and practices were closed to questioning or criticism, the Church fell outside the scope of Penn's approach to tolerance and freedom of belief. As a matter of fact, according to Penn, if faith was based on oppression and blind obedience, then so would the individual, society, and even the state; and in this case there could be no talk of tolerance or freedom. He, therefore, decided to found a Colony beyond the English territory in order to build religious tolerance and freedom of belief, which he envisioned from philosophical, theological, and moral points of view. This Colony included immigrants of Dutch, French, and German origins.⁴⁹ Penn made an effort to gather people of different nationalities and countries under one roof in the Colony he was going to build. His interest in this effort was to destroy uniformity and, instead, to spread the understanding of tolerance. According to him, intolerance was a cause of instability and disorder. He claimed that such an understanding did not exist in the Christian faith, that Christianity basically opened the door to religious diversity and tolerance that embraced all humanity. He underlined the need to bring forward and spread the broad and inclusive understanding of tolerance in Christianity and the European world. In this regard, Penn highlighted that it was essential to prevent marginalization of people due to faith, while building an area of freedom of faith where individuals would not be subject to any penalty or stigma due to religious nonconformity. This understanding of tolerance and freedom of belief advocated by Penn constitutes the basis of prosperity, security, and peace.⁵⁰

Penn argued that the right to religious freedom based on religious tolerance and freedom of conscience was fundamental and inalienable. Due to this thought, he lived in poverty, he was sentenced to prison and, at times, he led an unhealthy

⁴⁸ Andrew R. Murphy, *The Emergence of William Penn, 1668–1671*, p. 340.

⁴⁹ William C. Braithwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁵⁰ Martin I. Griffin, *William Penn, the Founder of Religious Liberty in America*, in "The American Catholic Historical Researches", Vol. 17, 1990, No. 4, p. 171-173.

life. However, he still did not compromise on his approach to religious freedom as the basis of both his philosophical and political views as well as European peace. Hence, he spent his entire life defending an understanding in which religious tolerance and freedom of belief would prevail in a free society.⁵¹

A PROPOSAL TO ACHIEVE LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

William Penn was an idealist who set peace and tolerance as his goals. Thinking that religion and politics were different spheres and had different consequences, Penn put forward a belief based on individual rights, leaving aside discourses such as the divine right of Kings, and rejected administrative models forcing people against their will. Valuing democracy and representative government, Penn also kept popular will above everything. In addition, Penn alleged that persecution and war prevented many positive developments in the world and dreamed of Earth as a place where people could live in peace. Indeed, he noted that while war caused people to die, on the one hand, it also led to waste of resources, on the other. According to Penn, if a single consensus was achieved in society, wars would end and everything causing injustice would disappear.⁵²

In this regard, Penn said that the way to achieve lasting peace in Europe was through consensus, aiming to unite Europe under one roof. As a matter of fact, Europe had suffered economic, political, military, and psychological damage and experienced crises due to the wars resulting from the power struggle between the European states. Thus, he sought ways to pursue a pro-peace policy in Europe.⁵³ For this purpose, Penn proposed the establishment of a European Confederation of Parliaments. Influenced and inspired by Hugo Grotius, he proposed that the European Parliament would meet regularly. Each member state in the Parliament would act jointly against a state that threatened and harmed peace. The idea of the European Parliament would aim to achieve lasting peace in Europe. In addition, he made this proposal to make war between the European states unnecessary and impossible.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Andrew R. Murphy, *The Emergence of William Penn, 1668–1671*, p. 342.

⁵² Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, London, Pearson Education, 1995, p. 26.

⁵³ Marc Thommen, *William Penn-The Idea of Institutional Peacekeeping*, p. 37.

⁵⁴ James William Frost, *William Penn's Experiment in the Wilderness: Promise and Legend*, in "The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography", Vol. 107, 1983, No. 4, p. 578.

Looking for ways to resolve the conflicts in the world by nonviolent methods, William Penn believed that the European Parliament would end the disputes among rulers, as well as between rulers and the people. According to him, problems could be solved not by force, but by justice. For this purpose, Penn focused on considerations such as creating an assembly of authorized persons who would meet regularly, listen to all complaints, and make fair decisions. Attaching great importance to mutual understanding and dialogue, Penn believed that this would only be possible with a Parliament to be established in Europe. He did not want to leave the task of resolving disputes to rulers and opposed the diplomatic activities where kings and other rulers met secretly, arguing that secret negotiations caused wars and conflicts. Furthermore, he stressed that if there was a problem, rulers called to solve the problem should work for Europe independently, not as the representatives of the state.⁵⁵

In this context, Penn strived to build the European Parliament by considering all the details and said that states that were not of equal size should not have an equal number of members in the European Parliament. Instead, he suggested that the number of members in the Parliament must depend on the economic wealth of states. Penn also stated that Parliament decisions needed to be made by majority of votes. In addition, he said that the languages to be used in the Parliament should be Latin and French. The fact that he did not see the need for the English language in the Parliament testifies to his fairness and impartiality.⁵⁶ He suggested the Parliament should consist of 90 members in total with 12 members from Germany, 10 from France, 10 from Spain, 8 from Italy, 6 from England, 3 from Portugal, 4 from Sweden, 3 from Denmark, 4 from Poland, 3 from Venice, 4 from Seven Provinces, 13 from Cantons, 2 from Small Neighbouring Sovereign Dominions, 1 from the Duchy of Holstein, and 1 from the Duchy of Courland. Penn also argued that it was possible to create joint electoral areas due to the existence of small countries in the Parliament. He suggested that the Parliament would convene every year or every three years and take decisions by a majority of 3/4 votes in order to prevent corruption.⁵⁷ Emphasizing that the greater the number of members in the Parliament, the easier peace would be established, and advocating

⁵⁵ William. M. Russels, *William Penn and the Peace of Europe*, in "Medicine, Conflict and Survival", Vol. 20, 2004, No. 1, p. 23.

⁵⁶ William Penn, *An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe (1693)*, In Andrew R. Murphy (Ed.), *William Penn Political Writings*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021. pp. 344-362.

⁵⁷ Caroline Robbins, *The Efforts of William Penn to Lay a Foundation for Future Ages*, in "Aspects of American Liberty", Vol. 16, 1977, No. 4, p. 70.

religious tolerance, Penn said that it was possible to include Turks and Russians in the Parliament as well. The reason for this is that Penn believed that bringing together as many states as possible would ensure a long-lasting peace.⁵⁸ In fact, the only reason for Penn to see the Ottoman Empire in the Parliament was not to build a union. At the same time, he wanted to end the Ottoman-Habsburg Wars that had been going on for many years. Indeed, the wars had led to the loss of many lives and the destruction of social and economic life. However, he advocated that if states benefited from diplomacy instead of war, they would be able to recognize that justice was stronger than wars. As a matter of fact, war was unfair for people. Thus, he deemed the need for establishing rules of justice to ensure peace and order. In this way, the value of Christians would increase in the eyes of Muslims, as well.⁵⁹

As it can be understood, the concept of justice occupied an important place in Penn's discourses. According to him, justice was essential in building peace. In addition, Penn suggested that peace was productive. In that, if there was peace in the international system, people's property would be protected, security would be ensured along with stability. Conversely, war is destructive and brings death, poverty, and misery to humanity. That is why it is essential to ensure peace. And the only way to protect peace is by justice, which is the fruit of government. Indeed, the core of the government is society, and the core of society is consent. The government is needed as an instrument of justice.⁶⁰

In the event of the formation of the expected international organization as the European Parliament proposed by William Penn, the probability of war between the states will decrease. Men who would otherwise join the army in case of war would benefit society by joining the labour force in the absence of war. This would also prevent many people from dying, and the people left behind from being harmed. If war is prevented, economic costs of war would be saved, and damage on cities and regions by armed conflict would be prevented, while immoral practices such as espionage would also end. Besides, Penn also thought that education was another fundamental element to ensure the happiness and well-being of society. According to him, educating and raising society in a country in the

⁵⁸ Peter Van den Dungen, *The plans for European peace by Quaker authors William Penn (1693) and John Bellers (1710)*, in "Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades", Vol. 16, 2014, No. 32, p. 63.

⁵⁹ Neta C. Crawford, *The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships*, in "International Security", Vol. 24, 2000, No. 4, pp. 116-156.

⁶⁰ Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1992, p. 2.

proper way would make sure that the future generations benefit that society.⁶¹

At the same time, William Penn also referred to the criticism against his proposals for the European Parliament and tried to come up with solutions. Accordingly, the most powerful and richest countries would not accept this plan. On the contrary, he argued that other states needed to force those countries in order to achieve lasting peace in Europe. Nonetheless, one of the reasons for the possibility of states not accepting this plan would be the concern for the loss of sovereignty. States would not want to lose their sovereignty. Penn, however, said that there was no sovereignty over the sovereign in the international system, while the system was defined by an understanding where big fish eat little fish. He propounded that this order would disappear with the adoption of his proposed plan.⁶²

Penn was one of the first to propose an organization to achieve a lasting peace in Europe. Penn's proposals seem like an old-fashioned version of the Council of Europe when compared to today's European institutions. It is important to note that Penn made this proposal two centuries before European states were ready for such structuring. After Penn, many other thinkers also proposed the creation of an organization that would ensure lasting peace in Europe. Abbot Pierre, for example, proposed an assembly of states to institutionalize cooperation among European states in his work *Plan for the Perpetual Peace*, published in 1713. Pierre, who divided the rules adopted among the rulers into two basic and important rules to ensure peace in Europe, argued that there would be no change in the rules unless the state in question accepted them, and that for important rules, a 3/4 majority would be sufficient.⁶³ In their work *The Reorganization of European Society*, published in 1814, Henry Saint Simon and Augustin Thierry stated that European patriotism would be formed by an organization to ensure lasting peace in Europe.⁶⁴

Immanuel Kant, in his work *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, said that a federation should be established to achieve lasting peace in Europe, and that the basic condition for the establishment of this federation was the republic. Kant

⁶¹ Wayne Mac Veagh, *William Penn*, in "The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography", Vol. 1, 1877, No. 4, p. 365.

⁶² Vladimir Kreck, *European Identity Concepts and the European Idea*, in "Journal of Inter-cultural Studies", Vol. 45, 2015, p. 125.

⁶³ Céline Spector, *Who is the Author of the Abstract of Monsieur l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre's 'Plan for Perpetual Peace'? From Saint-Pierre to Rousseau*, in "History of European Ideas", Vol. 39, 2013, No. 3, pp. 371-393.

⁶⁴ Henri Saint Simon, Augustin, Thierry, *The Reorganisation of European Society*, New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 30.

did not limit himself to Europe, but proposed a global federation that included all republics.⁶⁵ Constantin Frantz also proposed a European federation based on Christianity. The states within this structure would depend on the organization to decide their own internal affairs in matters such as foreign policy and war.⁶⁶ As it can be seen, the organizational structure Penn proposed to ensure lasting peace in Europe inspired thinkers and European political philosophy after him.

CONCLUSIONS

Penn's analysis of political philosophy is mainly based on the concepts of tolerance and freedom of belief, and discussions on the subject focus on the meaning assigned to these concepts and their framework. As a general conclusion, it can be uttered that Penn's view of the issue had a practical purpose in finding a solution to the clash of religions and sectarian conflicts of his time. From this perspective, Penn's fundamental aim was to found tolerance and freedom of belief and, beyond delineating the boundaries of these concepts – in other words, rather than merely philosophizing –, he aimed to place tolerance and freedom of belief at the centre of the relations between groups of people with different opinions and beliefs, while also trying to establish a peaceful environment. In this regard, the meaning and importance of Penn's struggle can be better understood⁶⁷ considering that the most common type of intolerance witnessed throughout history has been religious intolerance by individuals and societies against others with different opinions and beliefs and that "the history of tolerance is primarily the history of the struggle against religious intolerance and persecution". Thus, it is necessary to read his thoughts first as criticism of and proposed solution to the religious intolerance of his period.

As a matter of fact, Penn's analysis of tolerance and freedom of belief offers a religious view. It is possible to understand this view from the fact that Penn includes atheists, for example, in the category of those who cannot be tolerated. However, his analysis of this issue should also be evaluated in their historical context and interpreted pragmatically. As a matter of fact, he did not ignore the social

⁶⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1795, p. 79.

⁶⁶ Arno Carl Coutinho, *The Federalism of Karl Marlo and Konstantin Frantz*, in "Political Science Quarterly", Vol. 53, 1938, No. 3, pp. 400-422.

⁶⁷ Susan Mendus, *Toleration and The Limits of Liberalism*, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press International, 1989, p. 6.

norms of the period in which he lived. We can deduce this from the understanding that atheists or those who ignored other beliefs would not be tolerated. According to him, those who completely ignored other beliefs or God were not be tolerated because they lacked the moral virtues that guaranteed civil society. He implied that ignoring other beliefs and God, even in thought, would cause everything to fall and that discourses, agreements, and even oaths that maintained, consolidated, and strengthened the ties between individuals and societies would not be effective on such people. Although the relationship that Penn put forward between moral merits and belief in God is the subject of another discussion, it is possible to state that Penn included these people in the category of intolerable ones not on religious grounds, but rather on secular grounds. Penn's attitude towards Catholics can be shown as the basis for this determination.

When tackling Penn's opinions in the context of the historical period he lived in and the problems he tried to solve, even though it might seem logical and excusable to regard his analysis as having solely religious content to some extent at first sight, he expressed tolerance and freedom of belief as characteristics of the Quakers in one sense and constantly tried to build the topic around religion, while he did not systematically refer to equality and freedom, which are the more central concepts of philosophy, and did not explain non-religious intolerance examples in detail, all of which justify the criticism targeting him to a certain extent. Besides, one of the deadlocks in his opinions is that while he explained tolerance and freedom of belief based on political and religious authority, he always focused on the intolerance of the government and ignored intolerant practices that both individuals and groups might impose on each other. Perhaps for this reason, Penn's understanding of tolerance remained tangent to the centre of modern liberalism.

He did not systematically propose any religious, philosophical, or even political justification. Instead, he drew attention to the harmful consequences of intolerance. Penn mostly emphasized an understanding that would not disrupt the social structure and would not endanger civil rights. Indeed, wars would disrupt the social structure and corrupt society, causing backwardness. For this purpose, he deemed it necessary to create a progressive and libertarian society to ensure lasting peace between states. In fact, the European Parliament proposed by Penn was also a result of this situation. Penn claimed that the European Parliament would ensure peace, justice, and tolerance and end monotony in Europe. Believing that the more states participated in the Parliament, the more peace and tolerance would spread, Penn mainly wanted to include Turks and Russians in the Parliament due to his religious tolerance.

However, Penn's understanding of tolerance and freedom of belief can be criticized for opening the door to the irrationality of intolerance. Penn tried to base the irrationality of intolerance on the one hand on the system of religious belief and on the other hand on the epistemic nature of men.

Penn's views on tolerance can be criticized for reasons such as mostly having a religious content, relatively restricting the scope of tolerance and imposing an instrumental function on tolerance. However, his emphatic approach to the need to protect faith from all kinds of external interference and to guarantee one's freedom of belief carries a remarkable essence. It is also important that he endeavoured to impose some restrictions on religious and political power through freedom of belief and clearly distinguished their areas of authority. With this approach, Penn contributed to both the development and the secularization process of the liberal state by separating the political and religious powers and securing the freedom of belief. In conclusion, if secularism is expressed as securing the freedom of faith and protecting the field of faith from the coercion of both religious and political authorities, it should be underlined that we owe a lot to Penn, who had called out to us centuries ago.

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THE GRANITE REVOLUTION: A ROLE MODEL OR A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

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Abstract: *The events that took place on Kyiv's Maidan in 1991 went down in history as the 'Revolution on Granite'. It was one of the first student performances in the USSR. Over the years, however, the revolution lost part of its name because, as Oles Donii* himself recalls, the full name of the events he helped organise was 'Student Revolution on Granite'. However, the activity of young people was not rewarded, and the opposition, together with the Communists, raised the age for running for election to the Verkhovna Rada, which clearly destroyed the careers of young activists. The authors of the article try to show not only little-known facts from the history of Ukraine's systemic transformation, but also the changes that the revolution brought about in Ukraine's political system. The authors mainly use methods of source analysis, often a little-known position, which undoubtedly positively affects the cognitive value of the article.*

Keywords: *Revolution, Youth, Protests, Soviet Union, Ukraine, Maidan.*

Rezumat: *Revoluția pe Granit: un rol model sau o oportunitate ratată. Evenimentele care au avut loc pe Maidanul din Kiev în 1991 au rămas în istorie ca „Revoluția pe granit”, în fapt fiind vorba despre una dintre primele spectacole studențești din URSS. De-a lungul anilor însă, revoluția și-a pierdut o parte din nume pentru că, așa cum își amintește însuși Oles Donii, numele complet al evenimentelor la a căror organizare a contribuit a fost*

Copyright © 2023 “Codrul Cosminului”, XXIX, 2023, No. 1, p. 53–72.

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„Revoluția studențească pe granit”. Cu toate acestea, activitatea tinerilor nu a fost răsplătită, iar opoziția, împreună cu comuniștii, a ridicat vârsta de candidatură la alegerile pentru Rada Supremă, ceea ce a distrus în mod clar cariera politică a tinerilor activiști. Autorii articolului încearcă să prezinte nu numai fapte puțin cunoscute din istoria transformării sistemice a Ucrainei, ci și schimbările pe care revoluția le-a adus în sistemul politic al țării. Sunt folosite în principal metode de analiză a surselor, adesea puțin cunoscute, fapt care, fără îndoială, aduc un plus valorii cognitive a articolului.

INTRODUCTION

The 1991 revolution in Ukraine is the least known political uprising in the history of modern Ukraine, although it was unique in the region of the countries that were part of the USSR. In order to understand the process of national and state formation in modern Ukraine, it is necessary to delve into the period when, despite the totalitarian system, young people were the first to express their dissatisfaction with the socio-political situation in socialist Ukraine. The authors of the article would like to draw attention to the thesis of the work, which is: the generational conflict inhibited pro-democratic social changes in the Ukrainian SSR. It is worth noting that the only academic works dealing comprehensively with the issue of student protests in Ukraine are the Ukrainian-language articles by Luydmila Yuzva,¹ Vitaliy Kulyk² and Nadiya Popyk.³ Also abroad, the Polish language monograph⁴ by

¹ Luydmila Yuzva, *Student-s'ka molod' pro sotsial'ni revolyutsiyi v Ukrayini pochatku XXI stolittya (za rezul'tatamy analizu avtobiohrafichnykh tekstiv)* [Students Youth about Social Revolutions in Ukrainian in the beginning of the 21st century (by the results of the autobiography texts)], in “Visnyk of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University. Series Sociological Studies of Contemporary Society: Methodology, Theory, methods”, 2015, No. 1148, pp. 140-146.

² Vitalii Kulyk, *Revoliutsiia na hraniti: bunt pokolinnia 1990-kh* [Revolution on Granite: Rebellion of the 90s Generation], 03.10.2017, in <https://hvylya.net/analytics/history/revolyutsiya-na-graniti-bunt-pokolinnya-1990-h.html>.

³ Nadiia Popyk, *Studentskyi rukh Ukrainy v umovakh zmahannia za yii derzhavnu nezalezhnist* [The Student Movement of Ukraine in the conditions of the struggle for state independence], in “Naukovi zapysky z ukrainskoi istorii. Zbirnyk naukovykh statei”, Vol. 44, 2018, pp. 99-104.

⁴ Mateusz Kamionka, *Wzory zmiany społeczno-politycznej w świadomości ukraińskich studentów po 1991 roku* [Patterns of Socio-Political Change in the Minds of Ukrainian Students after 1991], Warszawa, Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2022.

Mateusz Kamionka, articles by Hurska-Kowalczyk⁵ and English language publications by Tom Junes,⁶ Christine Emeran⁷ and Nadia M. Diuk.⁸

The paper should present two key theoretical concepts for the scope of the research. The first is the concept of 'generation', seen especially from a social point of view, and the second is 'conflict' in society. A generation is understood in historical terms, i.e. as a community of attitudes and a hierarchy of values, and is used to refer to less tangible, more subjective characteristics, such as life wisdom and experience, which are nevertheless shared by wider communities. Note that in this sense the term is close to, but not identical with, the concepts of age group and social category.⁹ A generation understood in this way is, as Piotr Sztompka¹⁰ points out, not a community but a collective behaviour – a form of activity less complex than collective actions, social movements and organised actions. They are characterised by a lack of common goals and coordination, a lack of orientation towards social change and a lack of institutionalisation. However, the emergence of the generation phenomenon can allow these characteristics to emerge and thus the transition from collective behaviour to higher levels of organisation.

Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, in an article intended to provide an overview and synthesis of the meanings of the term conflict, suggest (without providing their own definition) that conflict should be understood in behavioural terms, as a particular system of interactions, which we will call conventionally hostile interactions.¹¹ Vilhelm Aubert, for example, defines conflict differently,

⁵ Liana Hurska-Kowalczyk, *Studencka "Rewolucja Na Granicie" w Kontekście Przemian Społeczno-Politycznych w Ukraińskiej Socjalistycznej Republice Radzieckiej* [Student 'Revolution on Granite' in the Context of Social and Political Changes in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic], in "Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne", 2014, No. 4, p. 197, <https://doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2014.4.11>.

⁶ Tom Junes, *Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity: A Case Study of Student Protest as a Catalyst for Political Upheaval*, in "Critique & Humanism", Vol. 46, 2016, No. 2, pp. 73–96.

⁷ Christine Emeran, *New Generation Political Activism in Ukraine 2000–2014*, London, Routledge, 2017.

⁸ Nadia M. Diuk, *The Next Generation in Russia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Youth, Politics, Identity, and Change*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.

⁹ Andrzej Klimczuk, *Kapitał społeczny ludzi starych na przykładzie mieszkańców miasta Białystok* [Social Capital of Old People on the Example of Inhabitants of the City of Białystok], Lublin, Wiedza i Edukacja, 2012, p. 19–23.

¹⁰ Piotr Sztompka, *Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa* [Sociology. Society Analysis], Kraków, Znak, 2002, pp. 175, 154, 173.

¹¹ Raymond W. Mack, Richard C. Snyder, *The Analysis of Social Conflict. Toward an Overview*

using psychological terms. For him, conflict is a kind of mental tension between the parties, open antagonism, hostility. And he distinguishes the conflict from its basis, which he sees as the conditions of the system, the whole social structure. Hence the concept of potential conflict.¹² Clinton Fink wanted to combine the two meanings of the term. He formulated a definition that would allow for a broad theory of social conflict: "Social conflict is any situation or process in which two or more social entities are related by at least one of the psychological antagonistic relations or at least one of the antagonistic interactions".¹³

But the most important thing is the combination of both parts in the 'conflict of generations', which influenced the political and social situation of Ukrainians at the time of the slow collapse of totalitarian power. During the protests, there were not many opportunities for young people to realise their dreams. The official communist youth political organisation, *Komsomol*, was no longer attractive to young people. Nationalist and national opportunities were one of the possible ideological choices, more attractive as they were pro-independence, and such actions fit in with Margaret Mead's¹⁴ anthropological and cultural concept as a manifestation of configurative culture, characterised by generational conflict, young people's conscious resignation from existing ideals and the search for others. The social sciences have long drawn attention to the fact that the young generation is looking for its own way. For example, Maria Braun Gałkowska argues that young people formulate their own world view, norms and values and acquire social skills.¹⁵ It should also be stressed that the 90s were a new era for the style of protests and revolutions, not only in Ukraine. In most of the earlier protests, the proletariat¹⁶ was the form of manifestation, which had the 'monopoly' on protesting in most of the countries in the region. However, as early as the 90s this situation changed, the new protesters were mostly youth (students), women and people from the global south living on the edge of survival.

and *Synthesis*, in "The Journal of Conflict Resolution", Vol. I, 1957, No. 1, pp. 211 – 248.

¹² Vilhelm Aubert, *Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and Conflict Resolution*, in "The Journal of Conflict Resolution", 1963, vol. VII, nr 1, pp. 26 – 42.

¹³ Clinton Fink, *Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict*, in "The Journal of Conflict Resolution", Vol. 12, 1968, nr. 4, pp. 412 – 460.

¹⁴ Margaret Mead, *Kultura i tożsamość. Studium dystansu międzypokoleniowego* [Culture and Commitment. Intergenerational Distance Study], Warszawa, 1978, pp. 25-147.

¹⁵ Maria Braun-Gałkowska, *Who would like to have a year without spring*, in T. Ożoga (Editor), *Social Sciences about Youth*, Lublin, 1974, pp. 146-159.

¹⁶ Most of the revolutionary power in the former 'Communist' countries was based on the proletariat before 90s, like the Polish 'Solidarność' (Solidarity) movement, etc.

The groups which were active had nothing to lose, the proletariat at that time already changed their social situation on economic grounds, as well as political attitudes. That is why it was students who started the revolution on Kyiv Maidan, not workers, whom a lot of politics from system opposition believed in as the main political power. Opposition political leaders thought that the worsening economic situation in the USSR would cause workers' strikes and create similar protest movements as it had happened in other countries in the region, like the 'Solidarność' (Solidarity) movement in Poland.

'STUDENT' REVOLUTION ON GRANITE

At the beginning of September 1990, two problems were at the centre of public attention and political life in Ukraine – the conclusion of a new Union Treaty and the distribution of forces in the national parliament and its prospects for development. Consideration of other issues, which were periodically raised at rallies, pickets and other political actions of the opposition (the creation of a separate Ukrainian army, the dismantling of monuments to Vladimir Lenin, etc.), and demonstrations of force by the official authorities were usually only an excuse to talk “about the main thing”. Political tension in society grew. On 15 September, a meeting of representatives of strike, labour and trade union committees of Ukraine decided to hold an all-Ukrainian one-day warning political strike on 1 October.¹⁷ On the 30th of September there was a kind of test of strength of the opposition. According to them, 100–120 thousand people took part in the big demonstration.¹⁸ Journalists, who also attended the rally, were less optimistic: “We didn't understand where 30 000 demonstrators had disappeared to, if even the queue at the Khreschatyk cafe was shorter than usual... As we predicted, the demonstrators picketed the Verkhovna Rada. We didn't count 30 000, obviously, there wasn't even half of that number.”¹⁹ According to the party authorities, only up to 15 000 people were able to take

¹⁷ Vitalii Kulyk, Tetiana Holobutska, Oleksii Holobutskyi, *Moloda Ukraina: suchasnyi orhanizovanyi molodizhnyi rukh ta neformalna initsiatyva. Doslidzhennia* [Young Ukraine: contemporary youth movement and informal movements. Research], Kyiv, 2000, p. 156-157.

¹⁸ Oleksii Haran, *Ubyty drakona: z istoriyi Rukhu ta novykh partiy Ukrayiny* [To Kill the Dragon: From the History of the Rukh and New Parties of Ukraine], Kyiv, 1993, p. 125.

¹⁹ *Proba syl? Korrespondenty "Komsomolskoho znameny" dyktuiut s Kreshchatyka* [Test of strength? Correspondents of 'Komsomol flag' dictate from Khreshchatyk], in “Komsomolskoe znamia”, 1990, 2 oktiabria, p. 3.

part in the opposition rally and demonstration, the majority of whom came from the western regions of the republic.

On the decisive day for the opposition – 1 October 1990 –, 10 000 people out of 25 million workers took part in the all-Ukrainian strike throughout the republic, according to official data. Faced with these statistics, analysts at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine were optimistic: “This testifies both to the possibilities of active explanatory work by party committees, Soviet bodies and the mass media, and to the fact that common sense is beginning to prevail over collective passions.”²⁰

It should be admitted that it was indeed an extremely painful defeat for the opposition, which demonstrated, on the one hand, a significant degree of inertia in the course of political processes in the republic, the maintenance of a certain control of the power structures over the formation of public opinion and manifestations of social activity, and, on the other hand, the organisational weakness of the democratic forces, their lack of a broad social base. The defeat of the October strike had to be recognised at the 5th Congress of the Rukh by Viacheslav Chornovil, who declared: “it was a huge mistake.”²¹ Within the opposition itself, there were huge divisions as to what the future of Ukraine should look like, some of the old activists believing that it should last within the framework of the Soviet Union and younger activists that it should be independent. However, they were united by the opinion that the student youth were clearly too ‘radical’ in their views.

The student youth, however, saved the opposition from a real political knockout. On 2 October, representatives of the Ukrainian Student Union (USU) and the Student Brotherhood (mostly from the Lviv region) began a political hunger strike in the capital’s October Revolution Square. On the first day of the action, 119 students and 120 volunteers took part. Most of them were students from Lviv, but there were also 37 students from Kyiv.²² It should be emphasised

²⁰ Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'iednan' Ukrainy (hereinafter: **TsDAHOU** [Central State Archives of Public Organizations of Ukraine], Fund 1, Inv. 32, F. 2768 – Informatsiia Sekretariatu TsK KPU “Pro rozvytok politychnoi sytuatsii u respubliki” vid 13 zhovtnia 1990 r. [Information to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine “On the development of the political situation in the republic”], ff. 30, 31.

²¹ Oleksii Haran, *Ubyty drakona*, p. 125.

²² TsDAHOU, Fund 1, Inv. 32, F. 2772 – Informatsiia “Pro holoduvannia studentiv v m. Kyievi 3 zhovtnia 1990 r.” [Information “About the hunger strike of students in Kyiv on October 3, 1990”], f. 133.

that this act of civil disobedience was not spontaneous. In the summer of 1990, during the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the Ukrainian Cossacks in Zaporizhzhya, the Kyiv branch of the Ukrainian Students' Union first publicly expressed the idea of holding a political hunger strike in Kyiv. According to the plan of the radical youth, the whole set of measures (the hunger strike was only one part of a large-scale protest action that included meetings, strikes and demonstrations) should lead to a general student strike that would force the authorities to carry out political reforms.²³

In order that the students' speech should be organised, large-scale and republican, it was necessary to coordinate and agree on the manifestations of political activity of various youth organisations. The main plan of action and the basic positions (the day of the action, the forms and methods of its implementation) were clarified during the negotiations between the Ukrainian Student Union (O. Donii, Y. Zubko) and the Student Brotherhood (O. Kuzan, T. Davydyak), which took place within the framework of the meeting of youth and student organisations of the USSR in Vilnius (Lithuania).²⁴

On the eve of the hunger strike, three demands were put forward in a leaflet distributed by the Kyiv organization of the Ukrainian Student Union:

- prematurely terminate the powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and call new elections on a multi-party basis in the fall of 1991;
- adopt a law on the nationalization of the property of the Communist Party of Ukraine and Leninist Communist League of Youth of Ukraine;
- prevent the signing of the alliance agreement (between soviet republics). Lviv students added two more items to this list:
 - a decision to be made on military service by citizens of Ukraine exclusively within the borders of the republic;
 - resignation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR Vitaliy Masol. In this respect, we have to mention that Masol was a supporter and at the same time a symbol of Soviet power in Ukraine, his Moscow-centric views were contrary to the national interests of the students).²⁵

²³ *Yak vse pochynalos? Pershi dni holoduvannia* [How Did it All Begin? The First Days of Starvation], in "Ukrainske studentstvo", 2000, 2 zhovtnia, p. 2.

²⁴ Oles Donii, Oleh Synelnykov, *Istoriia USS movoiu dokumentiv i faktiv (1989 – 1999)* [The History of the Ukrainian Student Union in the Language of Documents and Facts (1989–1999), Kyiv, 1999, p. 3.

²⁵ *Yak vse pochynalos? Pershi dni holoduvannia* [How Did it All Begin? The First Days of Starvation], in "Ukrainske studentstvo", 2000, 2 zhovtnia, p. 2.

As we can see, the students' demands did not relate exclusively to youth problems, but covered a wide range of issues, the solution to which required a deep political reform of society. It is characteristic that in 1990 even the Baltic states considered them too radical. The organisers of the action wanted to turn the student hunger strike into a catalyst for social development, a factor destabilising the system and awakening national consciousness among the people, a factor that would lead first the youth and then the broad masses of the people to large-scale acts of civil disobedience. It is in this context that the statement of one of the youth leaders, Markiyan Ivashishin, should be understood, according to which the radical nature of the demands predicted from the very beginning that they would not be met, and therefore the student hunger strike could bring the country to an almost revolutionary situation.²⁶

The students who started the hunger strike were convinced that on the very first night the authorities would take decisive action: the tent city would be destroyed and they would be put in detention centres. Recalling those days, hunger striker Yuri Zubko emphasised: "When we went to the square on the first day, we were sure that we would be quickly 'demolished' from there. Because there had already been arrests – both during the Kyiv city council picket on 23 February and after the first student rallies on 23 February..."²⁷ At the end of February 1990, students organized the first protests, but, as in the case of the one carried out in front of the Kiev City Council, they ended in arrests for all participants, who received a prison sentence of 5–15 days.²⁸ Anticipating such a development, the organisers of the action prepared its next stage – they planned to launch a wave of strikes in the universities of the republic in defence of the imprisoned students. The role of initiators and leaders of this political action on the ground was assigned to the members of the Ukrainian Student Union and the Student Brotherhood.²⁹

However, events took on a completely different course. While the central

²⁶ Konstantyn Bondarenko, *Velyka Zhovtneva Studentska Revoliutsiia* [Great October Student Revolution], in "Polityka i kultura", 2000, no. 37, p. 10.

²⁷ *Chas khryzantem: potomu desiat lit* [Chrysanthemum time: ten years later], in "Stolytsia", 2000, 7 zhovtnia, p. 4.

²⁸ Dmytro Shurkhalo, *Pershyy Maydan: 30-richchya Revolyutsiyi na hraniti* [First Maidan: 30th anniversary of the Revolution on Granite], <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/revolutsiya-na-hraniti-studentske-holoduvannia/30874467.html> (Accessed on 17. 02. 2023).

²⁹ Volodymyr Kovtun, *Istoriia Narodnoho Rukhu* [History of the People's Movement], Kyiv, 1995, p. 187.

government adopted a wait-and-see attitude, the Presidium of the Kyiv City Council (the representative of the Democratic Bloc, Oleksandr Mosiyuk, was the acting chairman at the time) retroactively adopted a decision at 23:00 on 2 October, which did not mention the hunger strike but gave formal legal permission for its implementation. In particular, the document stated: "Condemning the provocative acts of violence against police officers that are taking place ..., allow during the work of the second session of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR to hold mass events in the central part of the city that do not interfere with traffic."³⁰ It should be emphasised that such a decision was made possible, to a certain extent, by the fact that 40% of the deputies of the then city council were representatives of the Democratic Bloc.³¹

Under these circumstances, on 3 October, the tent city in October Revolution Square already had 49 tents and 137 people from Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk and other cities of the republic participated in the hunger strike³². In the centre of the majors' camp there is a flag with a medical cross, several dozen yellow and blue banners and two black and purple banners. The heads of the hunger strikers were tied with black ribbons. Posters were hung at various ends of the tent city: 'Destructive elements' of the Lviv Agricultural Institute are starving, "Our yoke: 239, KGB, KPU", "Kravchuk is persona non grata in Ukraine". One of the posters showed a monument to Vladimir Lenin on Taras Shevchenko Boulevard, and above it a hand with a hook from a lifting crane and the caption: "T. Shevchenko Boulevard, not Lenin." Already at this stage, the student hunger strike was perceived by the central party bodies not as an initiative of the youth, but as an action inspired by the opposition: "There is no doubt, it is noted in the information on the students' speech, that the above-mentioned action is one of the components of clearly planned actions of anti-Soviet, anti-communist, anti-socialist forces (Rukh – People's Movement of Ukraine –, URP – Ukrainian Radical Party –, SNUM – Ukrainian Youth Association –, etc.) aimed at seizing power, dissolving the parliament of the republic."³³

On 4 October, a group of deputies of the National People's Party of the USSR

³⁰ Mykhayl Svystovych, *Ne chipaite sviatoho! Tsiiei relikvii ne viddaiut chuzhym* [Do not touch the saint! This relic is not given to strangers], in "Polityka i kultura", 2000, No. 40, p. 39.

³¹ *Chas khryzantem: potomu desiat lit* [Chrysanthemum time: ten years later], in "Stolytsia", 7 zhovtnia, 2000, p. 4.

³² Vitalii Kulyk, Tetiana Holobutska, Oleksii Holobutskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

³³ TsDAHOU, Fund 1, Inv. 32, F. 2772, Informatsiia "Pro holoduvannia studentiv v m. Kyievi 3 zhovtnia 1990 r." [Information "About the hunger strike of students in Kyiv on October 3, 1990"], f. 133-134.

from Ukraine (Y. Shcherbak, V. Yavorivskiy, O. Honchar, V. Chernyak, S. Konev, O. Yemets, etc.) addressed a letter to the citizens of Ukraine, leaders and members of political parties, public movements, in which they noted that before the threat of a deepening of the general crisis in the USSR and Ukraine, it is necessary to immediately convene a 'round table' of the political forces of the republic.³⁴ This document was assessed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine as "an attempt to destabilise the situation, to provoke a governmental crisis", the aim of which was "to review the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR on the formation of the government, to involve representatives of the opposition."³⁵

The next day, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, Leonid Kravchuk, met with the leaders of the student action – O. Donii and M. Ivashyshin. Although, as expected, the meeting ended inconclusively, leaving each side dissatisfied, it did clarify the positions of the opposing parties, which had a significant impact on the further development of events. In particular, new, more democratic accents appeared in the views of the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. At a meeting with the leaders of the student action, he declared: "I want to be above the parties. I will not support any party, I will support the people. I am a member of the CPSU, but this is my personal position. There are interests higher than the party. This, I repeat, is in the interests of the people."³⁶ Incidentally, it was then that Leonid Kravchuk became convinced that the student hunger strike was not an action inspired by the 'adult' opposition, but a completely independent manifestation of the youth movement's activity. Recalling this historic moment, he remarked: "I wanted to hear whether this was really their point of view or whether there were older forces behind them and they were simply being used... The discussion was quite heated. After all, the students saw in me the communist forces of Ukraine. And they did not want that to be the case. Then I realised that these are convinced people. And they will stand until the end."³⁷

³⁴ *Zvernennia do hromadian Ukrainy, kerivnykiv ta chleniv politychnykh partii, hromadskykh rukhiv* [Appeal to citizens of Ukraine, leaders and members of political parties, public movements], in "Literaturna Ukraina", 4 zhovtnia 1990, p. 1.

³⁵ TsDAHOU, Fund 1, Inv. 32, F. 2768, Informatsiia Sekretariatu TsK KPU "Pro rozvytok politychnoi sytuatsii u respublitsi", vid 13 zhovtnia 1990 r [Information of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine "On the Development of the Political Situation in the Republic"], f. 32.

³⁶ *Studenty i Kravchuk* [Students and Kravchuk], in "Ukrainske studentstvo", 2 zhovtnia 2000, p. 3.

³⁷ *Leonid Kravchuk* [Leonid Kravchuk], in "Ukrainske studentstvo", 2 zhovtnia 2000, p. 3.

The round table of 9 October, apart from the public declaration of their positions, did not have any positive results. During the meeting the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada, deputies, representatives of ministries were unable to find a common language and reach an agreement with the leaders of the student protest action O. Barkov, O. Donii, M. Ivashyshin, O. Kuzan, V. Kyrilenko, Yu. Hertsyk. After a sharp and long discussion, I. Yukhnovskyi, who led the 'round table', thanked the students for their courage and activity and called on them to stop the hunger strike if two demands – on the Union Treaty and military service – were resolved positively. However, the starving students, through the voice of M. Ivashyshin, announced that they would remain in their positions regardless of the consequences.³⁸

The next day showed that each of the opposing parties was acting according to its own scenario: in the parliament it was decided by an open vote not to include the discussion of the hunger strikers' demands in the agenda of the session (only 161 deputies voted 'yes'), and the students, in violation of the decision of the Kyiv Council, organised a demonstration of tens of thousands that blocked the traffic on Khreshchatyk and the building of the State Television and Radio of the Ukrainian SSR. The main demand of the demonstrators was the provision of a 10-minute live broadcast to publicise the hunger strikers' demands. Under the circumstances, the authorities were forced to make some concessions – a group of People's Deputies were allowed to make a statement. The leitmotif of this speech was the thesis that the current parliament has exhausted its possibilities and a call for civil disobedience and strikes. The deputies of the People's Movement of Ukraine also announced that they would join the hunger strikers.³⁹ The hunger strike was started as a sign of support for the demands and actions of the youth by S. Khmara, L. Gorokhivskyi, V. Kolinets, O. Gudyma, M. Kuzemko, F. Sviderskyi, B. Rebrik, Ya. Zaiko, Ya. Kenzyor, V. Bed, M. Horyn.⁴⁰

Further events – 100 000-strong demonstration in Kyiv, 11 October, launching of the general student strike, 13-15 October, 'occupation strike' (occupation of the Red Campus of Kyiv State University by students), on the evening of 15 October, the formation of a second tented 'Freedom Town' near the walls of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, 16 October (298 students were already on hunger strike

³⁸ *Kruhlyi stil* [Round Table], in "Ukrainske studentstvo", 2 zhovtnia 2000, p. 6.

³⁹ Vitalii Kulyk, Tetiana Holobutska, Oleksii Holobutskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 161; TsDAHOU, Fund 1, Inv. 32, F. 2768 – Informatsiia Sekretariatu TsK KPU "Pro rozvytok politychnoi situatsii u respublitsi", vid 13 zhovtnia 1990 r., f. 31.

⁴⁰ Oleksii Haran, *Ubyty drakona...*, p. 129.

that day, 27 of them had been on hunger strike since the first day, 60% of the hunger strikers had colds, seizures became more frequent) – testified to the radicalisation of students' attitudes and actions.⁴¹ According to the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education of the Ukrainian SSR, about 30 000 of the 85 000 students enrolled in Kyiv universities took part in the hunger strike and strike. In Lviv, almost 59 000 out of 65 000 students were on strike. In Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk – ten thousand each, i.e. practically all students. Totally, almost 100 000 of the 510 000 students at Ukrainian universities took part in the campaign, one in five.⁴² At the time, a wave of protests against the official authorities' attitude to the starving youth was sweeping the republic. Such actions took place in Ternopil, Rivne, Donetsk, Kremenchuk, Horlivka, Kherson, Khmelnytsky and Dnipropetrovsk. As a sign of solidarity with the tent city in Kyiv, tent cities of the hungry were set up in the centres of Zhytomyr, Donetsk and Sumy...⁴³ These and other factors convincingly demonstrated that the socio-political situation in the republic, ignited by the student hunger strike, was rapidly approaching the limit beyond which uncontrolled processes could unfold. It is no coincidence that the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, analysing the dynamics and possible consequences of the hunger strike, stated as early as 13 October that "the danger of this action cannot be underestimated."⁴⁴

Under the pressure of circumstances, the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR was forced to adopt a resolution on October 17, 1990, the content and spirit of which reflected the shaky balance of power:

1. During the second session of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, adopt a number of laws – on the referendum, on political parties and organizations, on the status of the people's deputy of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1991, Ukraine should hold a national vote-referendum on issues of confidence in the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR and, based on its results, make a decision to hold new

⁴¹ *Pokhid ta piketuvannia Verkhovnoi Rady* [March and Picketing of the Verkhovna Rada], in "Ukrainske studentstvo", 2 zhovtnia 2000, p. 4; *Studentstvo i likari* [Students and doctors], in "Ukrainske studentstvo", 2 zhovtnia 2000, p. 8.

⁴² Vitalii Taranenko, *Peremozhstv ne sudiat* [Winners are Not Judged], in "Literaturna Ukraina", 25 zhovtnia 2000, p. 1.

⁴³ Serhii Kozak, *Shche v sutinkakh, ta vzhe bez iluzii* [Still in the Twilight, but Without Illusions], in "Literaturna Ukraina", 18 zhovtnia 2000, p. 1.

⁴⁴ TsDAHOU, Fund 1, Inv. 32, F. 2768 – Informatsiia Sekretariatu TsK KPU "Pro rozvytok politychnoi sytuatsii u respublitsi" vid 13 zhovtnia 1990 r. [Information of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine "On the Development of the Political Situation in the Republic"], f. 31.

elections by the end of the year.

2. To ensure that citizens of Ukraine complete military service outside the borders of the republic only by the voluntary consent of citizens. By December 31, 1990, adopt the law on the completion of military service by citizens of Ukraine on the territory of the republic, the law on alternative military service, and also establish the necessary state bodies.

3. To form a temporary commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to consider the issue of nationalization of the property of the CPSU and VLKSM on the territory of Ukraine.

4. To direct all efforts of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR to stabilize the political and economic situation in the republic, adopt the new Constitution of Ukraine and, until this is achieved, the conclusion of the union treaty should be considered premature.

5. To resolve, in accordance with current legislation, issues related to the resignation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR V. Masol.

6. By November 30, bring the current Constitution into compliance with the provisions of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine.⁴⁵

Subsequently, everything practically came down to the resignation of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. Kravchuk described the logic of putting the brakes on the conflict and making a 'sacred sacrifice' in his memoirs: during the student negotiations with Ivan Plyushch, "it was practically decided to hold early elections to the Verkhovna Rada, and it was approved by the Verkhovna Rada, but then it was rejected, and here too it was decided that it was necessary to throw someone out. But who? Masol, and so it was decided in the Politburo. Trying to find support in the situation, Masol went to Moscow, to Nikolai Ryzhkov, with whom they were on good terms. Ryzhkov, in the presence of Masol, called Mikhail Gorbachev to receive the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, but Gorbachev refused in the audience."⁴⁶ So the fate of the head of the Ukrainian government was decided...

On October 18, 1990, the student hunger strike was stopped. Evaluating its consequences from the hot tracks, at the press conference of the Movement on that day, M. Horyn emphasized that "what the People's Rada could not achieve, the

⁴⁵ Oles Donii, Oleh Synelnykov, *op. cit.*, p. 99-100.

⁴⁶ *Interv'yū z Leonidom Kravchukom. Rozpad Radyans'koho Soyuzu. Usna istoriya nezalezhnoyi Ukrainy 1988 — 1991, kaseta 3* [Interview with Leonid Kravchuk, Collapse of the Soviet Union. Oral history of independent Ukraine 1988–1991, tape 3], <https://oralhistory.org.ua/interview-ua/510/> (Accessed on 17.02.2023).

student youth achieved. This is our greatest conquest.” I. Drach especially noted that “the young blood did what the Verkhovna Rada could not do. Our tactical, strategic moves could not achieve anything. We could not think of such a resolution (we are talking about the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR dated October 17, 1990 – O.B.) a few days ago.”⁴⁷

Paradoxically, however, ten years later the leaders of the opposing parties had almost exactly the same assessment of the situation: a missed opportunity, and they were unanimous in concluding that the student revolution had been betrayed not by the communists but by the national democrats. Thinking back to the past, Donii, one of the organisers of the hunger strike, said with pain: “Now, when our demands are mentioned, it is usually the resignation of Prime Minister Masol. And there really were a number of demands.... We talked about the complexity of political and social reforms... And just then, in that short period of time, in the event of elections, it would be possible to radically ‘advance’ the nomenclature, and this was an opportunity, if not the Central European, then at least the Baltic way. But in fact, there was a betrayal of national democracy. I use this word deliberately, because if the old nomenclature was a deliberate opponent against whom we knew how to fight, then it was an unexpected blow in the back from the side of national democracy, because the People’s Council did not realise the need for new elections during the campaign. Its representatives came to us and asked us to cancel the only demand – new elections.”

Recalling the events of that time, the then Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR Kravchuk emphasised: “If we had listened to the students and held early elections to the Verkhovna Rada, the development scenario in Ukraine could have been completely different, both politically and economically. On the wave of the uprising, we could elect real patriots to the Verkhovna Rada, people who want good for Ukraine. And that would mean that we would pass twice as many laws that are necessary for Ukraine... Then there would be different people in the positions.”⁴⁸ In another interview, he added: “I regret to say, those national patriots who were supposed to support the students were against the re-election of the Verkhovna Rada.”⁴⁹ Why did the opposition group in parliament

⁴⁷ TsDAHOU, Fund 1, Inv. 32, F. 2768, Dovidka “Pro pres-konferentsiiu Rukhu”, vid 18 zhovtnia 1990 r. [About the press conference of the Rukh], f. 44.

⁴⁸ *Studentsku revoliutsiiu zradyl ne komunisty, a natsional-demokraty* [The student revolution was betrayed not by communists, but by national democrats], in “Polityka i kultura”, 2000, No. 37, pp. 12, 13.

⁴⁹ *Studenty i Kravchuk* [Students and Kravchuk], in “Ukrainske studentstvo”, 2 zhovtnia

not support the whole set of students' demands? We think there were several reasons. Firstly, there was a lack of confidence in their own abilities. After unsuccessful attempts to mobilise the Ukrainian people for mass action in late September and early October, the democrats had no guarantee of victory in the forthcoming early elections. This conservative pragmatist view, which dominates the counter-elite, was eloquently expressed by O. Yemets: "If 100 000 out of 50 million people come out to demonstrate on 30 September and 1 October, the time has not yet come. In Bulgaria there were three out of 10 million – and not everything was changed."⁵⁰

Secondly, of the 190 deputies who worked in the Verkhovna Rada's committees on a permanent basis, almost 80 were representatives of the opposition, which significantly exceeded the percentage of opposition deputies in the overall composition of the Ukrainian parliament. Incidentally, Canadian researchers Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson point to the disproportionate weight of the opposition in the structures of the highest legislative body of the republic.⁵¹ The National Democrats did not have 100% confidence that such a balance of power would be improved after the early elections.

Finally, there were serious contradictions between the older generation of the opposition and its new wave. Characterising the essence of the problem, Donii sensibly observed: "The student movement did not emerge as expected, not only for the Communist Party and the KGB, but also for the National Democrats. It was perceived as a political rival. And there was pressure not only from the Communist Party and the KGB, but also from our 'political partners', from various diaspora centres. The final straw came when the Verkhovna Rada passed amendments and additions to the law on elections: the age limit was suddenly raised to 25. And all the student leaders were simply denied the opportunity to turn the student movement into a political phenomenon."⁵² Increasing the age of candidates jointly by the ruling party and the opposition was intended to prevent the candidacy of new 'radical' but extremely popular young leaders of social-political changes.

Obviously, the extremely heterogeneous composition of the national counter-elite, which, on the one hand, consisted of former dissidents, veterans of

2000, p. 3.

⁵⁰ Oleksii Haran, *Ubyty drakona*, p. 132.

⁵¹ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*. 2nd edition, London, Macmillan, 2000; Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: Diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi* [Political Arena of Ukraine: Active Persons and Performers], Kyiv, 1994, p. 260.

⁵² *Studentsku revoliutsiiu zradly ne komunisty...*, p. 13.

the anti-Soviet movement, i.e. radicals who were not inclined to compromise, played a certain role in this development of events, and, on the other hand, was formed on the basis of moderate oppositionists, i.e. those who were used to carefully weighing up their every step, because, for a long time, circumstances had forced them to hide their true views while cooperating with the system. The sum of excessive radicalism and moderate caution in the ranks of the opposition gave rise to an insecurity that, at that stage, destroyed all hopes and opportunities for radical changes in society.

The October events in Kyiv stimulated the emergence of new features and accents in the process of forming Ukraine's image in the international arena. Characterising the reaction of the world press to the course of events in the Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine stated: "If one compares publications on Ukraine with similar material on, say, the Baltic States or Georgia, then one feels that the current situation in the Republic is still surprising, because in the memory of Western journalists the image of Ukraine as a stronghold of a stagnant period is still alive". Canadian newspaper "The Toronto Star" called the students' public disobedience "an impressive testimony to the awakening of the consciousness of the youth, whose alienation could not be overcome even by the novelty of the reforms of the first stage of perestroika". The "Globe and Mail" (Canada) emphasised that the resignation of V. Masol was the first in the history of resignations of political leaders under the pressure of public opinion. The resignation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR was evaluated by the "Ottawa Citizen" (Canada) as "evidence of the rise of the independence movement in Ukraine."⁵³

CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, it is clear that the aftermath of the first contemporary Maidan in Ukraine caused and initiated changes in the socio-political development of the nation. First of all, it was the first protest action of Ukrainian youth which achieved partial goals (mostly symbolic). But nevertheless, fulfilling some of the students' demands was a sensation in the Soviet totalitarian system. The students, who until those events had been locked up in prisons for any attempt to protest, showed the

⁵³ TsDAHOU, Fund 1, Inv. 32, F. 2764 – Zapyska Ministerstva zakordonnykh sprav Ukrainy "Zakhidna presa pro Ukrainu pislia pryiniattia Deklaratsii", vid 28 lystopada 1990 r., [Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine "Western press about Ukraine after the adoption of the Declaration"], f. 188.

public opinion that peaceful resistance was possible. However, the mistrust of the older generation of the opposition towards the youth did not create an opportunity for a complete transformation of the political environment, as was the case in Central Europe. The situation was similar in Hungary, where the future Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was a youth activist during the transformation and stayed in politics.⁵⁴ Therefore, after the collapse of Soviet power in Ukraine, there was no room for young 'radical' politicians who would support rapid democratic changes, but the previous political class remained in power.

The Student Revolution on Granite is a continuation of the Ukrainian national spirit of 'maidan' democracy, but it is also the beginning of the following events that should determine the fate of modern Ukraine. The role of the active youth generation in Ukraine's pro-democratic and pro-Western transformation has been above average, starting from the Revolution on Granite until today, when the youth is defending values on the front line, ideas for which the previous generation was protesting⁵⁵.

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⁵⁴ Bulent Kenes, *Viktor Orbán: Past to Present*, ECPS Leader Profiles Series, No. 1. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), August 2, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.55271/lp0001>.

⁵⁵ Mateusz Kamionka, *Młode pokolenie Ukrainy jako katalizator zmian społeczno-politycznych w latach 1990–2022* [The young generation of Ukraine as a catalyst for socio-political changes in 1990–2022], in "Youth in Central and Eastern Europe", Vol. 10, 2023, No. 15, pp. 48-55, <https://doi.org/10.24917/ycee.10107>.

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PUBLICATION OF HISTORICAL SOURCES – ASSESSMENT, APPROACH, INTERPRETATION. CASE STUDY: ANTIOCHUS CANTEMIR'S PASSPORT*

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Abstract: *This research focuses on the release of a previously unexplored historical document, Antiochus Cantemir's diplomatic passport, recently discovered in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts in Moscow. The inclusion of this authentic document in scholarly discourse is an important addition to Cantemir's family research. The investigation attempted not only to highlight one of the pages of Antiochus Cantemir's diplomatic activities but also to exploit, to a certain extent, the relevance of a representative documentary source for this era.*

Keywords: *Historical source, interpretation, Antiochus Cantemir, Peter I, Russia, passport, diplomacy.*

Rezumat: *Publicarea izvoarelor istorice – valorificarea, abordarea, interpreta-rea. Studiu de caz: pașaportul lui Antioh Cantemir. Prezentul studiu propune spre publi-care un document inedit cu valoare istorică specială: pașaportul diplomatic al lui Antioh Cantemir, recent depistat în Arhiva Istorică de Stat a Actelor Vechi din Moscova. Introducere în circuitul științific a acestui document autentic reprezintă o contribuție esențială la dezvoltarea cantemirologiei contemporane. Pe baza acestui document intenționăm să stu-diem nu numai una din paginile activității diplomatice a lui Antioh Cantemir, ci și să valori-ficăm, într-o anumită măsură, importanța unei surse documentare reprezentative pentru această epocă.*

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INTRODUCTION

To mark the 350th anniversary of the famous Romanian historian, scholar, and intellectual's birth (on October 26, 1673) and the 300th anniversary of his passing, the year 2023 has been declared the Dimitrie Cantemir Year. In this context, this study is devoted to his well-known son Antiochus Cantemir, who, like his father, contributed to an increased visibility of the Cantemir family in world history. "Many studies from the most diverse fields continue to provide in-depth analysis of these fascinating historical figures"¹, said Stefan Lemny, referring to both the renowned father and son.

The process of rewriting history by each generation is inevitable according to modern historiography. Finding, evaluating, and integrating new historical sources into scientific use contribute to reaffirming and further developing the study of history. Over the last three decades, modern historical research has reached a new stage of development with the emergence of new approaches, concepts, and methodological norms. Historians' inherent curiosity in many new research methodologies led to a fundamental shift in methodological standards, and transdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches, particularly through the perspective of historical anthropology.

RESEARCH PURPOSE

The concept of historical sources is continuously revised by incorporating newly found documents into the scientific circuit. A historian's main task is to establish the accuracy and reliability of the source, the relevance and importance of the information for the research, the evaluation and organization of data from historical sources, the selective use of sources, etc. Researchers must be capable of appreciating, evaluating and comparing the sources found. Unfortunately, these simple rules are not always followed, and document publishing is frequently quantitative rather than qualitative, the number of pages becoming more important than the scientific (informational) content. The question is whether publishing previously unknown document collections and using new scientific

¹ Șt. Lemny, *Dimitrie Cantemir. Un principe roman în zorile Luminilor europene* [A Romanian Prince at the Dawn of the European Enlightenment], București, Institutul Cultural Român, 2019, p. 67.

techniques contribute to a new interpretation of history or the manipulation of information acquired from the document.

This research focuses on a new historical document, an actual diplomatic passport of Antiochus Cantemir,² recently found in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), Fond 1374 *The Cantemirs*, coll. 1, fol. 142, p. 279. Antiochus Cantemir received the passport "on December 27, 1731, by decree of Empress Anna Ioannovna for a trip to England."³

RESEARCH CONTEXT

This historical source is of exceptional research significance since the passport was and continues to be an important legal document reflecting the history of law and diplomacy in the first half of the 18th century. The discovered original passport of Antiochus Cantemir is written in Russian, but there were cover letters in English, German and French since the journey to England was long and the diplomat had to cross numerous borders.

An appointed ambassador necessarily received the credentials⁴ certifying his authority as a diplomatic representative (envoy). A letter of credence was signed exclusively by the head of state and addressed to the receiving head of state in the 18th century. A special seal certified the letters. "On December 24, 1731, a letter of credence was drawn up for Antiochus Cantemir, and three days later, on December 27, an «Instruction», outlining the main directions of his activities in the host country."⁵

² Antiochus Cantemir (10/21.09.1708/1709, Istanbul – 31.03/11.04.1744, Paris), the youngest son of Dimitrie Cantemir (1673 – 1723), born in marriage to Cassandra Cantacuzino (1681 (?) – 1713). A poet-satirist, writer, diplomat and educator, figure of the early Russian Enlightenment. He took part in the events that led to the accession of Empress Anna Ioannovna, then in the struggle against members of the Supreme Privy Council, who were trying to limit the autocracy. A diplomatic representative of Russia in London (1732 – 1738), later in Paris (1738 – 1744). For his comprehensive education and wide erudition, he became famous in Russia and Europe. Had two illegitimate children.

³ Rossijskij gosudarsvennyi istoricheskij archiv drevnich aktov [Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts] (hereinafter **RGADA**), coll. 1374, aids 1, fol. 142, p. 279 (See Annex no. 1).

⁴ The credentials are one single document, although the word is plural. The plural has traditionally been preserved, since, in the letters of the Russian sovereigns, only the indication of the full title of the tsar required a listing of 55 territories that he owned. As a result, the document was a rather impressive scroll (V. P. Egorov, *Diplomaticheskij protokol i jetiket* [Diplomatic protocol and etiquette], Moscow, MGU Publ., 2013, p. 71).

⁵ Letter of Credence from the Russian Resident at the English Royal Court Antiochus

Unfortunately, there is no distinct literature of a historical and legal sort that would allow the study of the origin and formation of the diplomatic passport system methodologically. There are no complete analytical studies on the history of a diplomatic passport. This topic is merely addressed in the broad framework of passport history. The term “passaporto” is of Italian origin, derived from the Latin “passus” (“pace”). It consists of two words: “pass” (“to pass”) and “porto” (“harbour”, “port”). In this sense, the word “passport” spread to other European countries, including Germany, and France, and came to refer to any written documents authorizing passage across the border. The passport, like the passport system in general, did not become a legal document in Russia until the first quarter of the 18th century, during the reign of Peter I.⁶

In 1724, Peter I and the Senate⁷ issued a series of decrees introducing various kinds of documents for a significant part of the population inside the country, identical to modern passports. In the same year, Peter I revised his order on the free travel of nobles abroad. Starting from 1725, “those who are going overseas should not be allowed to leave without a passport from the Collegium of Foreign Affairs”,⁸ that is, nobility who travelled abroad for business or study was required to own a diplomatic passport, which strengthened the legal status of a Russian citizen abroad. These legislative acts established Russia's “passport system”, a

Cantemir dated December 24 (Old Style), 1731, in Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. Coll. 35 (Relations between Russia and England), aids. 1, fol. 542, p. 1–2; S. L. Turilova, A. A. Orlov, *Knjaz' Antioh Dmitrievich Kantemir – russkij diplomat, pojet i filosof (K 310-letiju so dnja rozhdenija)* [Prince Antiochus Dmitrievich Kantemir – Russian diplomat, poet and philosopher (To the 310th anniversary of his birth)], in “Lokus, ljudi, obshhestvo, kul'tury, smysly” [Locus, people, society, cultures, meanings], 2017, No. 4, p. 7. Available at: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/knyaz-antioh-dmitrievich-kantemir-russkij-diplomat-poet-i-filosof-k-310-letiyu-so-dnya-rozhdeniya/pdf>

⁶ Peter I (9 June/30 May 1672 – 8 February/28 January 1725), representative of the Romanov dynasty, most known as Peter the Great. A Russian monarch who ruled Russia from 7 May/27 April 1682 to 1721, and subsequently the Russian Empire until his death in 1725. Until 1696, he ruled jointly with his older half-brother Ivan V. He is primarily credited with the modernization of the country, transforming it into a European power.

⁷ The Governing Senate was established in 1711 by decree of Peter I as the highest governing body in the Russian Empire, combining important state functions including legislative, executive, supervisory, and judicial.

⁸ *Polnyj svod zakonov Rossijskoj imperii* [Complete set of laws of the Russian Empire], Coll. 1 (1649-1825), vol. 5, no. 3445/49.

feature of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century.⁹

According to the sequence of events, the passport provided to Antiochus Cantemir in 1731 has not yet attained the perfection of a European passport and might serve as an illustration of one of the first diplomatic passports. In this context, it is worth noting that the electronic release of a copy of Antiochus Cantemir's passport has been reported on the website "Oriental Literature. Medieval historical sources of the East and West",¹⁰ where the text is nearly identical to the original, apart from some phrases (expressions) that will be discussed in this study.

The passport's structure and semantic presentation must first be examined. The empress was first mentioned with all of her titles because it was an imperial order and only she had complete competence and authority to issue and sign a passport for a diplomatic servant, a particular state document: "By the Grace of God, we, Anna, Empress and Autocrat of All Russia,¹¹ and others, and others, and others. Through this announcement to all who should know that the bearer of this document, Prince Antiochus Cantemir, has been sent to England for our affairs. For the sake of this, we friendly ask all high officials, and especially His Royal Majesty of Great Britain, from each according to the rank and dignity."¹²

There is only one difference between the original and the copy. If Antiochus Cantemir simply appears as a prince in the original document, there is a more

⁹ V. G. Chernukha, *Pasport v Rossii. 1719-1917* [Passport in Russia. 1719-1917], Saint Petersburg, 2007, pp. 21-49.

¹⁰ "Passport to Prince Antiochus Cantemir. By the Grace of God, we, Anna, Empress and Autocrat of All Russia, and others, and others, and others. Through this announcement to all who should know that the bearer of this paper, our lifeguard lieutenant (poruchik) Prince Antiochus Cantemir, has been sent to England for our affairs; for the sake of this, we friendly ask all high officials, and especially His Royal Majesty of Great Britain, from each according to the rank and dignity; to those concerned, we express our kind wish, and we all-mercifully command to our military and civil administrators that the aforementioned Prince Antiochus Cantemir with the people and things that are with him not only freely and without delay pass wherever his path lies, both going there to England and returning back. But also, every favour and help to show him is ordered. For which we promise to repay mutually high-ranking persons in such cases; Our subjects should fulfil this command of ours. As evidence of this, this pass with our seal was given to him in Moscow, December 27, 1731. Chancellor Count Golovkin." Available at: <https://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Engl/XVIII/1720-1740/Kantemir/181-200/199.phtml?id=5113>

¹¹ Anna Ioannovna (January 28/February 7, 1693 – October 17/28, 1740), Empress of Russia from the Romanov dynasty. Daughter of Tsar Ivan V and niece of Emperor Peter I.

¹² RGADA, coll. 1374, aids 1, fol.142, p. 279.

thorough specification of his ranks in the copy: "our lifeguard lieutenant Prince."¹³ Antiochus Cantemir enlisted in the Lifeguards Preobrazhensky Regiment before completing his studies at the Academy of Sciences. He served in the lower ranks for three years before receiving the first officer rank of lieutenant (poruchik) in 1728.¹⁴

This is an important difference between the copy and the original because the text does not mention the conventional passport data that were already included in European passports, where the passport system has a longer historical experience.

Passport documentation of people who were in the state, military, or civil service at the time required an official list or a service record. It was an important component of the passport, the main document of the era. The form and content of the data changed, but information such as the first name, patronymic, last name, year of birth, class affiliation, family and property status, titles, ranks, state awards, etc. were mandatory.

Antiochus Cantemir (See Annex no. 2) was only 22/23 years old¹⁵ when he was appointed to the post of Russian Empire representative in Great Britain in 1731. He had the fame of a highly educated intellectual. Besides being excellently educated at home,¹⁶ he proved himself one of the best students at the Greco-Slavic Academy, and "in 1724-1725, Antiochus Cantemir spent a short period of study with St. Petersburg academicians. He studied mathematics with Professor Bernoulli, physics with Bilfinger, history with Bayer, and moral philosophy with Christophorus Gross."¹⁷ In society, Antiochus was known as a gifted and versatile person, he was fluent in several languages – Latin, English, Italian, and French, showed interest in ancient history, physics, and jurisprudence, and he was fond of literature and

¹³ See: <https://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Engl/XVIII/1720-1740/Kantemir/181-200/199.phtml?id=5113>

¹⁴ A. D. Cantemir, *Collected Poems*, Leningrad, Sovetskij Pisatel' Publ., 1956. Available at: <http://www.epwr.ru/quotaauthor/221/>

¹⁵ In the historical literature, opinions differ about the year of birth of Antioch Cantemir. Some researchers believe that he was born in 1708, others believe that in 1709. In particular, in the collection of works by Antiochus Cantemir dated 1849, the publisher P. Perevlessky indicates September 10, 1709, as the date of his birth. See: *Sobranie sochinenij izvestnejshih russkikh pisatelej* [Collected Works of the Most Famous Russian Writers], Issue 2, *Izbrannye sochinenija knjazja Antioha Kantemira* [Selected works of Prince Antiochus Cantemir], Moscow, University Printing House, 1849, p. IV.

¹⁶ A large role in the education of A. Cantemir belonged to his mentors when he was a child, Anastasy (Afanasy) Kondoidi and Ivan Ilyinsky. Anastasius Kondoidi taught him ancient Greek, Latin, Italian languages, and history. He mastered Latin, Russian language and writing to perfection thanks to Ivan Ilyinsky.

¹⁷ A. D. Cantemir, *Collected Poems*, Leningrad, Sovetskij Pisatel' Publ., 1956.

painting. Antiochus Cantemir took an active part in the events that led to the coming to power of Empress Anna Ioannovna. The Empress always treated Antiochus and his sister, Maria Dimitrievna, with warmth and tenderness, hosting her on numerous occasions and appointing her as her lady-in-waiting in 1730.

It should also be emphasized that the young Antiochus Cantemir was entrusted with a rather difficult diplomatic mission. The Russian Empire did not have a diplomatic representative in Great Britain as of November 14, 1720, following the memorandum of the English Secretary of State Stanhope, according to which Mikhail Bestuzhev, resident in London, was required to leave England within 8 days. "Official diplomatic relations were finally interrupted."¹⁸

Antiochus Cantemir, not only a young but also an inexperienced diplomat, faced a difficult task: restoring diplomatic relations interrupted for many years between the two leading empires of the world, the Russian Empire and Great Britain. They wrote upon his appointment stating, "he was appointed minister to the British court to renew goodwill."¹⁹

The conventional requirement for diplomatic officials crossing borders to comply with all security guarantees stated that: "To those concerned, we express our kind wish, and we all-mercifully command to our military and civil administrators that the aforementioned Prince Antiochus Cantemir with the people and things that are with him not only freely and without delay pass wherever his path lies, both going there to England and returning. But also, every favour and help to show him is ordered. For which we promise to repay mutually high-ranking persons in such cases; our subjects should fulfil this command of ours. As evidence of this, this pass²⁰ with our seal²¹ was given to him. In Moscow, December 27, 1731."²² Count Gavriil Golovkin, Chancellor and President of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs certified the passport.²³

¹⁸ *Reljácii knjazja Antioha Dmitrievicha Kantemira iz Londona (1732-1733)* [Reports of Prince Antiochus Dmitrievich Cantemir from London (1732-1733)], vol. I, 1892, p. III.

¹⁹ *Sochinenija knjazja Antioha Dmitrievicha Kantemira* [The works of Prince Antioch Dmitrievich Cantemir], St. Petersburg, 1836, p. 8.

²⁰ "Pass" is the term for passport, often used at that time.

²¹ The copy includes the note: "Sealed with a medium seal on red wax under a paper custodia." Available at: <https://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Engl/XVIII/1720-1740/Kantemir/181-200/199.phtml?id=5113>

²² RGADA, coll. 1374, aids 1, fol. 142, p. 279.

²³ Gavriil (Gavrila) Ivanovich Golovkin (1660 – 25.07.1734, Moscow), count from 1707, associate of Peter I, from 1709 was the first chancellor of the Russian Empire, the first cabinet minister in 1731-1734. Ancestor of the Golovkin count family. Upon the establishment of

The passport bears traces of a small seal on red wax. The red colour of the seal in the 18th century testified that it was a document of special national and international importance. As mentioned above, no special studies on the history of the emergence and development of the diplomatic passport system were conducted, but a comparison with a document available for research was possible, specifically, the auxiliary collection of the National Museum of History of Moldova²⁴, which contains a copy of “the jokey passport of Peter I, issued to him after the completion of the Prut Campaign, in the «wagon train on the Dniester River» in August 1711”²⁵: “By the Grace, we, Peter the First, the Tsar and Autocrat of all Russia, and others, and others, and others, declare through this to everyone who should know about it. Since our nobleman, born Peter Mikhailov,²⁶ was temporarily released to the European kingdoms and lands for his needs; therefore, we friendly ask all high-ranking authorities, and each by his rank and dignity: The one to whom this Pass is presented, we kindly ask that the said nobleman be allowed to go freely and without delay where his path lies on his business, both going there and returning back with the people and things left with him, and that he be freely allowed to live safely where he can, and every benevolent assistance be given. For his free passage and stay, this Pass was given to him with our seal in the wagon train at the Dniester, in August 1711. Count Golovkin” (See Annex no. 3).

A comparison of Peter I’s 1711 passport and Antiochus’ 1731 passport demonstrates that the form and content have remained virtually unchanged after 20 years, and the same government official, Count Gavriil Golovkin, signed both passports. In other words, the two models of a foreign passport from the first third of the 18th century discussed in this study accurately reflect the era and the passport system.

CONCLUSIONS

It remains unclear how Antiochus Cantemir’s original passport has survived to this day, but it most likely survived, firstly, because it was the main legal document in addition to the death certificate of the deceased returning home. “The body of

collegiums in 1720, he was appointed president of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs.

²⁴ Further in the text: **NMHM**.

²⁵ NMHM, FA-5433. In 1987, a copy of the document, made by the artist M. Shoskalskaya, was acquired by the State Museum of History (now NMHM) from the collection of archives and libraries of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) (Purchase Act no. 423,1987; 80 rubles).

²⁶ The secret name of Tsar Peter I during the Prut Campaign. The tsar used this name for his foreign travels.

Antiochus Cantemir was sent from Rouen to Russia on a Dutch ship five months later, on August 4, 1745; it arrived at home in the fall, and he was buried in October 1745. Together with the body, 11 boxes with precious things, portraits, books, manuscripts and personal service papers, dishes, and church utensils were loaded."²⁷

One of the testamentary executor Heinrich Gross' letters²⁸ sent to the "high heirs (Maria, Matvey and Sergey Cantemir – A/N) and the State Collegium of Foreign Affairs", includes the "inventory and register" of Antiochus Cantemir's personal belongings.²⁹

Secondly, Maria Cantemir made every effort to ensure that all the belongings of her beloved brother were delivered safely, as Antiochus Cantemir left the largest share of his property to his sister. Subsequently, after the death of Maria in 1757, all her property, including the belongings of Antiochus, passed to her brothers, Matvey and Sergey Cantemir, who, in turn, were very responsible for the preservation of family values. The well-known historian and archivist I. I. Shimko, in his research on Maria and Antiochus Cantemir, describing the family archive of the Cantemir princes at the end of the 19th century, makes references to the archive³⁰ of Sergey Cantemir, who was the last keeper of all Cantemir family possessions.³¹

²⁷ L. Zabolotnaia, *Izvestnaja i neizvestnaja istorija zhizni docherej Dmitrija Kantemira. Marija Kantemir i Ekaterina-Smaragda Golitsyna (Sbornik statej, dokumentov i illjustracij)* [The known and unknown life story of the daughters of Dimitrie Cantemir: Maria Cantemir and Ekaterina-Smaragda Golitsyna (Collection of articles, documents and illustrations)], Chişinău, Cartdidact Publ., 2020, p. 350-351.

²⁸ Heinrich Ivanovich Gross (also known as Alexey Leontievich Gross; German: Heinrich Gottfried Gross; 1713/1714, Kirchheim unter Teck / Stuttgart, Duchy of Württemberg – 1765, London), master of theology, Russian diplomat, privy councillor, personal secretary and executor of A. Cantemir. An employee of the Russian Embassy in Great Britain (1736–1738). Since 1738, he has been in Paris with A. Cantemir.

²⁹ RGADA, coll.1374, aids.1, fol. 868, part 8, p. 54-54 back.

³⁰ Sergey Cantemir (08/11/1706, Istanbul – 04/24/1780, Moscow, Donskoy Monastery) was the third son of the Moldavian ruler Dimitrie Cantemir and Cassandra Cantacuzino. His real name was Şerban, which he received in honour of his maternal grandfather, Şerban Cantacuzino, the Wallachian ruler (1678-1688). However, since he was brought up and lived in Russia from early childhood, more often his name there sounded like Sergey, less often as Serban. In adulthood, he signed all documents and letters exclusively with the name Sergey. Only the name Sergey is found in the correspondence between his older sister Maria and his brothers Antiochus, Matvey, and Konstantin.

³¹ I. Shimko, *Lichnost' knjazhny Marii Dmitrievny Kantemir* [Personality of Princess Maria Dmitrievna Cantemir], *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshhenija* [Journal of the Ministry of Public Education], Saint Petersburg, 1891, pp. 274-276; Ibidem, *Novye dannye k biografii knjazja Antioha Kantemira i ego blizhajshih rodstvennikov* [New data

As has been shown above, the diplomatic passport of Antiochus Cantemir is of particular importance as a historical source for research in the field of Cantemir family studies. To know history, it is not enough to have facts, one must have data, especially sources containing information and semantic load. This article aimed to explore not only one of the pages of Antiochus Cantemir's diplomatic activities but also, to a certain extent, develop the value of one unique source, to depict an era, based on a single document. Modern historical science differs from all prior historical research in that it evolves in a new information environment, appropriating certain approaches and impacting its formation. Now the objective is to provide a confirmed and accurate history based on fresh perspectives and research techniques, rather than simply produce historical works on a specific topic.

Annexes




Annex no. 1. *The diplomatic passport of Antiochus Cantemir.*

The Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), Fond 1374 *The Cantemirs*, coll. 1, fol. 142, p. 279.

on the biography of Prince Antiochus Cantemir and his closest relatives], p. 15-16.



Annex no. 2. *Portrait of Prince Antiochus Cantemir*. Unknown artist.
Oil on canvas. 76x61,5 cm. Copy from the original painting by J. Amigoni (1735).
Nizhny Novgorod State Art Museum. Accession No. NGHM-115.



Annex no. 3. The copy of "the jokey passport of Peter I" (1711).

The auxiliary collection of the National Museum of History of Moldova. FA-5433.
(Purchase Act no. 423, 1987).

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AN UNKNOWN TEXT BY AKA GÜNDÜZ AS AN EXAMPLE OF OTTOMAN–GERMAN JOINT WAR PROPAGANDA DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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Abstract: *The aim of this study is to unearth an unknown text by Aka Gündüz published in Germany in the in the second morning edition of 1 January 1915 of the 'Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt'. This text titled "O Young German!" is an example of German–Turkish joint war propaganda during the First World War. The text was handwritten and signed by Aka Gündüz. In the introductory part of the newspaper text, "The most important Turkish poet of our age, Ata Gündüz wrote a poem to the Germans at our request. [...] We have added a photograph of the original text in Ottoman (i. e. Turkish) language next to the German translation." note is included.*

According to archive records, Aka Gündüz did not publish it in Turkey. The text published in the 'Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt' was translated from Ottoman into German by Dr. Fr. Schrader. When the handwritten version is compared with the one published in the newspaper, it is revealed that there are some (intentional or unintentional) translation errors. Although the name of the poet was written as 'Ata Gündüz' instead of 'Aka Gündüz' at the beginning of the text, when the signature in the text is compared with the signatures in other texts by Aka Gündüz, it is seen that it belongs to him. It was written in a bespoke manner to show the German people the friendship and unity of the Turkish allies. The text was created with idyllic landscapes and an emotional atmosphere. Some sentences such as "You are nice and humane...", "As long as you and my Hungarian brother live, we will make this world strong", "Let's move on to war. Come on, so that there will be no savagery, no hatred, no enmity in the world" reveal the propaganda purpose of the text. This text is important in terms of both war propaganda studies and the identification of an unknown text in terms of Turkish literary history.

Keywords: Ottoman-German Alliance, Aka Gündüz, Propaganda, Enver Pasha, First World War.

Rezumat: *Un text necunoscut al lui Aka Gündüz ca exemplu al propagandei de război comune otomano-germane în timpul Primului Război Mondial.* Studiul pune în evidență un text necunoscut al poetului Aka Gündüz, publicat în „Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt” din Germania, la 1 ianuarie 1915, în cea de-a doua ediție matinală a ziarului. Textul intitulat „O, tinere german!” reprezintă un exemplu de propagandă comună germano-turcă din timpul Primului Război Mondial. Textul a fost scris de mână și semnat de Aka Gündüz. În partea introductivă a textului ziarului este scris: „Cel mai important poet turc al epocii noastre, Ata Gündüz a scris o poezie pentru germani la cererea noastră. [...] Am adăugat o fotografie a textului original în limba otomană (adică turcă), lângă traducerea germană”.

Potrivit înregistrărilor de arhivă, Aka Gündüz nu a publicat acest text în Turcia. Textul publicat în „Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt” a fost tradus de dr. Fr. Schrader, din turcă în germană. Când se compară textul scris de mână cu textul publicat în ziar, se vede că există unele erori de traducere (intenționate sau neintenționate). La începutul textului, numele poetului a fost scris ca „Ata Gündüz” în loc de „Aka Gündüz”. Când semnătura de pe text este comparată cu semnăturile din alte texte ale lui Aka Gündüz, se vede că aceasta îi aparține. Evident, textul a fost scris „la comandă”, pentru a arăta poporului german prietenia și unitatea aliaților turci, fiind împănăt cu pasaje idilice, pentru a crea o atmosferă emoționantă. Câteva propoziții precum „Ești draguț și uman...”, „Atâta timp cât tu și fratele meu maghiar vei trăi, vom face această lume puternică”, „Hai să trecem la război. Haide, ca să nu existe în lume sălbăcie, ură, dușmănie” dezvăluie scopul propagandistic al textului. Acest text este important atât în ceea ce privește studiile de propagandă de război, cât și identificarea unui text necunoscut din istoria literaturii turce.

INTRODUCTION

It is inevitable to seek alliances among countries before great upheavals and world wars. This situation, which we can closely follow in world politics today, was also experienced before the First World War. Due to its geopolitical position, Turkey – a country established after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire – has been more or less affected by all kinds of tensions in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Therefore, it has to be part of the game in the plans related to the geography above.

The Ottoman Empire decided to join the First World War with the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria) against the Allied Powers (England, France, and the Russian Empire forming the Triple Entente) due to

following reasons: a) Hope to gain economic independence via getting rid of capitulations¹, b) Desire to create a modern economic system by radical reforms, c) Awareness of Germany's respect for the Ottoman Empire's integrity and survival, and d) Hope to reinforce their regional security by constructing a Balkan bloc with Bulgaria and Romania.²

Before the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had tried to get closer to the Entente Powers. As a result of not receiving a positive response from them, it made an alliance with Germany. In fact, it should not be thought that this alliance emerged suddenly.

Except for the geographic position of the Ottoman Empire, Germany was right not to favour the latter as a military ally due to many aspects (educationally backward, industrially underdeveloped, financially bankrupt, and lacking enough resources). Conversely, the Ottomans did trust Germany because the Germans had not occupied any Ottoman territory up to the First World War.³

Starting from the 1880s, especially during the reign of Wilhelm II (1888–1918), the Germans were an important figure and example for the Turks from economic, political, and military points of view. For the Germans, the Turkish homeland was a source of raw materials, a market, and a means of directing the Muslim geography by the effect of the caliphate. The intensification of interest towards German technology during the reign of Abdulhamid II evolved into a strong German admiration due to the problems encountered during the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (*İttihat ve Terakki* in Turkish) government.⁴

¹ For detailed information about Ottoman Capitulations, see Hilal Çiftçi, *Mediation as a Diplomatic Tool in Ottoman Capitulations*, in "Codrul Cosminului", Vol. XXVIII, 2022, no. 1, p. 29–54.

² Mesut Uyar, *Ottoman Strategy and War Aims during the First World War*, in Holger Afflerbach (Ed.), *The Purpose of the First World War: War Aims and Strategies*, Oldenbourg, De Gruyter, 2015, p. 165–166; Mehmet Biçici, *Memories of the Ottoman Empires Entry into the First World War*, in "Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences", Vol. 33, 2014, Issue 3, p. 693–722.

³ For detailed information, see Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 2001, p. 15; Edip Öncü, *The Beginnings of Ottoman-German Partnership: Diplomatic and Military Relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire Before the First World War*, Master Thesis in History, the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, 2003, p. 70–71.

⁴ İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu* [German Influence in the Ottoman Empire], İstanbul, Alkım Publications, 2006, p. 135–145.

Before the First World War, the CUP regime's completely taking over the administration of the Ottoman Empire had marked the beginning of the golden age of the Turkish–German Friendship. Especially Enver Pasha, one of the most prominent figures of the CUP, encouraged entry of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire in the First World War on the same front against the British, French, and Russians.⁵ On the one hand, Enver Pasha believed that he could realize the *Touran Ideology*⁶ with the support of the Germans. On the other hand, Germany thought that, since the Ottomans held the caliphate, it could mobilize the Muslim people against the British and French through the religious leadership of the Muslims.⁷

It cannot be denied that Enver Pasha was one of the biggest factors in the entry of the Turks in the war on the side of the Germans in the First World War. Although Enver Pasha's closeness to the Germans is frequently mentioned in history books, we are aware of the different dimensions of this closeness in some recent scientific studies. For example, the fact that the letters written by German Naval Attaché Humann to Enver Pasha in 1915 were unearthed by Sezen Kılıç shows how much the Ottoman Empire was politically and socially connected to Germany at that time.⁸ Kılıç – pointing to the origin of the friendship between Humann and Enver Pasha – shows the sources of Enver Pasha's trust to the Germans in the person of Humann.

⁵ Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, in Marian Kent (Ed.), *Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2005, p. 117-135; Caner Çakı, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndaki Alman Propaganda Kartpostallarında Kullanılan Karikatürlerde Türklerin Sunumunun Göstergebilimsel Açısından İncelenmesi* [The Semiotic Study of the Presentation of the Turks in the Caricatures used in German Propaganda Postcards during the First World War], in "Akdeniz Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi" [The Journal of Akdeniz University's Faculty of Communication], 2018, No. 29, p. 77.

⁶ Ziya Gökalp – the father of modern Turkish nationalism, poet and sociologist – states that "To a Turk the homeland is neither Turkey nor Turkistan/ But a Big and Eternal country that is Touran". The first phase is creating a 'nationalist Turkey', the second phase 'Oguzism' (uniting the Turks West of the Caspian Sea) and final objective 'Touranism' (uniting all the Turks under one state). See detailed information about Touran Ideology: Alihan Limoncuoglu, *The Evolution of Turkish Nationalism between 1904 and 1980*, PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, UK, 2015, pp. 54, 61, 71; Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* [Components of Turkism], İstanbul, İnkılap Publication, 2009.

⁷ Michael Howard, *The First World War*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003; Çakı, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndaki...*, p. 77.

⁸ Sezen Kılıç, *Alman Deniz Ataşesi Humann'ın Mektuplarında Enver Paşa* [Enver Pasha in the Letters of the German Naval Attaché Humann], in "Bilig", Spring 2016, No. 77, p. 109-130.

According to German historians, Humann is one of the most important representatives of Germany in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War due to his dialogue with many Ottoman statesmen (especially Enver Pasha).⁹ Humann was born in Izmir in 1878 as the son of German archaeologist and engineer Carl Humann (who found the Bergama ruins). He grew up with Enver Pasha in Turkey, where he spent twelve years of his childhood, and their friendship continued constantly via meeting and writing letters. Papen – another close friend of Humann's – used the phrase 'milk brotherhood'¹⁰ to explain the degree of closeness of Humann and Enver Pasha. After returning to Germany in 1890 and completing his school education, Humann started his career as an officer in the German Naval Forces. He worked for a while in the intelligence branch of the German Naval Ministry, and, in the autumn of 1913, he was assigned to Istanbul.¹¹ He officially served as Naval Attaché from 1915 until he was summoned to Germany in 1917. Sezen Kılıç emphasizes that the event of hoisting the Turkish flag on the German ships *Goeben* and *Breslau*, which led the Turks to enter the First World War, was said by some German historians to be Humann's masterful plan. While it is observed in Humann's letters that he felt a great sincerity and friendship starting from his address to Enver Pasha, we also understand how much he guided Enver Pasha politically with his harsh and commanding style from time to time.

On the one hand, the unity of Germany with the Turks enabled the Turks to benefit from Germany's advanced technologies, war propaganda techniques, and all kinds of military experience during the First World War. On the other hand, despite the success of the Turkish soldiers on the battlefield, when the whole of the war is considered, the martyrdom of the soldiers on many distant and close fronts and the acceptance of being defeated together with the Germans have been

⁹ Mustafa Çolak, *Enver Paşa; Osmanlı-Alman İttifakı* [Enver Pasha; Ottoman-German Alliance], İstanbul, Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2008; Şükrü Hanioglu, *Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa* [Enver Pasha in His Own Letters], İstanbul, Der Yayınları, 1989.

¹⁰ Sources emphasize that Enver Pasha admired the Germans due to the atmosphere in the military school and that his admiration was reinforced after his appointment as attaché to Berlin in 1909. The main sources and Enver Pasha's memoirs do not mention his friendship with Humann. Based on German archival sources (Archiv der Marine, Kriegsakten 1-105 (60876) Enver Pascha: 1-27), Sezen Kılıç mentions the childhood acquaintance between Enver Pasha and Humann and their correspondence. This information about Enver Pasha is the first data that has emerged for the first time in Turkish history and has the power to reshape our perspective.

¹¹ Kılıç, *Alman Deniz Ataşesi Humann'ın...*, p. 111.

painful in terms of Turkish history.

WAR, PROPAGANDA, AND LITERATURE

Propaganda was used actively by Alliance Power and Central Powers during the First World War. Several books have been published by some authors (George Creel¹² in the United States, Sir Campbell Stuart¹³ in England, Nicolai in Germany, Waitz and Tonnelet in France) who held responsible propaganda positions during the War.¹⁴ Literature review shows that the number of studies on German propaganda efforts is very limited during the First World War. Fondren explains this on account of its “being written off as either negligible or too ham-fisted to be worth studying.”¹⁵ The term propaganda is explained as “the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols”,¹⁶ “the war of ideas on ideas”,¹⁷ “a kind of advertising – or vice versa”¹⁸. War propaganda is defined as “demoralisation of the enemy”¹⁹. The First World War brought forth propaganda wars as well as the front wars of between Germany and England with its allies.

The propaganda activities of the British against the Turkish soldiers in a concrete way can be seen especially during the Çanakkale War (Dardanelles, Gallipoli Campaign).²⁰ For example, short and striking brochures explaining that

¹² George Creel, *How We Advertised America*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1920.

¹³ Sir Campbell Stuart, *Secrets of Crewe House; The Story of a Famous Campaign*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1920.

¹⁴ Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, New York, Peter Smith, 1938, p. 1.

¹⁵ Elisabeth Fondren, *Fighting an Armed Doctrine: The Struggle to Modernize German Propaganda during World War I (1914–1918)*, in “Journalism & Communication Monographs”, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 4, p. 257.

¹⁶ Harold D. Lasswell, *The Theory of Political Propaganda*, in “The American Political Science Review”, Vol. 21, 1927, No. 3, p. 627.

¹⁷ Idem, *Propaganda Technique...*, p. 12.

¹⁸ Fiona Reynoldson, *The Home Front Propaganda*, England, Wayland, 1991, p. 4.

¹⁹ Edward L. Bernays, *The Marketing of National Policies: A Study of War Propaganda*, “Journal of Marketing”, Vol. 6, 1942, No. 3, p. 237.

²⁰ The British benefited from well-known writers, scientists, intelligence personnel, and politicians, as well as expert journalists in their propaganda units. Wellington House, which has a great infrastructure and painting, photography, and cinema departments, carried out propaganda activities by publishing various books, brochures and newspapers. For more information, see: Servet Avcı, *Birinci Dünya Savaşında İngiliz Propagandası* [British Propaganda in the First World War], Ankara, Kim Yayınları, 2004.

the Union and Progress, deceived by the Germans, had brought the Ottoman Empire into the war, that the general situation of the Ottoman country was getting worse day by day, the mistake of the Holy Jihad, and the desire of the Germans to own the Turkish homeland, were thrown to the fronts by the British from airplanes and balloons at regular intervals.²¹ Despite all the negativities, the Turks did not stay idle and made similar counter-propaganda at the front to the extent of the possibilities at hand. War propaganda based on literature constitutes the primary issue in this study.

“It can be said that the short history of the state’s realization of the need for propaganda literature does not date back to the Balkan War, and that it learned to use it as a support force, coinciding with the years of the First World War. There is no doubt that such an activity was initiated by the personal efforts of the Enver Pasha – Minister of War... Enver Pasha, who became acquainted with propaganda literature while he was still in Berlin as a major and an attaché, received the information he needed by visiting the Military Propaganda Office in Berlin during his trip to Germany in 1915. On his return, he initiated propaganda literature in the Ottoman Empire, especially with the encouragement of the ambassador Wamgenheim, the Naval Attaché Humann, and Liman von Sanders Pasha. Acting on the principle of ‘a book in every backpack’, the publication of works that the soldiers would read and gain morale on the front began later than Enver Pasha took his decision from force to action”.²²

It can be said that the Ottoman Empire tried to use the war propaganda techniques that it learned under the guidance of the Germans during the First World War as much as possible. “War Magazine” (Turk Harb Mecmuası), which started to be published by the Ministry of War in 1915 at the beginning of the war, created an important psychological effect with its photographs of the front and soldiers on quality paper. As mentioned above, the books ordered by the Ministry

Ömer Çakır, *Türk Şiirinde Çanakkale Muharebeleri* [Battles of Çanakkale in Turkish Poetry], Ankara, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 2004, pp. 38-95; Nesime Ceyhan Akça, *Gallipoli Campaign in the Poems of British-Australian Soldier/Poet Geoffrey Wall*, in “RumeliDe Journal of Language and Literature Studies”, 2023, No. 33, p. 444.

²¹ Hamit Pehlivanlı, *Çanakkale Muharebeleri Sırasında Müttefiklerin Propagandası ve Karşı Propaganda* [Allied Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda during Çanakkale Battles], in “Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi”, Vol. 7, 1991, No. 21, pp. 535-552.

²² Metin Kayahan Özgül, *Harp Edebiyatına Harbî Bir Bakış* [The Looking Straight Ahead to War Literature], in Ömer Çakır (Ed.), *Türk Harp Edebiyatı Konulu 1. Uluslararası Türkiyat Sempozyumu Bildiri Kitabı* [Proceeding Book of 1st International Turkic Symposium on Turkish War Literature], Ankara, Berikan, 2014, p. 10.

of War were to give morale to the soldiers. Taking artists to the Çanakkale Front (Gallipoli Campaign) for observation is also a propaganda activity that should not be forgotten.²³ At the beginning of the war, it is seen that especially Turkish writers fully supported the war in the press. In the first two years of the war, it can be said that the literary works about the war were included in the newspapers and magazines, even if not intensely. However, the worsening of the conditions in 1918–1919 affected literary production in a negative way. The impact of heavy censorship in the press is undeniable in this.²⁴

The works of many literary figures, especially Mehmed Emin and Ziya Gökalp, were printed in thousands of copies and distributed to the army free of charge. Their costs were funded by the budget of the Ministry of War. After a while, it is seen that especially poetry books were added to the war texts due to their short, effective, and memorable features. The first work on this path will be a poem by Yusuf Ziya (Ortaç), entitled *Akından Akına* [From the Raid to the Flood], and many works will be published later. It can be said that the real rise and spread of the national literature movement took place after this date; in other words, national literature developed under the wings of Enver Pasha.²⁵

The Germans – allies of the Ottoman Empire – opened war literature and painting exhibitions in Istanbul, Konya, Aleppo, and Baghdad, and tried to raise awareness of the course of the war by establishing information offices.²⁶ War painting exhibitions were also organised in Vienna and Berlin, and Turkish painters participated in these exhibitions with their works.²⁷

Cartoons in the First World War, where propaganda was used more intensely than ever before, became a propaganda weapon by which the enemy countries satirized each other,²⁸ as well as a tool that made the parties accept their

²³ Nesime Ceyhan Akça, *Osmanlı'nın Cihan Harbi'nin Hikâyesi* [The Ottoman Empire's War's "Story"], in "TYB Akademi", Vol. 4, 2014, No. 11, p. 92-93.

²⁴ Nesime Ceyhan, *II. Meşrûtiyet Dönemi Türk Hikâyesi (1908-1918)* [The Turkish Story of the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918)], İstanbul, Selis Publications, 2009.

²⁵ Özgül, *Harp Edebiyatına Harbî Bir Bakış*, p. 11.

²⁶ Erol Koroğlu, *Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1914-1918): Propagandadan Milli Kimlik İnşasına* [Turkish Literature and the First World War (1914-1918): From Propaganda to the Construction of National Identity], İstanbul, İletişim Publications, 2004, p. 47.

²⁷ Mustafa Selçuk, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sürecinde Harbiye Nezareti'nin 'Çanakkale Kahramanlığını Yaşatma' Amaçlı Faaliyetleri* [The Activities of Ministry of War for Cherishing and Heroism of Gallipoli during the First World War], in "Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi", Vol. 1, 2012, No. 2, p. 229-234.

²⁸ Caner Çakı, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndaki Alman...*, p. 80.

allies and make the events seem reasonable. Caner Çakı has interpreted the Turkish image on the postcards printed in Germany during World War I in his article. He concluded that while trying to establish Turkish-German friendship in the drawings on the postcards, the perception that the Turks served the Germans was also prepared. It is understood from the drawings that Turks were very eager to enter the alliance. They were drawn as small and weak compared to the Germans and Hungarians to show them in need of protection, but they are strong and fearless people who promise victory in wars.²⁹

The German press, which did not hesitate to commemorate the outstanding success of the Turkish soldiers, which they supported in all aspects (military consulting and ammunition delivery), especially in the Battle of Çanakkale, was also criticized for the danger that they could pamper the Turks and that the Turks could only claim this victory for themselves.³⁰ While the war was going on, “*Illustrierten Zeitung*” published a special issue (No. 3803, 16 May 1916). It is important in terms of the propaganda of the Turkish-German alliance towards the German people.

After the announcement of the alliance with the Germans, the Turks resorted to propaganda activities to legitimize this alliance in the eyes of the people. “The activities of imposing German admiration, initiated through the civil and military press, were conveyed to the public with very interesting headlines in the newspaper columns.”³¹ Upon the Ottoman Empire’s participation in the First World War by making an alliance with Germany, the former was subjected to intense criticism both inside and outside the country and, for this reason, the Ottoman Empire began to carry out a praising propaganda activity concerning the Germans in the press. The article titled *If Only Our Enemies Were Germans* by Mahmut Muin in the “Navy Magazine” (*Harb Mecmuası* in Turkish) is one of the typical articles containing German propaganda that appeared in the Ottoman press at the time. While the newspapers praised German industry, army, and technology, their treatment of the people on the battlefields became part of the propaganda. The war ethic of the German soldier was praised by saying that the German soldier who occupied Paris did not even touch or mistreat prostitutes³².

This shows that their activities are carried out very consciously. A similar

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³⁰ Necmettin Alkan, *Alman Kaynaklarına Göre Çanakkale Savaşı ve Zaferi* [Çanakkale War and Victory According to German Sources], in “*Belleten*”, Vol. 80, 2016, No. 289, p. 911-912.

³¹ Mehmet Ali Karaman, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı-Alman İttifakını Meşrulaştırma Çabaları* [Ottoman Efforts to Legitimize German Alliance within World War I], in “*Osmanlı Mirası Araştırmaları Dergisi*”, Vol. I, 2014, No. 1, p. 57.

³² Karaman, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı-Alman...*, p. 54.

attitude is observed in the only humour magazine, named “Karagöz”,³³ that was published during the war. In “Karagöz”, “the negativities of the war were not shared with the reader and the Germans, with whom we were allies, were always portrayed as strong, mighty, and dominating everything. In those days, the majority of the media were heavily broadcasting in favour of Germany. Talat Pasha mentions that in the first two years of the war, neither the administration nor the people believed that the Germans would be defeated in the war. (...) In «Karagöz»’s cartoon dated August 17, 1914, the German Emperor Wilhelm I was portrayed as a wrestler, who took the Austro-Hungarian Emperor Franz Jozeph on his shoulders, and lifted the French President Raymond Poincaré and Russian Tsar Nicholas II with his hands.”³⁴

It is noteworthy that Germany intended to present its desire to provide more convincing information about the ongoing war to its citizens through cinema and that it appointed one of its intelligence officers, Ulrich, with the permission of Turkey, to take images from the Turkish fronts. In the meantime, Enver Pasha’s decision to open a Central Army Cinema Department (SOND) within the Ottoman army with its function in the German army, with the effect of his testimonies during his trip to Germany, and the appointment of Hungarian citizen Sigmund Weinberg as the head of the unit and Fuat Uzkınay, one of the first filmmakers,³⁵

³³ Karagöz is the most striking example of the shadow plays in the traditional Turkish performing arts. The comical shows shaped around the dialogues of two heroes named ‘Karagöz’ and ‘Hacivat’ based on misunderstandings are watched with interest to this day. “Karagöz” Humour Magazine, which began its publication life with the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908, continued to be published after the Republic, albeit with interruptions. “Karagöz” Humour Magazine closely followed the war, especially during the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence, and gave morale to the Turkish people through its cartoons and articles. For detailed information, see Fevzi Çakmak, *Karagöz Mizah Dergisi Sütunlarında Birinci Dünya Savaşı* [First World War in the Columns of Karagöz Humour Magazine], in Mustafa Daş et al. (Ed.), 2. *Uluslararası Tarih Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı-100. Yılında Birinci Dünya Savaşı* [Proceeding of 2nd International History Symposium on First World War Centenary], 16-18 October 2014, İzmir, 2015, pp. 361-381; Fevzi Çakmak, *Aydede ve Karagöz Mizah Dergilerinde Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı* [Turkish War of Independence in Aydede and Karagöz Humor Magazines], *Büyük Taarruzun 90. Yılında Millî Mücadele ve Zafer Yolu Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı* [Proceedings of the International Symposium on the National Struggle and the Path to the Victory on the 90th Anniversary of the Great Assault (2-4 October 2012), Vol. 2, Ankara, Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayını, 2014, pp. 1113-1142.

³⁴ Çakmak, *Karagöz Mizah Dergisi Sütunlarında Birinci Dünya Savaşı ...*, p. 364-365.

³⁵ Selçuk, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sürecinde...*, p. 225-226.

as his assistant is one of the important indicators of our joint action with our allies.

As seen, both Germany and the Ottoman Empire tried to consolidate their unity and power in the war in the eyes of the people via propaganda in similar ways.

AKA GÜNDÜZ AND WAR PROPAGANDA

Aka Gündüz (his real name is Enis Avni), one of the most important writers of the National Literature period,³⁶ who is mentioned together with Ömer Seyfeddin, has recorded the loss of land of the Ottoman Empire moment by moment in his stories, poems, and plays since 1911. Apart from the Tripoli War, the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the days of the National Struggle were also immortalized in the stories of Aka Gündüz and his poems (although little known). Aka Gündüz showed how responsible he was as a writer during the war period in his books titled *Türk Kalbi* (*Hearth of Turk*, 1911, story), *Türk'ün Kitabı* (*Book of Turk*, 1913, story), *Bozgun* (*Defeat*, 1918, poetry), *Muhterem Katil* (*Reverend Killer*, 1914, stage play) written with the thought of Turanism, *Yarım Türkler* (*Half Turks*, 1919, stage play), *Asker İçin Seçilmiş Yazılar* (*Selected Essays for the Soldier*, ?), *İki Süngü Arasında* (*Between Two Bayonets*, 1929, long story). The topics that, in his writings, Aka Gündüz shared with his nation on the pages of newspapers and magazines without losing hope include the families waiting for the soldiers behind the front, the Turkish friendship or enmity in the broken lands of the Ottoman Empire, as well as scenes of war.

³⁶ National Literature is the term representing the period between 1911 and 1923 in the history of Turkish Literature. It is a fact that nationalism was supported by state policies under the Committee of Union and Progress after the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908. The manifesto written by Ömer Seyfeddin in the magazine "Genç Kalemler" [Young Pens] in 1911 is considered as the beginning of National Literature. This date also marks as the beginning of the Ottoman Empire's entry in the period of hot wars. The Tripoli War (1911), the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the First World War (1914–1918) and the National Struggle / War of Independence (1919–1922) were the years in which the Turks' life-and-death struggle took place. It is natural that the literature that emerged during these years, when unity was needed as a nation, adopted a nationalist discourse. For detailed information about National Literature period, see: Nesime Ceyhan, *Millî Edebiyat Devrinde Hikâye ve Roman (1911-1923)* [Story and Novel in the National Literature Period (1911–1923)], in Metin Kayahan Özgül (Ed.), *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihine Bir Bakış: Yeni Türk Edebiyatı* [An Overview of the History of Turkish Literature: New Turkish Literature], Ankara, Kurgan Edebiyat Publications, 1913, pp. 333-366; Orhan Okay, *Millî Edebiyat Akımı* [National Literature Movement], in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 30, TDV Publications, p. 72-74.

The fact that Aka Gündüz used a pen name in many of his articles published in newspapers and magazines is the main reason why many of his works have not yet been revealed. Aka Gündüz, who published his articles in various magazines and newspapers since the age of sixteen, worked for many years as founder, editor-in-chief or responsible in the magazines named “Kadın” (1908), “Karagöz” (1908–1918, humour magazine), and “Alay” (1920, humour magazine).³⁷ “Aka Gündüz, who has an organic relationship with the CUP, joined the New Language Movement advocating the simplification in language and literature for the construction of national identity, after the Woman magazine. (...) He adopted Turkism as a cultural ideology and defended Turkism in language.”³⁸ “Nationalism, heroism and patriotism are the dominant qualities seen in the poems, plays and novels written by Aka Gündüz during the Second Constitutional Era.”³⁹

Aka Gündüz’s initial closeness to the CUP, his Turanist thoughts and his active writing life in a magazine such as “Karagöz”, which was actively used in war propaganda, especially during the First World War, provides an understanding of the background of the text that is the subject of this article. The short information at the beginning of the text informs that the Germans asked Aka Gündüz to write a text describing the feelings of Turks towards their German allies and that Aka Gündüz sent this text to them.

AN UNKNOWN TEXT BY AKA GÜNDÜZ: “O YOUNG GERMAN”

This text, which we did not come across in Turkish sources, was published in the newspaper “Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt” on 1 January 1915. This text, which the Germans demanded to show the strength of Turkish–German friendship, was written by Aka Gündüz and sent to the newspaper. The text was published in the newspaper in Ottoman alphabet (in Aka Gündüz’s handwriting)

³⁷ For detailed information about Aka Gündüz’s life, pen-names and works, see: Abide Doğan, *Aka Gündüz*, Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989, pp. 18-110; Sema Uğurcan, *Aka Gündüz*, in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 2, İstanbul, TDV Publications, 1989, p. 208-209; Metin Oktay, *Aka Gündüz’ün Hayatı, Sanatı ve Eserleri* [Aka Gündüz’s Life, Art and Works], PhD Thesis, Selçuk University Institute of Social Sciences, Konya, 2008.

³⁸ Yaşar Zorlu, *Mütareke İstanbul’unda Mizah Gazetesi ‘Alay’ ve Politik Tavrı* [The Humor Newspaper *Alay* During the Armistice Process in İstanbul and Its Political Attitude], in “*E-Journal of New World Sciences Academy*”, Vol. 10, 2015, No. 1, p. 20.

³⁹ Ahmet Demir, *Aka Gündüz’ün Bozgun Adlı Şiir Kitabında Milli Romantik Duyuş Tarzı ve ‘Türk’ İmgesi* [National Romanticism and ‘Turkish’ Image in the Poetry Book Titled *Bozgun* Written by Aka Gündüz], *SOBİDER*, V, 2018, No. 26, p. 58.

and German (translated by Dr. Fr. Schrader).

The English translation of the text from Ottoman alphabet is as follows (See: Figures 1 and 2):

"O Young German

I feel the beating beats of your heart with an unquenchable fervour in my own heart; Does excitement and love caress your heart? Which captive, which angel sends and binds the same blow that strikes these two hearts at once?

I know the power that dominates your vast soul that even this endless universe cannot fill: the love of victory.

I have this love in my broad soul, which has been crying for years, happy and dejected. We, you and me, two lovers; let's run to the east, west, to the snowy mountains, to the climates where the rivers cascade to find our beloved! This road that you opened with your sword leads to the land of truth, I am with you, come! Let's not return without conquering this land.

It's not blood that comes out of the enemy's chest that you pierced with your bullet. It is the tears of humanity that have been waiting for salvation from us for centuries; Come! Let's not cut our fire until we dry it with the fire in our hearts and comfort it!

You are brave. You are the hero, you are the saint and the human being. So you are German. O young German who mingled with my soul with all its nature! Know that I am Turkish and I am young too. Let's shake our sword-wielding, rifle-firing hands. May the divine power in them also know each other. You, me and my brother Hungarian are quite sure that the universe will make this world a man.

Sounds from the horizon are not gunshots; history laughs. It laughs with joy as it sees real humanity and real civilization emerging.

O, young silk-haired friend! Let the flowers of (Hyde Park) fall on him when the hand of the angels of victory raises his proud head. I too would like to sing your epic as we pass through the snow-covered Caucasian groves.

O young German with golden spurs, who makes the ruins he treads rosy! When the sun-covered cloud horse of the nymph of splendour and glory sets its proud foot upon its shores, let the (Volga) stand in reverence to give you way, and let it not flow. I would like to tell your story to the slowly flowing (Nile) under the palm leaves illuminated by the crescent that night.

Give me your hand, young brother! Let's go ahead! Forward until there are no more savagery, grudges, and enemies in the world!

Aka Gündüz

1 January 1915

It is obvious that the text was written in the style of prose poetry. Considering that the Ottoman Empire officially entered the First World War on 11 November 1914, the date of 1 January 1915 shows the first months of the alliance between the Germans and the Ottoman Empire. On this date, the Çanakkale (Gallipoli, Dardanelles) Front was not opened yet (19 February 1915). Mutual trust and friendship should be felt to the peoples of both sides. As mentioned above, in the first two years of the war, there was not the slightest hesitation in the Ottoman Empire that the Germans would emerge from the war in defeat. At the same time, the German people should be persuaded about the Turks.

Aka Gündüz wrote this text, most likely, upon a request made by German officials of Turkish officials. Rather than contacting Aka Gündüz directly with the German newspaper, it seems the most logical way to reach him with the request of the newspaper's propaganda unit from the Turkish state because it is impossible for Aka Gündüz to be known as a poet in Germany at that time. In fact, Aka Gündüz was known more as a writer in Istanbul at that time, not as a poet. It has been mentioned above that Enver Pasha was aware of war propaganda techniques as a major while he was in Berlin as an attaché, and that he visited the Military Propaganda Office in Berlin during his trip to Germany in 1915. It is certain that this text by Aka Gündüz is also a part of the joint propaganda activity of the Turkish and German units.⁴⁰

The stylistic similarity of the lines written by Aka Gündüz in the last paragraph of the prose text called *Open Letter to the Army* [*Orduya Açık Mektup* in Turkish] in his book, *Selected Articles for the Soldier* [*Asker İçin Seçilmiş Yazılar* in Turkish], with the Ottoman text published in Germany, vocabulary, addresses, emphatic expressions, imperative expressions, exclamations show that there should be no doubt that the text that forms the basis of our article was written by Aka Gündüz: "Don't come before you turn the enemy, turn off his light! You are young, you are brave, you are noble! Army! The road you take leads to Sofia. Won't you send me a message with the morning stars when you get there and read the Morning Prayer! Oh, send it and in an irreparable moment, let's do it together for a while..."

⁴⁰ Although it does not have as strong an organization as the British, The Ottoman Empire carried out war propaganda activities with guidance and support from the Germans. For example, the publication of the "War Journal" [*Harp Mecmuası* in Turkish] in 1915, the preparation of a book by the Ministry of War (Harbiye Nezareti), the taking of a delegation of poets, writers, and artists to the Çanakkale Front for the intention of sightseeing and observation. For more information, see: Ceyhan Akça, *Osmanlı Cihan Harbinin Hikayesi...*, p. 93.

Braves... Behind you, a nation consisting of orphans, women and innocents remained. *You are young, you are brave, you are noble!* Army! Do not leave the orphans to the square, the women to the enemy, and the innocent to disappointment. Right now, peace be upon you, may your path be clear. *Let the fire spread always to your right and left;* don't bend your arm from anything. Peace be upon you, may your path be clear."⁴¹

The text is handwritten and signed by Aka Gündüz. Although the name of the poet is written as "Ata Gündüz" at the beginning of the text, when the signature is compared with the signatures in other texts of Aka Gündüz, it is clear that it belongs to him. The text was translated from Ottoman Alphabet to German by Dr. Fr. Schrader. It is understood that Schrader misread the K(af) (ك in Ottoman Alphabet) in the Aka expression as T(e) (ت in Ottoman Alphabet) in the signature due to the handwriting. Moreover, before and after these years, there was no Turkish writer named Ata Gündüz. The person in question is Aka Gündüz (Enis Avni), a famous writer-poet who produced many war literature works at that time and before.

The difficulty in the introduction of this prose praise text written by Aka Gündüz for the German soldier is an important sign that it was written at the request of the other party. In the text created with idyllic landscapes and an emotional atmosphere, the sentences such as "*You are kind and humane... Because you are a German...*", "*As long as you and my Hungarian brother live, we will make this world strong, and whip into shape.*", "*Extend your hand my young friend...! Let's move on to war. Come on, so that there will be no savagery, no hatred, no enmity in the world.*" reveal the propaganda purpose of the text. It gains fluency after the first few paragraphs.

CONCLUSIONS

It is seen that Dr. Fr. Schrader, who translated the text into German, did it quite freely, and re-created a poetic text by interpreting the places he could not read in his mind. The most obvious mistake is to read 'Hyde Park' as 'Hyderabad'. Aka Gündüz wishes the flowers of Hyde Park to be poured on the German soldier when victory is achieved. Meanwhile, he will tell their epic in the Caucasian groves. These spatial references indicate that at the end of the joint victory, one of the two allies will be the dominant element in the West (England) and the other

⁴¹ Aka Gündüz, *Asker İçin Seçilmiş Yazılar* [Selected Articles for the Soldier], İstanbul, Matbaai Askeriye, 1914, p. 98-99.

in the East (Russia). A similar intention is felt in the dream of the Volga River stopping its flow to give way to the German soldiers, and the author's telling of these heroic deeds to the Nile River. North to the Germans; the south is given to the Turks.

When we examine Aka Gündüz's book of poetry titled *Bozgun* [*Debacle* in English], published in 1918, leaving aside the poems about the Balkan War, it is seen that in his poems about the First World War, he sometimes mentions the British and French in a negative way and does not say any bad word about the Germans. Aka Gündüz, who mainly wrote poems about the Caucasian front in this book, tells a young Polish girl in his poem titled *Vistol Kızı* [Vistula Girl]⁴² not to be afraid and sad anymore because the Turkish soldiers have come to save them from their enemies. Here, too, not a word is used about our alliance with the Germans. In one of his poems, he invites the people of 'Iraq' and in another poem the people of 'Iran' to fight together with the Turks. But mainly anger towards the Russians and pity for the Caucasian people and their front and shame for not being able to meet them are felt. We can say that this text, which is different from the general atmosphere of Gündüz's poems, was written as a bespoke result, probably as part of a task, and that he did not need it to be published in Turkish. However, we think that this text is important both for the historiography of war, war propaganda studies, and for the identification of an unknown text in terms of the history of Turkish literature.

⁴² Aka Gündüz, *Bozgun* (written in *Ottoman Alphabet*), İstanbul, Dersaadet-Kanat Matbaası, 1918, p. 104-105.



Figure 1: *The front page of the Newspaper “Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt”, 1 January 1915, Germany.*

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ROMANIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORY OF MODERN UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR II

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Abstract: *The article deals with the organisation and operational activities of the Romanian military intelligence during World War II in the territory of modern Ukraine (1941–1944) based on Soviet counterintelligence documents from the funds of the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine and the USSR KGB documentary publications. Newly created in 1940, the Special Information Service (SSI), an authority fulfilling the functions of military intelligence and military counterintelligence, set up a special intelligence institution in the theatre of military operations: the Eastern Front Agency (Vulturul), with a network of centres (branches) and subordinate offices and residencies. SSI counterintelligence units managed to inflict significant blows on the Soviet underground and in some NKVD intelligence residencies in Odessa and Mykolaiv. The Romanian special service created training institutions for agents, radio operators, saboteurs, and couriers, as well as units of information and psychological confrontation, considering the study of public consciousness and mental characteristics of the enemy country's population.*

Keywords: *Romania, Special services, Ukraine, World War II, intelligence, counterintelligence, sabotage, propaganda.*

Rezumat: *Activitățile serviciilor speciale militare române pe teritoriul Ucrainei moderne în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Articolul analizează organizarea și activitățile operaționale ale Serviciului Special de Informații al României (Informații și Contrainformații militare) în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial, pe teritoriul Ucrainei modern, în perioada 1941-1944. Autorii introduc în circuitul științific o serie de documente*

ale organelor de contrainformații sovietice aflate în fondurile arhivelor Serviciului de Securitate al Ucrainei și în publicațiile fostului KGB. Serviciul Special de Informații (SSI) fusese reorganizat în 1940, îndeplinind concomitent funcții de informații și contrainformații militare (Birourile 1 și 2). SSI a înființat agenția de informații „Vulturul”, care acționa pe frontul de est, având o rețea de centre (filiale), birouri și rezidențe subordonate. SSI a reușit să dea lovituri semnificative serviciilor secrete sovietice, în zonele de operații NKVD din regiunile Odessa și Mykolaiv. De asemenea, a creat instituții de instruire pentru agenți, radio-operatori, sabotori și curieri și unități de informare și război psihologic, pe baza studierii caracteristicilor opiniei publice și a celor psihice ale populației țării inamice.

INTRODUCTION

In the period 1941–1944, the territory of modern Ukraine became one of the priority military theatres of World War II (1939–1945). As an ally of Hitler’s Germany, Romania had military intelligence and counterintelligence agencies actively participating in the ‘secret war’ in the territory of nowadays Ukraine. From late August 1944 de facto, and from September 12th on a contractual basis, Romania took part in the war on the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition, having lost, according to various data, 130,000–170,000 soldiers killed and wounded during the liberation of Europe from Nazism.

This paper introduces a set of documents of the Soviet special services into the scientific discourse to describe the Romanian intelligence activities through the lens of enemy documents (Soviet counterintelligence), which in turn can contribute to a comprehensive analysis of Romanian special services in the past.

In addition, the study will contribute to disclosing military-historical aspects of the Ukrainian past during World War II, the role of special services at the time, and the period of the confrontation between Soviet special services and rival intelligence. It opens up additional opportunities for studying other aspects of the military and political history of World War II, i. e. activities of the Romanian and Soviet special services during their confrontation in 1941–1944, the deployment of guerrilla and underground movement, the Ukrainian insurgent movement (with whom the Romanian intelligence established cooperation).

The scientific aim of the article is to study the evolution of the organisational structure of the central authority and peripheral operational bodies of Romanian military intelligence, forms and methods of their operational and service activities during the military campaigns in the territory of modern Ukraine in the period 1941–1944, based on little-known documents of the Soviet special services.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ISSUE

In the USSR, the issue of Romanian intelligence activities in the territory of modern Ukraine has been approached in scientific and historical papers on the activities of the Soviet underground and illegal residencies in the Romanian-occupied Southern Ukraine (primarily in Odessa and Mykolaiv). According to counterintelligence documents, a more detailed and professional study of the organisation, forms and methods of Romanian intelligence has been carried out in closed studies by scientific and pedagogical personnel of the USSR Committee for State Security (KGB). Romanian intelligence activities have been studied in the context of describing the structure and operational activities of the special services of Germany and its allies, the factors of the operational situation on the Eastern Front, the study of forms and methods of counterintelligence activities of SMERSH state security and military counterintelligence countering the reconnaissance and sabotage activities of the aggressors' special services.¹

In nowadays Ukraine, the topic of research has been described (including the works of Romanian scientists) in several publications on the history of development and activities of Romanian intelligence in the 20th century by Volodymyr Palyvoda and Artem Fylypenko, modern Ukrainian researchers of the past of the European countries' special services (National Institute for Strategic Studies).²

¹ P. Petrenko, *Bor'ba organov gosbezopasnosti s agenturnoj razvedkoj spetssluzhb fashistskoj Germanii v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [The Struggle of State Security Agencies with the Intelligence Agency of Fascist Germany during the Great Patriotic War], in "Trudy Vysshej Krasnoznamennoj shkoly KGB SSSR," 1985, № 35, pp. 56-65.; A. Tsvetkov, P. Petrenko, *Bor'ba sovetskoj kontrrazvedki s diversionno-razvedyvatel'nymi formirovaniyami protivnika v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [The Struggle of Soviet Counterintelligence with Sabotage and Intelligence Units of the Enemy during the Great Patriotic War], in "Trudy Vysshej Krasnoznamennoj shkoly KGB SSSR," 1985, № 34, pp. 68-77; Vasilii Korovin, *Sovetskaya kontrrazvedka v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [Soviet Counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War], in "Trudy Vysshej Krasnoznamennoj shkoly KGB SSSR," 1985, № 35, pp. 43-56.; Ivan Ustinov, *Iz istorii bor'by sovetskoj voennoj kontrrazvedki s nemecko-fashistskoj razvedkoj vo vremena vojny* [From the History of the Struggle of Soviet Military Counterintelligence with Nazi Intelligence during the War], in "Trudy Vysshej shkoly KGB pri SM SSSR," 1971, № 2, pp. 50-62.; Nikolai Dushin, *Sovetskaya voennaya kontrrazvedka v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [Soviet Military Counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War], in "Sbornik KGB SSSR," 1985, № 106, pp. 7-16.

² Volodymyr Palyvoda, *Spetsialni sluzhby Rumunii: vid 'Sihurantsy' do rozviduvalnoho*

Among the primary scientific sources of Ukrainian authors have been the works of Romanian researchers on the history of the Romanian special services during 1918–1945, primarily the works by Pavel Moraru, Ion Constantin, Cristian Troncotă, Daniel Diaconescu, Cezar Măț, Alin Spanu, Florin Pintilie, etc.³ Furthermore, these researchers have not used Soviet counterintelligence documents, which further update their scientific research. The authors of this paper have also outlined the activities of the Romanian intelligence in the works on the history of the Soviet special services in the territory of modern Ukraine during World War II.⁴

spivtovarystva [Romanian Special Services: from Sigurantsa to Intelligence Community], in "Vyklyky i ryzyky". Bezpekovi ohliad Tsentru doslidzhen' armiyi, konversiyi ta rozzbroyennya ["Challenges and Risks". Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies Security Review], 2017, No. 18 (81), pp. 24-33; Artem Fylypenko, *Rumunski spetssluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate*, chastyna 1-3 [Romanian Special Services in the 20th Century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, parts 1-3], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate>; <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-2> and <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/rumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-3> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

³ Pavel Moraru, *Romania și bătălia informațiilor între Prut și Bug (1940-1944)* [Romania and the Information Battle between Prut and Bug (1940–1944)], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2011, 324 p.; Pavel Moraru, *Serviciile secrete și Basarabia (1918-1991). Dicționar* [Intelligence Services and Bessarabia (1918–1991). Dictionary], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2008, 319 p.; Ion Constantin, *Gherman Pânte: între mit și realitate* [Gherman Pânte: Between Myth and Reality], Bucharest, Bucharest's Library Publishing House, 2010, 384 p.; Cristian Troncotă, *Mihail Moruzov și frontul secret* [Mihail Moruzov and the Secret Front], Bucharest, Elion Publishing House, 2004, 310 p.; Idem, *România și frontul secret 1859 – 1945* [Romania and the Secret Front], Bucharest, Elion Publishing House, 2007, 449 p.; Daniel Diaconescu, *Din istoria serviciului special de informații 1940-1945* [From the History of the Intelligence Service 1940–1945], Târgoviște, Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, 2018, 280 p.; Cezar Măț, *Serviciile secrete ale României în războiul mondial (1939-1945)* [The Intelligence Services of Romania in the World War (1939–1945)], Iași, Demiurg Publishing House, 2010, 380 p.; Alin Spânu, *Istoria serviciilor de informații/contrainformații românești în perioada 1919-1945* [The History of the Romanian Intelligence/Counterintelligence Services from 1919 to 1945], Iași, Demiurg Publishing House, 2010, 791 p.; Florin Pintilie, *Serviciul special de informații din România: 1939-1947* [The Intelligence Service of Romania: 1939–1947], Vol. 2, Bucharest, National Academy of Intelligence Publishing House, 2003, 1248 p.

⁴ Dmytro Viedienieiev, Oleksandr Lysenko, *Protydiia radianskykh spetssluzhb nimetskii*

THE RESEARCH SOURCES

The authors have introduced little-known documents into scientific discourse, which concern the structure, forms, and methods of operational and service activities of Romanian military intelligence agencies and which are stored in the funds of the Sectoral State Archive (SSA) of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU). These are documents of the Soviet special services containing data and analysis, stored in several funds of the State Security Service of Ukraine: Fund 2 (counterintelligence structures of state security bodies); Fund 9 (administrative documents); Fund 13 (collection of printed publications); Fund 16 (information documents).

Valuable data about the network and activities of Romanian military intelligence in the territory of modern Ukraine can be found in the information materials of the Chief Counterintelligence Directorate (GUKR) of the People's Defence Commissariat (NKO) SMERSH (Soviet military counterintelligence) and the Counterintelligence Directorates SMERSH of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts. Some of them were published in collections of documents by the USSR Committee for State Security (KGB), which were unavailable to a wide range of researchers at the time. From similar documentary editions, the authors have used the 5-volume collection *Soviet State Security Bodies in the Great Patriotic War*,⁵ special documentary editions *Activities of State Security Agencies during the Great Patriotic War*⁶ and *Soviet Military Counterintelligence*.⁷

rozvidtsi y kontrrozvidtsi na terytorii Ukrainy v 1941–1944 rr. [Countering by the Soviet Special Services of the Activities of German Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Territory of Ukraine in 1941–1944], in "Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal," 2015, No. 1, pp. 69–91.; Dmytro Viedienieiev, *Diialnist orhaniv ta viisk derzhavnoy bezpeky v Ukraini v period Druhoy svitovoy viiny (1939–1945 rr.)* [Activities of State Security Structures and Troops in Ukraine during World War II (1939–1945)], Kyiv, Natsionalna akademiia SBU, 2011, 98 p.

⁵ *Sovetskie organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti v Velikoj Otechestvennoy vojne: sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Soviet State Security Bodies in the Great Patriotic War: Collection of Documents and Materials], Moskva, Vysshaya shkola KGB SSSR, 1990, vol. V, 1264 p.

⁶ *Deyatel'nost' organov gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoy vojny. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Activities of State Security Agencies during the Great Patriotic War. Collection of Documents and Materials], Moskva, Vysshaya shkola KGB SSSR, 1964, 864 p.

⁷ *Sovetskaya voennaya kontrrazvedka. Sbornik dokumentov* [Soviet Military

PREPARING ROMANIAN SPECIAL SERVICES FOR THE WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION

In 1924, using the experience of Great Britain and France, Mihail Moruzov, the famous organizer and reformer of the Romanian special services, created the Secret Information Service (SSIAR), fulfilling the functions of foreign intelligence, military intelligence, and counterintelligence, subordinated first to the General Staff and later to the military. Romanian intelligence prioritised operational activities in Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, and the Soviet Union. According to American spies (after the defeat of Romania in 1944), Romanian intelligence had collected the best information about the USSR, surpassed only by Germany.⁸

After the abdication of King Carol II (September 1940) and the establishment of the dictatorship of Ion Antonescu, on November 12th, 1940, the latter created SSI, Special Information Service (SSI or Serviciul Special de Informații), which was directly subordinated to him, and, in administrative terms, to the Ministry of National Defence. The service was headed by Eugen Cristescu (1895–1950), an experienced officer and one of the former heads of the political police (*Rom.* Siguranța, *Eng.* Sigurantsa). Preparing for the offensive against the USSR, in May 1941, the SSI Mobile Echelon was formed, headed by Colonel Ioan Lissievici, an intelligence officer. According to Eugen Cristescu, it “included groups of employees of the counterintelligence section, section G for communications with foreign services, a technical photography section, a telephone and telegraph section, an automobile section with cars and trucks, an administrative section with bureaucratic personnel, service personnel, officers’ canteen, security... a total of about 100 people, who comprised a reduced version of the service, whose task was to carry out intelligence and counterintelligence activities in contact with the General Staff.”⁹

Counterintelligence. Collection of Documents], Vol. 3, Moskva, Vysshaya shkola KGB SSSR, 1984, 444 p.

⁸ Artem Fylypenko, *Rumunski spetsluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate, chastyna 1* [Romanian Special Services in the 20th Century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, part 1], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

⁹ Idem, *Rumunski spetsluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate, chastyna 2* [Romanian Special Services in the 20th Century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, part 2],

In early 1941, the School of Intelligence Agents was established, which trained agents for work abroad and within the country. They studied individually for better covertness and qualification. The school curriculum included the following disciplines: terrorism and sabotage (20 hours), political and social movements (16), communism (20), separatism (16), ethnic groups and religious sects (16), law (40), intelligence and counterintelligence activities (34), encryption (6), radio communication (14), reconnaissance methods (30), field reconnaissance classes (90), shooting training.¹⁰

The intelligence work of Romanian military intelligence against the USSR intensified as World War II approached. In particular, the report for the first half of 1939 (August 10th, 1939) by Amayak Kobulov, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR illustrated that in the reported period out of 109 detained violators of the state border 12 were Romanian intelligence agents (618 refugees fled to the territory of modern Ukraine from the Romanian side until November 1st, 1939). In the area of Odessa alone, in the first decade of December 1939, border guards detained 6 agents of the Romanian special services, including those with significant experience in intelligence activities. Interrogations and analysis of various materials conducted by Soviet counterintelligence revealed certain systemic features of the Romanian military intelligence. Firstly, selecting and recruiting agents against the USSR was carried out, as a rule, by operative personnel of information bureaus (intelligence bodies) of the Third and Fourth Army Corps (Chişinău and Chernivtsi, respectively), as well as separate 'special intelligence centres' A (Chernivtsi) and B (Chişinău). Secondly, special training of agents for Soviet Ukraine was conducted in Chişinău and intelligence offices at border crossings. The curriculum included the study of Soviet uniforms, ways of crossing the Dniester River, possession of weapons, and most importantly, mastering the methods of collecting information about military units, the location of barracks, highways, military construction sites, etc. And finally, the primary tasks of the agency during the reconnaissance were to study the fortifications of the border zone, the military units there, the location of border outposts, military garrisons in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other places, to recruit

in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-2> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

¹⁰ Idem, *Rumunski spetsluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate, chastyna 3* [Romanian special services in the 20th century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, part 3], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/rumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-3> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

informants, and to send them to Romania for training.¹¹

The intelligence bodies of the NKVD Border Troops noted joint activities of Romanian intelligence and representatives of German military intelligence in the border zone, particularly sending agents to the territory of present-day Ukraine.¹² At the same time, the Soviet special service acknowledged that the lack of proper filtering of refugees from Romania “definitely allows Romanian intelligence to send a significant amount of its agents into our territory, which remains out of our sight.”¹³

After the USSR annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940 and Romania entered the war against the USSR in 1941, SSI intelligence centres increased their activities: in Iași (headed by Lieutenant Colonel Trofin Macrinici) and in Suceava (Major Emil Tulbure). The centres were involved in sending agents across the state border to Bukovina and Bessarabia, directing them to collect data on the Soviet armed forces, state security agencies, public administration, the mood of the population in those regions, etc.¹⁴

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN SOVIET TERRITORY

During World War II, the chief intelligence body of Romania was the above-mentioned SSI, which fulfilled both intelligence and counterintelligence functions. At the time of Romania’s withdrawal from the war on the side of Germany, the SSI personnel numbered 917 people, including 89 senior and 24 junior officers, 502 officers, and 302 part-time officers; there were more than 140 cars, 35 radio stations, and a position-finder. The 1944–45 budget was set at 560 000 lei and additional funds were raised from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its diplomatic missions abroad, and other departments.¹⁵

According to the Tripartite Pact of November 17th, 1940, intelligence agencies were to cooperate among the allied states, i. e. Germany was not to carry

¹¹ Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy [Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine] (hereinafter **HDASBU**), fond 16, inv. 32 (1951), d. 69, f. 198-202.

¹² *Ibid.*, fond 16, inv. 34 (1951), d. 1, f. 245.

¹³ *Ibid.*, fond 16, inv. 32 (1951), d. 13, f. 375.

¹⁴ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1124.

¹⁵ *** *Din Memoriile lui Eugen Cristescu* [From the Memoirs of Eugen Cristescu], Bucharest, State Security Council, Education Directorate (Unpublished, for internal use only), 1968, p. 115.

out any activities or arrests in the territory of Romania and it was to report on the results of cooperation regularly.¹⁶

The primary units of the SSI headquarters were the intelligence agency department, the counterintelligence department, the military attaché department, and the special propaganda department. In turn, the intelligence agency department had the following sections:

Active, whose employees were engaged in selecting candidates for recruitment, recruiting agents, analysing intelligence data obtained; and

Passive, which carried out information and analytical processing of data obtained and developed new tasks for collecting data.

In January 1942, the SSI headquarters was reorganised, and it acquired the following structure:

1st section, reconnaissance (66 servicemen and 96 civilians), which in turn comprised three 'fronts' (areas of work): South, East, and West;

2nd section, counterintelligence, comprising nine specialized departments (secretariat, political, communists, economic, legionnaires (i.e., Romanian radical nationalists and fascists), national minorities, military personnel, air force, residency);

3rd section, relations with foreign intelligence services;

4th section, special counterintelligence tasks;

5th section, counter-sabotage;

A number of support sections: 6th (external surveillance and censorship of correspondence); 7th (personnel); 8th (legal); 9th (operational and technical); 10th (radio communication); 11th (automobile); 12th (administrative).¹⁷

The army had its own organisational and functional structure of intelligence agencies. It included the 2nd section (intelligence department) of the General Staff; 2nd bureaus (sections) at the level of military units (division, corps, army); regimental intelligence service, as well as special information services of aviation, navy, and artillery. Maritime and aviation intelligence, ground surveillance service, special eavesdropping service, decryption service, and secret service (intelligence agency) served as means of military intelligence.¹⁸

Specifically for intelligence and counterintelligence work on Soviet

¹⁶ Artem Fylypenko, *Rumunski spetssluzhby...*, chastyna 2 [part 2], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-2> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

territory, the intelligence agency of the Eastern Front, i.e., *Agency of the East*, was established (other names are *The Eastern Front Agency* (*Vulturul* or 'Eagle')), to which three centres (*Centru-1, 2, 3*) with intelligence and counterintelligence functions were subordinate. They were located, respectively, in Chernivtsi (headed by Colonel Mihai Goanță), Chișinău (Major Balotescu), and Odessa (Colonel Perju; he was sentenced to 25 years in prison on March 11th, 1949, by a military tribunal of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Odessa region as a war criminal but, on December 1st, 1955, he was returned to the Romanian government). *Vulturul* was headed by Colonel Vasile Palius, a former White Guardsman better known by the pseudonym 'Vasile Ionescu.'

Vulturul's headquarters comprised the following functional units:

Bureau-1 (or 'methodical department', headed by Lieutenant Colonel Trofin Macrinici 'Ioanovic') consisted of 5 operatives, technical staff, and a group of captured senior officers of the Red Army. The unit studied and summarized materials from various sources and drafted analytical documents;

Bureau-2 (intelligence department, captain Ion Curăraru) comprised 12 operatives, which recruited the agents from the population evacuated from the Soviet territory, instructed the agents, and studied the information obtained. Within the unit, there was a 'special group C,' which recruited and trained the agents for withdrawal from the front line;

Bureau-3: the secretariat;

Bureau-4: transport department (of up to 30 people);

Radio group of up to 10 people, including prisoners of war.¹⁹

Vulturul's activities included recruiting, equipping, and training agents for performing various missions on the enemy front, interrogating prisoners of war, gathering documents that the enemy had left on the battlefield, identifying industrial infrastructure and warehouses of all kinds.²⁰

The Eastern Front Agency was created at the beginning of the war with the USSR, and, in the first stage of its activities, in fact, it did not conduct intelligence work along the front line. Instead, this institution initially focused on the "in-depth study" of the USSR army, industry, and the socio-political situation. Its sources were the interrogation of prisoners of war, defectors, the exposed agency of the Soviet special services, the interrogation of Soviet citizens in the occupied territories, the study of trophy documents, etc. In the area of deployment of the Romanian army, this agency organised counterintelligence work. According to the

¹⁹ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1128.

²⁰ Cristian Troncotă, *România și frontul secret ...*, p. 342-343.

Soviet military counterintelligence SMERSH, such information and analytical work allowed the SSI to obtain “relatively complete data” on the situation in the USSR, the capabilities of the military-industrial complex, and the state of the Red Army reserves. The SSI also clearly understood the current activities of the Red Army on the southern part of the Eastern Front.²¹

Each of the above-mentioned SSI ‘mobile’ centres had subordinate ‘subcentres’: branches and groups (sections, subsections) in different settlements, and within the Romanian army units. Thus, the Odessa SSI centre established branches in Ochakiv, Balta, and Tiraspol, and separate groups of captains Botezat, Frumos, and Porumbescu operated in Odessa. In turn, e.g., the sub-centre *Tiraspol* established residencies *Tiraspol*, *Dubosary*, *Berezivka*, *Ananiev*, *Rybnitsa*, and *Balta*.²²

Subsections (branches) directly established residencies and separate operational groups which operated in certain areas of responsibility. The *Centru* tasks included collecting intelligence data on the Soviet armed forces, the state of the Black Sea military and navy, counterintelligence of its own troops and bases in the Black Sea, combating guerrilla and underground movements, and studying the mood of the population in the occupied territories. These intelligence units were properly equipped and had their own radio stations and encryption facilities, laboratories, etc. As a rule, SSI centres were disguised as military construction units.²³

FEATURES OF THE AGENT-OPERATIVE WORK OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE

SSI bodies conducted military, political, and economic intelligence behind the lines of the Red Army and in the territory of European countries. Counterintelligence functions were much broader, as noted in Soviet documents. These included identifying enemy intelligence centres and their agents, exposing the Soviet underground and guerrilla units, preparing their intelligence and sabotage agents and withdrawing them from the front line (leaving to settle in

²¹ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1124-1125.

²² HDASBU, fond 13, d. 465, tom 4, f. 54; Artem Fylypenko, *Rumunski spetssluzhby...*, chastyna 2 [part 2], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-ukhkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-2> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

²³ Vasili Hristoforov, *Organy gosbezopasnosti SSSR v 1941–1945 gg.* [State Security Bodies of the USSR in 1941–1945], Moskva, Glavnoe arhivnoe upravlenie goroda Moskvy, 2011, p. 197-198.

retreat), and setting up illegal sabotage groups. The Soviet side, in particular, acknowledged that Romanian intelligence had managed to study the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence bodies on its front line in depth. In the document *Special Soviet bodies identified on the Romanian–Soviet front* drafted by the SSI, “the activities of the intelligence agencies of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts were sufficiently covered.”²⁴

Such information collected by the SSI territorial centres came to Bucharest, where there was an analytical unit called ‘1st echelon of the Eastern Front Agency’ (headed by Captain Valeriu Bartu, pseudonym ‘Vlădescu’). He summarised the information received, analysed it, and submitted it to the SSI headquarters.

Depending on the front line and military situation, the *Vulturul* bodies underwent reorganisation and redeployment. At the beginning of 1943, the special body had three centres on the Eastern Front: Northern (nowadays Ukraine), Stalingrad, and the Caucasus. Later, such units were reorganized into the Crimean Centre (Simferopol, headed by Captain ‘Orovianu’), the Centre of Captain ‘Cucu’ (Crimea) and the Centre of Lieutenant ‘Zarafu.’

In addition to the mass-recruited agency, highly qualified undercover assistants also worked for the SSI. SMERSH documents have cited the example of 25-year-old recruiting agent Maria Lisnetska (‘Gavrilesco’). She had worked for the Polish intelligence in the past and she spoke several European languages, as well as Ukrainian. From 1940, she cooperated with SSI for a monthly salary of 50,000 lei. She repeatedly crossed the border with the USSR and she was in direct contact with the head of the SSI counterintelligence section; she was given the task of ‘substituting’ for the recruitment of the Soviet special service and joining its intelligence body, as well as establishing contacts with the Polish emigration intelligence, and collecting information about the British intelligence.²⁵

The defeat of German–Romanian troops near Stalingrad in November 1942–February 1943 led to a change in the priorities and tactics of the *Agency of the East*.

From that point on (starting in October 1943, when a top-secret SSI directive #8300 was issued), *Vulturul*’s emphasis was on recruiting the agents, leaving them for illegal work during the Romanian army’s retreat from the Bug and the Dniester rivers. This directive ordered the deployment of reconnaissance work along the front line in two priority areas: establishing residencies in the territory of Transnistria and the Crimea left by Romanian troops; and training

²⁴ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1125.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

qualified agents ('search agents'), residents, radio operators, and radio transmitting officers and sending them across the frontline.

Soviet documents stated that *Vulturul's* main body in Mykolaiv and its branches focused on recruiting agents and their special training for reconnaissance and sabotage missions in the Mykolaiv-Odessa-Tiraspol districts. In total, it was planned to leave 250 agents, and 19 radio stations in Transnistria, 220 agents, and 16 radios in Bessarabia, 150 agents, and 9 radios in Bukovina.

The agents were selected from traitors who tarnished themselves by extraditing communists, underground members and guerrillas, members of anti-Soviet organisations – the *Monarchical Union*, the *National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS)*, *Officers' Society*, former *White Guard* –, members of Ukrainian nationalist organisations, as well as doctors, agronomists, artists, speculators, shopkeepers, etc. For one or two months, special training took place in secret apartments and courier communication with the agency, passwords, and ciphers were developed. Soviet counterintelligence officers noted that the abandoned Romanian agents were provided with radio communications (there were training courses for radio agents in Odessa) and received 5 000 to 30 000 rubles for operational needs. In June–July 1944 alone, three radio stations left behind in retreat contacted the SSI. For their direction-finding, the deployment in Simferopol of a stationary radio counterintelligence point of the 5th Department of the People's Commissariat of the USSR State Security was sped up.²⁶

A fairly large contingent of SSI confidants was settled. In January–June 1944, the SMERSH military counterintelligence bodies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front found 991 spies, 121 of whom were trained and left in retreat by German and Romanian intelligence agents. As reported by the SMERSH Chief Directorate of Counterintelligence of the People's Commissariat of Defence of the USSR on May 10th, 1944, in the liberated territory of the Crimea at that time, 46 German and Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence officers were found and detained, 172 agents of such services were left for illegal work in the rear of Soviet troops, 388 active collaborators, and police officers.²⁷ In the Odessa region alone, more than 40 Romanian SSI officers and agents were arrested.²⁸

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1133.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

²⁸ HDASBU, fond 13, d. 693; d.375, f. 9-17; *Sovetskiye organy ...*, pp. 215-223; *Podryvnaya deyatel'nost' voenno-morskoj razvedki fashistskoj Germanii protiv Sovetskogo Soyuza nakanune i v period Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny 1941-1945 gg.* [The Subversive

Totally, during the warfare in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in the period 1941–1944, 6 951 German, 791 Romanian, and 20 Hungarian intelligence agents were identified and detained. Of these, 2 574 agents were left before the retreat, and 508 were abandoned in the Soviet rear, 175 were recruited in the pre-war period. In retreating, the aggressors left more than 200 residencies in the territory of modern Ukraine with reconnaissance and sabotage missions (up to 2 500 trained agents). In total, during the period of Ukraine's liberation, counterintelligence agents exposed 4 822 agents of German, Romanian, and Hungarian special services.²⁹

The arrests by Soviet counterintelligence officers were significant in exposing the abandoned SSI agency. Thus, in Chişinău, the SMERSH operation group of the 3rd Ukrainian Front captured Major Balotescu, the head of the SSI 2nd centre, and many centre agents. In one of the prisoner-of-war camps, Lieutenant Păun (Ovidiu Şerbănescu), an operative and recruiter of the SSI agents, and radio operator Maric, who disclosed the radio station and codes, were found. Şerbănescu testified against 23 agents settled, including three residents. Seven of them were detained after receiving data about other agents known to them.

In addition, Major F. Botezatu, the head of *Centre H* of the 2nd section (intelligence) of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, was detained in Chişinău (he tried to shoot himself, was rescued, sentenced to 25 years in prison, and released in 1955). Many employees of this centre gave extensive evidence of the structure and intelligence work of the 2nd section of the General Staff, its Moldovan branch, and disclosed the place of document storage (they unsuccessfully tried to burn them in the old well). This made it possible to seize the personal files of 84 agents of the centre, correspondence with the General Staff, lists and addresses of radio stations left in the Odessa and Mykolaiv regions of the USSR, materials left behind in retreat, etc. In total, SMERSH detained 25 employees of 'Centre H,' 5 residents, and 6 agents.³⁰

After the Red Army entered Bucharest (August 31st, 1944), the Soviet agent 'Trajan' passed data from the agency's logbook to the operative group of the SMERSH Chief Directorate of Counterintelligence. After Romania entered the war

Activities of Naval Intelligence of Fascist Germany Against the Soviet Union on the Eve and During the Great Patriotic War], Moskva, RIO VKSh KGB SSSR, 1977, p. 172–173.

²⁹ HDASBU, fond 13, d. 375, f. 40; *Deyatel'nost' organov...*, p. 65; Vitalii Nikitchenko, *Chekisty Ukrainy v period Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [Security Officers of Ukraine During the Great Patriotic War], in "Sbornik KGB pri SM SSSR," 1971, No. 2, pp. 66–82.

³⁰ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 383–384.

in the Anti-Hitler Coalition and the arrest of the SSI head, it was renamed (on September 15th, 1944) as the *Information Service* of the Ministry of War. Soviet counterintelligence received data on 108 settled agents, lists of German and Hungarian agents, as well as many other valuable materials about the SSI activities, anti-Soviet emigration, foreign intelligence services, etc.

There were other military intelligence bodies, primarily through the aforementioned 2nd section of the General Staff at the relevant army headquarters or in the occupied settlements, particularly, the 2nd department of the Romanian Armed Forces Staff in Transnistria in Odessa, which also had a separate branch, 'Dr. Dinescu's apartment' (26 agents of this special body were found).³¹

It has been known that, in 1942 when the Romanian army was located in Rostov-on-Don, Colonel Ion Lissievici's 'SSI operational echelon' operated under it for some time. The structure of this body resembled the *Eastern Front Agency*, but without territorial branches. Practically, it was an information-analytical body, where all the materials obtained on the Eastern Front were sent for processing and generalizing (with the retreat of the Romanian army, the 'echelon' moved to Romania and ceased to exist).

Notable features of the SSI were the active use (establishment) of amateur anti-communist organisations and the introduction of intelligence positions there for reconnaissance and subversive work after the retreat of their troops. The OUN (i.e., The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) underground, White Guard, and Russian national-monarchist organisations offended by Stalinist policies were involved in the occupied territories. Romanian intelligence paid increased operational attention to the intellectuals, religious environment, and youth.

Therefore, the directive of the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKVD) of the Ukrainian SSR No. 12 *On strengthening intelligence and operational work to develop an anti-Soviet element among youth and hostile organisations and groups identified in 1943–1944* of January 25th, 1945, is significant. Among them is the illegal group of the National Labour Union of the New Generation, where youth was recruited by Romanian intelligence resident Yu. Penkovskiy and many of its members were recruited by the Romanian General Staff Intelligence Unit and German Naval Intelligence Service. A number of recruits were trained at a Romanian intelligence school in Odessa.³²

During the war in the territory of modern Ukraine, Romania created a network of special and security agencies of various departments, almost all of

³¹HDASBU, fond 13, d. 465, tom 4, f. 53.

³² *Ibid.*, fond 9, d. 5, f. 236-239.

which established their intelligence and operational positions. Chernivtsi is an example where in the period 1941–1944, the SSI Intelligence Centre, the Security Inspectorate (*Sigurantsa*, the Political Police of the Ministry of the Interior), the Police Department, the Gendarmerie Department (from the Chief Gendarmerie Department of the Ministry of the Interior), and the Counterintelligence Department of the 8th Infantry Division operated. Soviet counterintelligence in the Chernivtsi region managed to identify (arrest, register, and search) up to 700 agents, informants, and provocateurs of the Romanian special services. As of September 1st, 1950, 609 agents of the above-mentioned Romanian special services were arrested in Odessa.³³

After the end of World War II, the primary goal of Soviet security agencies was to identify the structure and personnel of Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies and to clear the territory of the southern regions of nowadays Ukraine of Romanian agents (Odessa, Mykolaiv, Ismail, Vinnytsia, Kherson regions, and Bukovina).³⁴

Furthermore, Romanian intelligence actively involved prominent representatives of the anti-Soviet political emigration of the peoples of the USSR. Following Romania's withdrawal from the alliance with Germany, and its entry in the war on the side of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, SMERSH detained 47 Romanian and German intelligence officers, 546 Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agents, and arrested 99 functionaries of political emigration organisations. Notably, they detained the following and proved their contacts with the intelligence services of the Antonescu regime: I. Porokhovskiy, Secretary General of the Chief Military Council of Ukrainian Emigration to Europe (he was sentenced to 25 years in prison by a military tribunal), S. Delvig, Tsarist Army General and Colonel General of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), the Head of the Former Soldiers Society of the UPR Army and the Ukrainian Community in Romania. According to Soviet documents, on November 14th, 1944, he was sentenced by the military tribunal of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to the maximum penalty, although in encyclopaedic publications the date of death is 1949.³⁵

³³ *Ibid.*, fond 13, d. 465, tom 4, ff. 21-26.

³⁴ V. I. Ilnytskyi, M. D. Haliv, A. S. Boichuk, *Funktsionuvannia rumunskykh rozviduvalnykh i kontrrozviduvalnykh orhaniv u Transnistrii (1941-1944) (za materialamy HAD SBU)* [Functioning of Romanian Intelligence and Counterintelligence Structures in Transnistria (1941–1944) (based on Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine)], in "Zaporizhzhia Historical Review", 2020, Vol. 3 (55), p. 143.

³⁵ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1027-1028.

It is necessary to mention the mechanism of the SSI interaction with the intelligence services of Hitler's Germany. Professional contacts of the Romanian intelligence with the German military intelligence (Abwehr) began in 1937. For this purpose, a special department G was created within the SSI headquarters, which coordinated intelligence work on the front and in the territory of Romania. The above-mentioned Colonel V. Palius was personally connected with the leadership of the German military intelligence, and "provided them with services greater than those laid down in the framework of official cooperation," for which he received the Iron Cross Order.

Department G systematically provided German intelligence with information obtained, trophy documents on the state of the Red Army at the front and its rear, and the situation in the occupied territories. In turn, the Germans informed the SSI, although not as extensively (among the documents handed over to the Romanian side there is the well-known *Organisation of the SMERSH bodies of the Red Army*). To control its allies, German intelligence introduced its agency within the SSI, particularly the well-known head of one of the SSI centres, Major Balotescu, who left with the Germans after Romania's withdrawal from the war. Perhaps German partners often took away the most well-trained and promising agents of Romanian intelligence.

ORGANISING SABOTAGE WORK OF ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE RED ARMY

Another important area of activity of Romanian military intelligence was establishing sabotage groups, including those who acted under the guise of Soviet guerrillas of Romanian nationality. Work on the formation of guerrilla special forces intensified as Romanian troops retreated in 1944, with Romanian intelligence trying to use the carefully studied experience of the Soviet security forces in organizing the struggle along the front line.

In May 1944, the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR obtained information about the organisation of a *Romanian guerrilla unit* of up to 500 persons in the Crasna Putnei district, which was to spread the sabotage underground ("develop the guerrilla movement") in Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Moldova (weapons of the detachment were supplied by German military units). The establishment of a pseudo-guerrilla unit was led by Captain Cucu (in Crasna Putnei) and Major Balotescu (Vatra Dornei).³⁶

³⁶ HDASBU, fond 2, opus 87, d. 78, f. 321.

The guerilla unit, known and established in June 1944 in Bukovina (40 fighters, a radio station), was led by the German Istrati, a very experienced, specially trained recruiting agent. Recruited in 1940, he repeatedly crossed the border with the USSR and the front line. From July 1944, the unit's base was located near the villages of Davideny (*Rom.* Davideni) and Panca in the Storozhynets district of the Chernivtsi region. The unit, which consisted mainly of local Ukrainians, collected intelligence data, sent agents to the front line, conducted propaganda work among the population, and carried out numerous sabotage and terrorist acts against the Red Army.³⁷

According to the documents of the Soviet counterintelligence, the Romanian special service successfully created a pseudo-underground, especially in Odessa. Several similar facts came to light after the war as a result of inspections by state security bodies, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (CP(B)U), and the Odessa Regional Committee of the CP(B)U. Particularly, it turned out that Romanian counterintelligence defeated a significant part of the Communist underground due to the traitors (including Petrovskiy, the Secretary of the Underground Regional Committee of the CP(B)U, left in the occupied territories, and some members of the underground district committees of the CP(B)U in Odessa).

The Romanians set up a controlled *Municipal Underground Committee of the CP(B)U* led by the traitor Fajn, and other provocation units. Stepan Tymoshkov's 'underground group' was among them (he was captured, recruited, and sent to Odessa by the Romanian special services in December 1941), who tried to legalize traitors after the war, and submitted lists of 12 groups (353 members) of the non-existent 'underground.' According to the operative development of 'Pendulum,' the Soviet counterintelligence exposed S. Plotnyskyi's pseudo 'NKGB underground' (28 persons). During the exposure of the Romanian pseudo underground in Odessa, 5 agents of the German and Romanian special services, 22 SSI agents, 56 traitors, 22 active collaborators, etc., were arrested.³⁸

Accordingly, the directive of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR of December 21st, 1944, #2534/c provided counterintelligence agents with the operational development of members of the Communist Party and Komsomol, among whom Hitler's intelligence agencies *Abwehrstelle Ukraine*, *SD*, *Sonderstab R*, *Romanian counterintelligence* and *Sigurantsa* established pseudo-underground, pseudo-

³⁷ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1129-1130.

³⁸ HDASBU, fond 9, d. 75, f. 260-261.

guerrilla units, and carried out provocative work.³⁹

COOPERATION OF ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE WITH THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

In the interests of intensifying reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the advancing Red Army, Romanian military intelligence tried to establish cooperation with the command of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In November 1943, *Vulturul* put forward proposals for cooperation with Ukrainian nationalists in obtaining military, economic and political information (in exchange for assistance). With the participation of a white emigrant, Colonel Oleksii Pavlov, the SSI headquarters of the 'Eastern Front Agency' prepared a report outlining the capabilities of the Ukrainian insurgent underground movement and its use against Soviet troops (subject to arms assistance). After the project was approved personally by the 'Leader' Ion Antonescu (*Rom. 'Conducător,'* 1940–1944), through the Captain C. Chirilovici SSI centre (Bacău), several trained and recruited SSI agents from OUN members in Bucharest were sent to the front line to establish contact and interaction with OUN and UPA forces.

Furthermore, during the war, the underground intelligence of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) carefully studied the main policy areas of the Romanian occupation administration, the armed forces, special and police forces located in Northern Bukovina, Odessa and Transnistria, in typical intelligence and information reports of OUN centres, such as "News from the Romanian occupation," and "Overview of the life of Zabuzhzhia (Transnistria)." At the same time, special attention was paid to the features of military units, gendarmerie, police, network of the secret political police (*Sigurantsa*), counterintelligence regime features, and the attitude of the population towards the Romanian administration.⁴⁰

As the Soviet army was advancing in the territory of modern Ukraine, Ukrainian insurgents operating under the political leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists established contacts with the SSI headquarters and peripheral bodies. In particular, in October 1943 in Odessa, Pavlyshyn, a representative of the OUN Chief Commander (Provid) and the head of the OUN network in the territory of Transnistria, and his deputy Semchyshyn contacted the

³⁹ *Ibid.*, fond 60, d. 83554, f. 181–193.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, fond 13, d. 376, tom 32, f. 135–136; tom 21, f. 81–85.

leaders of the SSI Centre #3, Colonel Perju, and Captain Arghir, who announced the government's agreement to negotiate with the OUN.

An agreement was reached on the mutual refusal of warfare. In April 1944, in Galați, OUN emissaries met with Colonel Alexandru Ionescu, a new head of the above-mentioned intelligence centre. The latter announced a decree of the Romanian government on the release of Ukrainian nationalists and readiness to provide the UPA with military-technical assistance. 14 OUN members were sent to Romanian intelligence. Later, OUN and UPA members studied at an intelligence school led by Pavlyshyn 15–20 km away from Bucharest and were sent to the Soviet rear on condition that the Romanian side is provided with intelligence information. In turn, radio operators were trained for the UPA in Galați.⁴¹

The Soviet special services attempted to deploy guerrilla and sabotage activities in the territory of Romania. In June 1944, NKGB Lieutenant General T. Stokach, Chief of the Ukrainian Staff of the Guerrilla Movement (USGM), approved a plan of organisational and operational measures of the USGM to intensify combat operations of Ukrainian guerrillas and assist the guerrilla movement in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland in disrupting the export of industrial equipment and strategic raw materials from these countries to Germany, as well as communication routes that transported reserves to the front line.

It was also planned to create organisational and sabotage units of 25 people each, staffed by experienced guerrillas, and representatives of the peoples of Eastern Europe (up to 40–50%) from among the cadets of the USGM School of Special Purposes (SSP) (including 17 units in Romania).

The training of foreign organizers of guerrilla groups in the above-mentioned USGM SSP initiated in May 1944 was significant for the rise of reconnaissance, sabotage, and combat activities of foreign anti-fascists (a total of 930 foreigners came to school by November 1944: Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, residents of Yugoslavia, and Ukrainians of Transcarpathia), 764 people graduated by November 1st. The basis of 'miner-saboteur' training was a 240-hour 4-week program. Much attention was paid to bilateral training close to combat conditions, mine actions, fire and topographic training, the

⁴¹ Dmytro Viedienieiev, Gennadii Bystrukhin, *Mech i tryzub. Rozvidka i kontrozvidka rukhu ukrainskykh natsionalistiv ta UPA (1920–1945). Monohrafiia* [Sword and Trident. Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Movement of Ukrainian Nationalists and the UPA (1920–1945). Monograph], Kyiv, Geneza, 2006, p. 277–278.

basics of propaganda, and tactical training based on the real experience of the guerrillas.⁴²

In addition to the SSI as a separate military intelligence service, the 2nd (Intelligence) Department of the General Staff of the Romanian Army moved directly to the territory of modern Ukraine (to the rear of the 2nd Ukrainian Front advancing towards Romania), for which it created a number of peripheral bodies, i.e. 2nd Bureau A at the headquarters of the 4th Infantry Corps in Iasi (headed by Major Constantin Păunescu). The bureau's activities included agency work and sending agents (under the guise of local residents) to a depth of 100 km beyond the front line. Recruitment candidates were selected in military units from among officers and soldiers who had relatives in territories adjacent to the USSR and were trained in special schools of intelligence.⁴³

Romanian special services considered information and psychological operations to be effective activities. 'Military propaganda' bodies are known to have existed within the branches of the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of the General Staff in the occupied lands. Romanian specialists had to admit that the basis of the stability and resistance of the Soviet population was the psychological type of the new Soviet person, which they did not understand. It is interesting to note the SSI's conclusion that the Soviet government "had formed the necessary human material, imbued with communist ideology, ready to always and everywhere follow the USSR administration directives [...], the entire Soviet territory inhabited by people with completely changed domination of communist ideology."⁴⁴ In May 1942 in occupied Odessa, the Institute for Anti-Communist Studies and Propaganda was established to develop special propaganda content (a group of anti-Soviet local scientific and pedagogical intellectuals also worked in the institution).⁴⁵

CONCLUSIONS

During World War II, a separate central subordination service was established in Romania with the functions of military intelligence and military counterintelligence: the Special Information Service. Its headquarters was built on

⁴² Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine], fond 62, inv. 1, d. 133, ff. 115-120.

⁴³ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 762-763.

⁴⁴ Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi..., fond 57, inv. 4, d. 103, f. 18, 20.

⁴⁵ HDASBU, fond 60, d. 83503, f. 325.

a functional-territorial basis. SSI deployed a separate structure in the theatre of operations and in the rear of the Romanian army: the Intelligence Directorate of the Eastern Front Agency (*Vulturul*). The latter created a network of centres (branches) with subordinate offices and residencies.

At the same time, the intelligence service of the General Staff (2nd Department of the General Staff and its subdivisions within the army staffs of the respective levels), the navy, and aviation intelligence services operated. The main SSI and military intelligence activities were carried out in Southern Ukraine, Northern Bukovina, and Crimea (especially, since the USSR border regions served as an arena of intense confrontation between Romanian and Soviet special services in the 1920s and 1930s).

According to Soviet documents, they praised Romanian intelligence's operational capabilities and qualifications in gathering information and deploying sabotage and subversive activities. In fact, in the territory of modern Ukraine, the SSI became the second most critical opponent of Soviet counterintelligence and SMERSH bodies, and the disclosure of the SSI agents and active collaborators serving in Romania lasted in the Ukrainian SSR for at least several years after the war.

The leading activities of the SSI and other military intelligence institutions (excluding field intelligence) were as follows: studying open sources; using intelligence and information capabilities of military diplomacy and other international relations; creating numerous intelligence headquarters in the occupied territory by withdrawing the agents from the front line or leaving the residences to settle in the retreat; preparing and withdrawing sabotage groups from the front line; interrogating prisoners of war, defectors, and the population of the occupied territories; establishing cooperation in the exchange of information with the intelligence services of Romania's allies; creating pseudo-underground and guerrilla units operating under the guise of Soviet guerrillas; and using the anti-Soviet opposition, political emigration of the peoples of the USSR and the nationalist movement, anti-Soviet insurgents.

SSI counterintelligence units, together with the political police *Sigurantsa*, managed to inflict significant blows on the Soviet underground and in some NKVD intelligence residencies in Odessa and Mykolaiv (using both traitors and collaborators), e.g. the effective reconnaissance and sabotage residency 'Kira' by an intelligence officer V. Molodtsov (Badaiev). At the same time, other successful reconnaissance and sabotage residencies, i. e. Major M. Geft ('Zolotnikov'), remained undisclosed.

The Romanian special services also demonstrated an understanding of the long-term importance of information-psychological (information-humanitarian) confrontation based on the results of the study of public consciousness, and mental features of the enemy country's population.

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THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN ROMANIA. THE FIGHT FOR THE CONTROL OVER THE SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICE (MARCH – JULY 1945)

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Abstract: *Control over the institutions of force was essential for the Romanian Communist Party's strategy to seize complete state power. In such a context, the Special Information Service's politicized activity stood out immediately after the establishment of the Petru Groza government, on March 6, 1945.*

Emil Bodnăraș was the key figure appointed for this mission by the party leadership. This study explores the most important period, March – July 1945, using documents from secret archives, some of which have recently been made available to researchers.

Keywords: *Emil Bodnăraș, Special Information Service, Communist takeover, Cold War, Soviet occupation, Popular democracy.*

Rezumat: *Preluarea puterii în România de către comuniști. Lupta pentru controlul asupra Serviciului Special de Informații (martie – iulie 1945). Pentru strategia Partidului Comunist Român de preluare a puterii totale în Stat, controlul asupra instituțiilor de forță a fost un element esențial. În acest context, operațiunea de politicizare a Serviciului Special de Informații, imediat după instaurarea guvernului condus de Petru Groza, la 6 martie 1945, trebuie subliniată.*

Figura centrală desemnată de către conducerea partidului cu această misiune a fost Emil Bodnăraș. Studiul nostru își propune să analizeze perioada cea mai importantă, respectiv cea din martie și până în iulie 1945, bazându-se pe documente din arhivele secrete, unele dintre acestea fiind puse de curând în circuitul cercetării.

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Second World War, Stalin devised a plan that aimed to integrate the states of Eastern Europe into a Soviet-style structure. In this sense, he used a tactic that is common everywhere, obviously with certain regional variations. One of the classic stages of the rise of indigenous communists in such countries is first a genuine coalition, which they later manage to dominate from behind the scenes and bring to light, allowing one to speak then of a purely extreme left government.

A central role in this plan of the Kremlin was played by taking control of the secret services from the phase when the communists entered the government controlled the Shadow Power, still resorting to the tactic of using 'companions'. These were political people with a bourgeois background who had either been close to the extreme left or were trying to protect themselves by collaborating with the communists.¹

The Romanian Communist Party played a marginal role until August 23, 1944, after functioning illegally for two decades (1924 – 1944). The situation changed completely during the Red Army's *de facto* occupation of the country, and they took advantage of every opportunity to carry out a policy of gradually gaining a dominant position within state institutions.² This is how the government led by Petru Groza, was established on March 6, 1945, under the banner of the National Democratic Front.³ Along with political issues, such as re-establishing the Romanian administration in northwestern Transylvania or the agrarian reform, one of the important objectives of the new power was taking control of the Special Information

¹ In Romania such figures included the prime minister imposed on March 6, 1945, Petru Groza, and the vice-president of the Council, Gheorghe Tătărescu, to name just the well-known people. See Gheorghe Onișoru, *Revolta „tovarășului de drum”. Memoriul lui Gheorghe Tătărescu din 22 mai 1947* [Revolt of the 'way comrade'. The Memorandum of Gheorghe Tătărescu from May 22, 1947], in "Arhivele totalitarismului", 2022, no. 1-2, p. 93-116.

² See: Stefano Bottoni, *Reassessing the Communist Takeover in Romania: Violence, Institutional Continuity, and Ethnic Conflict Management*, in "East European Politics and Societies", Vol. 24, 2010, No. 1, pp. 59-89.

³ For more details see Gheorghe Onișoru, „*Stalin și poporul rus...*” *Democrație și dictatură în România contemporană. Premizele instaurării comunismului* [‘Stalin and the Russian people...’ Democracy and dictatorship in contemporary Romania. The premises of the establishment of communism], Bucharest, Corint Publishing House, 2021, pp. 239-299.

Service and transforming it into an effective tool for fighting the opposition.

EMIL BODNĂRAȘ: A CONTROVERSIAL AND STILL ENIGMATIC CHARACTER

The person assigned for this purpose was Emil Bodnăraș. Officer, a former defector to the Soviet Union⁴ caught on his return to the country in July 1934,⁵ was tried and sentenced to ten years in prison; he met famous communist leaders in the penitentiary, led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Released on November 8, 1942, after serving eight years of detention,⁶ Bodnăraș left with precise instructions from him, which he followed.

When Emil Bodnăraș obtained his release, he made contact with the party leadership, using the code name Felix.⁷ He also benefited from the freedom of action granted to indigenous communists after the self-dissolution of the Komintern on 15 May 1943.⁸

Applying his experience as an officer, particularly the one acquired during his two years in the Soviet Union, he quickly established himself as an expert on military matters. The fact is also proven by a report from November 28, 1943, entitled *The War Apparatus of the Romanian Communist Party*.⁹

Bodnăraș proposed that in addition to the Central Committee, a Special Central Commission, made up of three members, should lead a Special Operative

⁴ Born on February 10, 1904, at Iașlovăț, in Bucovina, he graduated from the Artillery as valedictorian in 1930. On the night of February 16/17, 1932, the young lieutenant crossed the Dniester through the Hotin area, coming into contact with the Soviet secret services and returning to the country two years later, after an investigation at the O.G.P.U. (Unified State Political Directorate), followed by an internship at one of the espionage schools under the auspices of the Komintern. See Central National Historical Archives, fund *Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Special Information Service*, file 2/1926, f. 49; Florian Banu, *Emil Bodnăraș, patriot român sau agent sovietic?* [Emil Bodnăraș, Romanian patriot or Soviet agent?], in "Enigmele istoriei", I, 2020, no. 1, p. 4.

⁵ Central National Historical Archives, Fund *Collection of party files of party members from illegal years who died*, File B 171, f. 6-7.

⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 7v.

⁷ Idem, Fund *C.C. of the R.C.P. Chancellery Section*, File 86/1943, f. 7-13.

⁸ See Gheorghe Onișoru, *May 15, 1943: Dissolution of the Komintern and its effects on the Communist Party of Romania*, "Annals of the University of Craiova", History, Vol. XIX, 2014, no. 2, pp. 75-84.

⁹ Central National Historical Archives, Fund *C.C. of the R.C.P. Administrative Political Section*, file 2/1943, f. 2-11.

Group. It consisted of five divisions,¹⁰ each composed of sections, and there was also an organization at a regional level. Based on this plan, they would activate the formations of patriotic struggle groups starting August 23, 1944, first against the German troops, then moving on to operations of a political nature directed against the bourgeois parties.

However, the most important operation directed by Emil Bodnăraș remains the one of April 4, 1944, when he and Iosif Rangheț took Ștefan Foriș, the Communist Party secretary, off the street, detained him in a conspiratorial house and imposed a triumvirate, along with Constantin Pârvulescu.¹¹ On April 16, Bodnăraș informed Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Teohari Georgescu, imprisoned in the Târgu Jiu camp, about the success of the operation.¹²

Emil Bodnăraș seconded Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu during the preparation of the coup on August 23, 1944, and was introduced to Palace circles under the name engineer Ceaușu¹³ at the conspiratorial meeting on the night of June 13/14.¹⁴ He was not content to be Pătrășcanu's shadow but actively participated in the preparations to overthrow Marshal Antonescu. In this respect, he presented on July 24 a Plan of political-organizational, civil and military measures to be taken when the armed insurrection began.¹⁵ This Plan proved to be a very helpful tool for the success of the operation.

Another spectacular moment for Emil Bodnăraș was the taking over, on the night of August 23/24, after 2 o'clock, of former marshal Ion Antonescu from the Royal Palace and placing him under the guard of patriotic troops in a conspiratorial house in the Vatra Luminoasă district. From there, he would be picked up by

¹⁰ Division I Intelligence, II Liaison, III Operations, IV Policy and V Services.

¹¹ During Foriș's detention (under the conspiratorial name Ilie), he received a letter notifying him that he had to hand over all the documents he had, the Central Committee being dissolved. See Central National Historical Archives, fund *C.C. of R.C.P. Chancellery Section*, file 49/1944, f. 2.

¹² *Ibidem*, file 52/1944, f. 8-10.

¹³ For more details, Gheorghe Onișoru, „*Stalin și poporul rus...*” [‘Stalin and the Russian people...’], pp. 136-186.

¹⁴ On October 31, 1952, Bodnăraș evoked the preliminaries on August 23, 1944, in a discussion with Constantin Pârvulescu, emphasizing with obvious satisfaction “Nobody knew me, not even Maniu, nobody. I met them all then for the first time. I noticed that they were very surprised that Pătrășcanu came with me. I was then introduced as engineer Ceaușu. Pătrășcanu was unhappy with the fact that the decision was made to double him...”. See Central National Historical Archives, Fund *C.C. of the R.C.P. Chancellery Section*, file 97/1952, f. 42-54.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, Fund *C.C. of the R.C.P. Administrative Political Section*, file 70/1944, f. 1-4.

the Soviet General Colonel Ivan Z. Susaikov on August 31 at 5 p.m. and taken to the command post of the Soviet 33rd Army, to be sent to Moscow on September 2.¹⁶

The report drawn up by the commander of the Second Ukrainian Front, Marshal Rodion I. Malinovski on the subject reveals the bold attitude of Emil Bodnăraş, who tried - as far as possible - to prevent the takeover of Ion Antonescu by the Soviets. "On August 31, 1944, General Colonel Susaikov approached Colonel Teodorescu, the head of the Bucharest garrison, and demanded the surrender of Antonescu. Teodorescu replied that he did not know where he was. Susaikov insisted, pointing out that the situation would otherwise escalate. Teodorescu informed the government. Comrade Bodnăraş, a member of the C.C. of the R.C.P., and General Dembrowski came.¹⁷

The representatives of the Soviet command were led to the house where Antonescu was held. Susaikov claimed that the guard was not properly organized, despite the ten Romanian communists armed with revolvers, and as a result, the Soviets took over the detainees. Emil Bodnăraş objected that it was better for the prisoners to stay there, adding a Soviet guard. Susaikov refused. Then Emil Bodnăraş requested that the transport be carried out with a Romanian escort. The transport of the arrested was carried out under the guard of an escort made up of Soviet soldiers and three Romanian communists. On August 31, at 5 p.m., the prisoners were taken to the command post of the 33rd Red Army, where they spent the night under Soviet guard, and on the morning of September 1, they were brought to the Front command post. On September 2, they were sent to Moscow."¹⁸

Emil Bodnăraş opted for a reserved political approach between August 23, 1944, and March 6, 1945, preferring to deal mainly with the patriotic battle formations. Thus, although at the time of Antonescu's fall, he was part of the triumvirate that led the party, he remained in the shadow of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ana Pauker, Teohari Georgescu or even Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu.

SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICE UNTIL MARCH 6, 1945

The Special Information Service operated in Romania from 1924 to 1951, when it was incorporated into the General Direction of State Security by decree no. 264 of April 2.¹⁹ During the interwar period, under the leadership of Mihail

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, Fund I.S.I.S.P. Moments from the history of the Romanian people, Fund XIII, File 9-89, f. 1.

¹⁷ Victor Dombrowki had been appointed Prefect of the Capital Police after August 23, 1944.

¹⁸ Central National Historical Archives, *loc. cit.*

¹⁹ Alin Spănu, Cristian Troncotă, *Serviciul Special de Informaţii* [The Special Information

Moruzov, director between April 12, 1924, and September 13, 1940, the Service was primarily at the service of King Charles II, carrying out intense activity both internally and externally.

After the Sovereign abdicated and General Ion Antonescu assumed state power, Mihail Moruzov was arrested on September 8, 1940, and his duties were taken over by Colonel Ioan Nicolaid, a Major Staff Army officer.²⁰ Imprisoned in Jilava, the former director of the S.I.S. would be among the victims of the Jilava prison massacre on the night of November 26/72, 1940.²¹

After a short two-month interim, on November 11, General Antonescu issued the decree appointing Eugen Cristescu - at that time director of the State Administration, Personnel and Mobilization within the Ministry of the Interior - as the head of the Service.²² He took office on November 15 and served as one of the Head of State's devoted men until August 23. On November 19, a decree-law no. 3813 was published outlining the organization and operation of the S.I.S., composed of Management, Secretariat, Section I Information (Eastern, Western and Southern Fronts) and Section II Counterintelligence.²³

Between August 23, 1944, and March 6, 1945, the Service experienced a period of deep turmoil, as evidenced by the departure of three directors in less than six months.²⁴ On August 27, 1944, when Eugen Cristescu had disappeared during the coup d'état, Colonel Victor Siminel took over, attempting to implement internal restructuring during the transition from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to the Ministry of War.²⁵

Service], in Octavian Roske (Coord.), *România 1945 – 1989. Enciclopedia regimului comunist. Represiunea* [Romania 1945 – 1989. The Encyclopedia of the Communist Regime. The Repression], Vol. IV, S – Ș, Bucharest, I.N.S.T., 2021, p. 243.

²⁰ Ottmar Trașcă, *Relațiile politice și militare româno-germane, septembrie 1940 – august 1944* [Romanian – German Political and Military Relations, September 1940 – August 1944], Cluj, Argonaut, 2013, p. 391.

²¹ See the prosecutors' report, Central National Historical Archives, Fund *Ministry of the Interior. Varia*, File 27/1940, f. 1-10.

²² *Ibidem*, Fund *Ministry of National Propaganda. Internal press*, File 480, f. 87a.

²³ Ministry of the Interior, *Organizarea și funcționarea organelor Ministerului de Interne de la înființare până în prezent* [The organization and functioning of the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior from its establishment until now], Bucharest, 1978, p. 89.

²⁴ Directors: Victor Siminel (August 25, 1944 and September 20, 1944), Ioan Lissievici (September 25 – December 25, 1944) and Gheorghe Săvoiu (December 25, 1944 – March 6, 1945).

²⁵ By circular order no. 1,156 of September 9, 1944, signed by Victor Siminel, the Special Intelligence Service is reorganized into four Sections, namely External Intelligence,

However, Siminel's mandate was extremely short, because on September 19 Colonel Ioan Lissievici replaced him.²⁶ Five days later, on September 24, Eugen Cristescu was arrested and handed over to the Military Command of the Capital²⁷ and the media did not overlook the topic²⁸. In this context, on September 27, Traian Borcescu, head of the Counter-intelligence Service of S.I.S., sent a Report to the Minister of War denying claims that the Service had served as a Gestapo outpost during the war. "S.I.S. was an intelligence service of the Romanian state, having no instrumentation equipment on the ground and whose activity was limited to the procurement of military and civil information, according to the orders and instructions received from the Head of State, personally only by the director of the Service."

Moreover, Borcescu claimed that through the work he did, important politicians escaped arrest or even deportation to Germany, and all the counter-informative material collected was prepared only for Marshal Antonescu and Deputy Prime Minister Mihai Antonescu.²⁹

In this uncertain context, Colonel Iona Lissievici, the new head of the S.I.S., sent a report on November 27, 1944, to the tutelary forum – the Ministry of War, specifically to the undersecretary of State, General Ilie Crețulescu. The document captures the state of confusion among the institution's employees and analyses the factors that determined it.

This Report³⁰ was inspired by General Nicolae Vlădescu's visit to the headquarters of the Special Information Service concerning organisational

Counterintelligence, Technical and Administrative. See Florian Banu, Liviu Țăranu (Coords.), *Securitatea, 1948 – 1989. Monografie*, [The Securitate, 1948 – 1989. Monography], Vol. I, Târgoviște, Cetatea de Scaun, 2016, p. 47-48.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 49.

²⁷ On October 12, 1944, the Soviets took Eugen Cristescu and sent him to Moscow for investigations. He returned to the country to be tried as part of Marshal Antonescu group, and was initially sentenced to death, then the punishment was commuted to hard labour for life ("Monitorul Oficial", part I, no. 128, June 5, 1946, p. 5715). See Cristian Troncotă, *Omul de taină al Mareșalului* [The Marshal's Confident], Bucharest, 2005, p. 115 and appendix 2.

²⁸ For example, on September 28, 1944, National Peasant Party journal, "Dreptatea" (The Justice), published a virulent attack on Eugen Cristescu and the S.I.S., *At the Pillar of Infamy*. The attack is, however, somewhat surprising if we consider the fact that during the war, Eugen Cristescu mediated the connections between Iuliu Maniu and Ion Antonescu.

²⁹ Archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service, Fund *Penal*, File 40.011, vol. 56, f. 27-29.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, Fund "Y", File 25.374/Bucharest, Vol. 3, f. 101-107.

measures on November 25, 1944. Lissievici specified that he had already done so by cutting the number of Sections from 12 to five, plus the Secretariat. The number of employees also decreased from 89 officers, 814 civil servants, 22 non-commissioned officers and 175 troops, to 37 officers, 630 civil servants (including drivers, mechanics, washermen, workers, etc.) and 13 non-commissioned officers.³¹

One of the big problems of S.I.S. was the restoration of the information network, which practically disintegrated following the passage of the front line across the national territory, thus in regions such as Moldova and Dobrogea there was no longer any connection. Another important problem was that “the majority of the officials are frightened by the measures depriving them of freedom, taken by the Soviet bodies against some of their comrades.”³²

On December 24, 1944, Colonel Gheorghe Săvoiu replaced Lissievici³³ and was in command until March 12, 1945, during a time of intense political turmoil that led to the forced resignation of Prime Minister Nicolae Rădescu.

MARCH 1945: COMMUNIST TAKEOVER ON S.I.S. BEGINS

On March 14, a week after the installation of the Groza government, Nicolae D. Stănescu,³⁴ who led the political group within the II Counterintelligence Section, was appointed as the new director of the Special Information Service. However, the big change came the next day, when the representative of the Communist Party, Emil Bodnăraș, took over the position of secretary general at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.³⁵

At the proposal of Bodnăraș, on March 24, the government decided that the Special Information Service should move from the Ministry of War to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, under the direct coordination of the General Secretary.³⁶ An operation to purge the Service and bring in new cadres loyal to the Communist Party immediately began. At the same time, former director Ioan Lissievici, Colonel Traian Borcescu and other senior officers were

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Florian Banu, Liviu Țăranu, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

³⁴ Born on August 17, 1911, at Bucharest. *Ibidem*, p. 49.

³⁵ He replaced Constantin I. Botez, “Monitorul Oficial”, part I, no. 62, March 16, 1945, p. 1990.

³⁶ Central National Historical Archives, Fund *Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Transcripts*, File 3/1945, p. 390.

arrested on March 26 and initially sent for about two weeks to Moscow, where they were interrogated by the Soviet services. When they returned to the country, they were imprisoned at Malmaison and released on December 23, 1945.³⁷

On April 27, 1945, ministerial decision no. 79 establishing the structure, functioning, and powers of the Special Information Service was issued as well at the initiative of Emil Bodnăraș.³⁸ The most important element was the limitation of the powers available to the director of the institution, practically totally subordinated to the 'coordinating factor', respectively the general secretary of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.³⁹

The decision specified that the Service was staffed with civilian and military personnel (Art. 3), and its organization would be entirely secret (Art. 5). The General Director, responsible for the "informational and administrative direction of the Service", theoretically had important duties, according to Article 6: "Fixes the attributions for all subdivisions of the Service, as well as for the entire Service staff; Appoints, promotes, distributes and conducts every move of civilian Service personnel, for all ranks; Manages all funds associated with the Service and approves costs of any size".⁴⁰

The 'theoretically' important duties of the Director General include the provisions of the following article of the analysed normative act, which states that "In exercising all the powers provided for in this decision, the General Director of the Special Information Service is directly responsible to the General Secretary of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers."⁴¹

Also essential are the provisions of article 29, justifying the purges from the Service ordered and patronized by Emil Bodnăraș: "The purification and

³⁷ The information appears in the statement given by Traian Borcescu, under arrest, on May 15, 1962. See Archive of the National Council for the Study of Security Archives, Fund *Penal*, File 10.933, Vol 13, f. 399.

³⁸ Ladislau-Antoniou Csendes, *NKVD/ KGB Approaches and Party Control in Romanian Secret Services and Army between 1948 – 1964*, in Alexandra Grúňová (Ed.), *NKVD/KGB Activities and its Cooperation with other Secret Services in Central and Eastern Europe 1945 – 1989. Anthology of the international conference, Bratislava 14. – 16. 11. 2007*, Bratislava, Nation's Memory Institute, 2008, p. 80.

³⁹ First article of the decision signed by Petru Groza was explicit: "The Special Intelligence Service is a State Institution and functions under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, under the control of the Secretary General, charged with this attribution by the Decision of the President of the Council of Ministers." See Archive of the National Council for the Study of Security Archives, Fund *S.I.E.*, File 253, f. 2-13.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

retraining of Special Information Service staff of all categories will be done until the term specified by Law for the purification of public administrations No. 217, published in the Official Gazette No. 74 of March 30, 1945".⁴²

A RELEVANT DOCUMENT

A variety of archive documents and analyses of historians who tracked the establishment of communist rule in Romania demonstrate how things were in reality. An important source recently made available to researchers is a typewritten unsigned report containing pen corrections, which at the very least can be attributed to Emil Bodnăraș himself. The document *Report on the activity of the Special Section (Special Information Service) from March 6, 1945, to date* is relevant for the leadership of the Communist Party and is dated July 3, 1945, providing a very interesting perspective on the class struggle from the viewpoint of an espionage service.⁴³

The first part of the report concerns the S.I.S. Organization, and the introductory sentence leaving no room for interpretation: "Immediately after the installation of the Petru Groza government, it was decided to reassign the Special Information Service, which from the most odious instrument of Antonescu's dictatorship had to become a powerful weapon in the fight that the government started against the forces of reaction, and especially an instrument in the service of the party and our common interests."

In other words, Emil Bodnăraș openly admitted that the mission he received was done using a state institution and gradually turning it into a Communist Party instrument. The official document states why the Special Information Service was transferred from the Ministry of War to the General Secretary of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

Another interesting finding relates, in light of the Report's completion date of July 3, to the actions of the group of advisers around King Michael I, which Bodnăraș described as 'a reactionary-militarist clique'. The Palace was aware of the danger of placing the Special Intelligence Service under the command of a

⁴² *Ibidem*. It is interesting that, according to article 33, the Decision of April 27, signed by Prime Minister Petru Groza and General Secretary Emil Bodnăraș, came into force on April 18.

⁴³ Central National Historical Archives, Fund *Collection 50. Documents elaborated by the repressive organs about the activity of the Romanian Communist Party and revolutionary mass organizations*, File 10.615, f. 1-29.

communist leader. Consequently, there was an attempt to delay the enactment of the decree on the so-called reorganization of the institution, which was not sanctioned by the King until April 14.

A less widely circulated piece of information in the specialized literature is that the Report talks about the action of a Special Section, which would be included in the S.I.S. only after April 17, although the directives of the Communist Party had foreseen this even before March 6.⁴⁴ Under these conditions, Special Service staff operated between March 6 and April 30 only as observers of the Special Information Service, "without being invested with any official capacity."⁴⁵ Only at the end of April, the 'specialists' were able to benefit from the reorganization of the institution and were appointed directors in the newly created Coordination Directorate, "which masks in this phrase the express powers of the Special Section."⁴⁶

Thus, 22 people were first assigned to the Special Information Service, all of whom either were members of the Communist Party or 'politically close'. Of these, seven entered the Coordination Directorate, and the rest were redistributed to other sections with the mission "to control the personnel and activity of the S.I.S.". It should be noted that the Service had at the end of April 769 employees, 650 civil and 119 military personnel.

The first purge targeted people deemed compromised due to their activity during the time of Marshal Antonescu's government. The result was a batch of 230 civilians and 18 military personnel who were removed, which is about a third of the employees. It should be emphasized that among the 18 officers, 16 were superiors.

In parallel, a new organizational chart of the Special Information Service was adopted, which was to be led by a career General Director, who was responsible for technical and administrative duties. Four sections completed the organization scheme: Staff, Secretariat, Administrative⁴⁷; Foreign Information⁴⁸;

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵ The Report emphasizes that "They limited themselves to controlling the activity of the S.I.S. through the General Director and prepared the documentary material regarding the value of the Service, the organizational situation, as they tried to control the activity of the senior staff of the S.I.S. through personal contacts, thus preparing a first bundle of elements from the Service with which to make a first reclassification." *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ "with the mission to take care of the civil and military situation of the staff, as well as purely administrative matters: cash register, credit bureau, vehicles." *Ibidem*.

⁴⁸ "with the mission of collecting information from outside the borders, systematized in

Counterintelligence⁴⁹; Counterinformation.⁵⁰

The Special Section, listed as the Directorate of Studies and Coordination in the organizational chart, played a distinctive function, as shown by its supervision attributions over personnel operations as well as the institution as a whole and by the fact that most of its members were conspirators. One issue that stood out was the addition of a new task, that of “politicizing the entire S.I.S. apparatus.”

Undoubtedly, such a task was difficult, but it reveals that the Communist Party was determined to apply both short-term and long-term policies, which is why people training became a fundamental element. Until then, professionals who understood Bodnăraș's message were successfully used, one of whom was the Special Section's appointed director, Lucian Stupineanu.

As a result, by the end of the first stage of transformation after passing under the total control of Bodnăraș, the Special Information Service had embarked on a road of deep and even irreversible mutations. However, there was still much to do, so the General Secretary of the Government set three new goals for the second phase of his ‘reform’: strengthening the number and quality of Special Section collaborators; a second massive purge of S. I. S. officials; a closer collaboration between the different S.I.S. sections and the Special Section.⁵¹

Thus, on June 1, 1945, the second wave of purges took place at the Special Information Service, and 130 civil and 59 military officials were removed, most of them senior officers. This meant that more than half of the existing staff on March 6, 1945, had already left the institution. Among the new arrivals, a good part went to the Special Section, which reached a hundred members.

A communist cell directed by a former illegalist, Ion Didenco,⁵² was also

three sectors: North, West and South. This section will become more important upon once diplomatic relations with the other countries resume.” *Ibidem*.

⁴⁹ “with the mission of supervising the activity of foreign Legations and Intelligence Services, at the same time to follow the general intelligence activity of espionage systematized in the various countries. The Counter-Espionage Directorate also has its own investigation and surveillance agency.” *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ “with the mission of ensuring internal counter-informative action, in the following the sectors: political, social, nationalities, economic and military, as well as having its own investigation and surveillance agency.” *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵² He had escaped from the Târgu Jiu camp together with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej on the night of August 9/10, 1944. Didenco was a pseudonym; his name was Ion Anton Vidrașcu, born in 1906 in Odesa, party member since 1936. See Central National Historical Archives, Fund *Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Collection*, File 671, p. 10 and File 674, vol. I-II.

created at the beginning of June 1945, in keeping with the politicization of the institution and as a new feature for an espionage service. In the same sense, a Trade Union was established on June 13.⁵³

Despite the political work, Emil Bodnăraş did not neglect the informative work either; as the agency's maintenance and consolidation was an important priority. Hubert was the conspiratorial name of one of the best political informers, found in many files containing information notes coming from the Special Information Service during 1945 – 1947.⁵⁴ The Report identifies him as Cohn Burăh, 44 years old, a member of the Communist Party who had been recruited since September 1944 to be used in connection with the National Peasant Party due to his friendship with one of the Maniu's men, Gică Macărescu. From the latter, he obtained a lot of information regarding Iuliu Maniu and other leaders of the party. Thanks to his good results, Hubert⁵⁵ became a resident, having in turn a network of informants who helped him obtain information from the American and British missions in Bucharest.

Because of the policy carried out by Bodnăraş, on the drafting date - July 3, 1945, of the analysed Report, the S.I.S. had 297 civilian employees, and the 99 employees of the Special Section, even though between May 1 and July 1, 437 employees had been purged.⁵⁶

As for the future of the Service, Emil Bodnăraş believed that the good path he had started on could not lead to the expected results if the General Director Nicolae Stănescu, considered too close to the old regime, was not replaced. The deadline given in the Report for this step was two weeks, but the General Secretary's wish was fulfilled sooner. On July 12, Stănescu⁵⁷ submitted his

⁵³ *Ibidem*, Fund Collection 50. Documents elaborated by the repressive bodies about the activity of the Romanian Communist Party and revolutionary mass organizations, File 10.615, ff. 1-29.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁵ The Hubert source did indeed produce many high-quality briefing notes, such as those of 24 and 28 August 1945, drawn up at the height of the crisis leading to the 'royal strike'. See Archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service, Fund Documentary, File 4033, f. 150-151.

⁵⁶ Central National Historical Archives, Fund Collection 50. Documents elaborated by the repressive bodies about the activity of the Romanian Communist Party and revolutionary mass organizations, File 10.615, ff. 1-29.

⁵⁷ In March 1950, Stănescu was detained for a few days, then he was released and returned to the informative work, only to be arrested again on October 20, 1950, for six years; *Ibidem*, Fund I.S.I.S.P. Memories and memoirs regarding the revolutionary and democratic labour movement in Romania (fund XVII), File 10, Vol. I, ff. 4-18.

resignation and Lucian Stupineanu took his position.⁵⁸

CONCLUSIONS

The takeover of the Special Intelligence Service by the communists immediately after the installation of the Groza government was not a result of the struggle for power between various political forces. It was a well-thought-out plan that, when implemented, was supposed to bring additional leverage to the extreme left as it built the totalitarian regime it was going to patronize. In this context, Emil Bodnăraș played an essential role because he managed to not only purge the Service and bring in obedient staff, verified communists, but also to start achieving important results in the line of informative work. Even if from the summer of 1945 there was a race between the S.I.S. and the Directorate of the Security Police under the control of the Minister of the Interior, Teohari Georgescu,⁵⁹ the conclusion is that the secret services fully contributed to the establishment of communism in Romania. The actions of Emil Bodnăraș from March to July 1945 have proved particularly significant from this point of view.

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⁵⁸ He maintained his position until January 1947, when he was replaced by Serghei Nicolau. See Archive of the National Council for the Study of Security Archives, Fund *Penal*, File 10.931, Vol. 12, f. 54.

⁵⁹ Relevant in this sense is the report drawn up by the leadership of the S.I.S., on July 12, 1946, analysing the relations with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and insisting on the hostile attitude of the general secretary Avram Bunaciu and general Alexandru Nicolschi, head of the Corps of Detectives. See S.R.I., *Cartea Albă a Securității* [The White Book of Securitate], Vol. I, *August 23, 1944 - August 30, 1948*, Bucharest, 1997, p. 311-315.

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THE ROMANIAN ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE ALBANIA IN THE WARSAW PACT MEETINGS AGENDA OF 1965

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Abstract: *Albania's inclusion in the Warsaw Treaty was a key moment in Albania's international relations after the Second World War. Joining this treaty "cemented" Albania's ties to the communist bloc and its Eastward orientation. During the Cold War, this membership reflected the Albanian communist government's particular political, military, and social orientation. Albania's relations with the Warsaw Pact should be seen as satellite relations conducted through the Soviet Union.*

This study investigates an event that has already been studied by several Cold War researchers, exposing the dissenting ambitions within this coalition, particularly focusing on Romania's efforts to build bridges of cooperation with Albania in 1965 with the assistance of communist China and in opposition to Moscow. The subject is not new to Romanian studies of the Warsaw Pact. The examination of documents from Albania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive on how the Albanian communist leadership saw this event at the time, on the other hand, is innovative. The comparative approach, which paired data from the archives of former Warsaw Pact members, revealed that attempts to create fluid alliances amongst them were in embryo but did not threaten their vassalage to Moscow. Likewise, contrary to the perception of communist regimes, Cold War scholars have recently classified Albania and Romania as allies without any strategic weight within the Pact, debunking the myths of communist historiography with nationalist undertones in both countries.

Keywords: *Romania, Albania, Warsaw Pact, Cold War, embryo dissidence, Soviet Union, satellite relations, China.*

Rezumat: *Tentativa României de a include Albania pe agenda reuniunilor Pactului de la Varșovia, în anul 1965. Includerea Albaniei în Tratatul de la Varșovia a*

reprezentat un moment cheie în relațiile internaționale ale Albaniei de după cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Alinierea Albaniei la acest pact a „cimentat” legăturile sale cu blocul comunist și orientarea sa spre Est, apartenența la această alianță politico-militară fiind o expresie a tipologiei politice, militare și sociale care a caracterizat guvernul comunist albanez în timpul Războiului Rece. Evident, relațiile Albaniei cu Pactul de la Varșovia trebuie privite ca relațiile unui satelit (Albania), purtate prin intermediul Uniunii Sovietice.

Studiul urmărește să examineze o perioadă analizată de diverși cercetători ai Războiului Rece, evidențiind eforturile disidenților în cadrul acestei organizații, concentrându-se pe eforturile României de a construi punți de cooperare cu Albania în 1965, cu asistența Chinei comuniste și în opoziție față de Moscova. Subiectul articolului este prezent în studiile autorilor români asupra Pactului de la Varșovia, dar noutatea constă în examinarea acestui moment pe baza documentelor Arhivei Ministerului Afacerilor Externe din Albania, analizându-se modul în care inițiativa României a fost privită de conducerea de atunci a comuniștilor albanezi. Abordarea comparativă, prin juxtapunerea informațiilor din arhivele fostelor membre ale Pactului de la Varșovia, conduce la concluzia că încercările de a crea alianțe fluide între ele erau deja în stare embrionară, însă acestea nu au subminat vasalitatea lor față de Moscova. De asemenea, contrar percepției avute de regimurile comuniste, specialiștii în Războiul Rece au clasificat recent Albania și România ca fiind aliate fără nici o pondere strategică în cadrul Pactului, dezmințind miturile istoriografiei comuniste, cu accente naționaliste, din cele două țări.

INTRODUCTION

Albania, the poorest country in the Balkans, where the communist regime was imposed immediately after the end of the Second World War, became a member of the Warsaw Treaty on May 14, 1955. This treaty was the first international political and military organization that Albania adhered to, following a decade of isolation in international relations. It is worth mentioning at the beginning of this study that Albania, unlike Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and East Germany, was the only member country of the treaty that never had an agreement of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, neither during the Stalinist era nor after its death.

At the time of accession to the Warsaw Treaty, Albania had an agreement of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Bulgaria, signed in 1947, following Enver Hoxha's visit to Moscow.¹ This treaty received the approval of Stalin, who during the first years adopted a rigid attitude towards Albania, whose interests,

¹ Valentina Duka, *Historia e Shqipërisë 1912- 2000* [History of Albania 1912- 2000], Tiranë, SHBLU, 2007, p. 237.

according to him, could be represented by Belgrade. Enver Hoxha adopted a similar stance, claiming that Albania's road to Moscow went through Belgrade.² At the end of the war, Yugoslavia managed to come out with a preferential status concerning Moscow, which allowed it to become a key factor in the region. In this regard, Yugoslavia propagated the idea of a confederation that would also include Bulgaria and Albania to establish a solid Soviet stronghold from the Adriatic to the Black Sea.³

According to the analysis of some of the most renowned international and national Cold War authors, keeping Albania away from Moscow and from signing an agreement of friendship and mutual assistance originated at the Yalta conference.⁴ Yugoslavia and Albania were considered countries outside blocs, and any attempt to include Albania in the socialist camp would have been seen as a reason to escalate hostilities with the West.⁵

The estrangement between Stalin and Tito in 1948 was a favourable time for the Albanian Stalinist leadership to gain ground in the socialist camp, which was facilitated by the support of Stalin's successors. Khrushchev granted a new status to communist Albania, making it part of the Warsaw Treaty on May 14, a very important alliance at the time, antagonistic to the West and NATO. In this context, researcher Ana Lalaj has rightly remarked, "Albania's participation in the Warsaw Treaty was a matter of status and prestige".⁶

The establishment of the naval base in Vlora at the initiative of the Soviets

² Nina Smirnova, *Historia e Shqipërisë përgjatë shekullit XX* [The history of Albania throughout the 20th century] Tiranë, Ideart, 2004, p. 322; See Hamit Kaba, Ethem Çeku, *Shqipëria dhe Kosova në arkivar ruse* [Albania and Kosovo in the Russian archives], Prishtinë, Brezi 81, 2011, p. 24-25.

³ Petrit Nathanaili, *Ideologjia dhe orientimi i politikës së jashtme të Shqipërisë*, in *Shqipëria mes Lindjes dhe Perëndimit. Aktet e Konferencës Ndërkombëtare* [The ideology and the orientation of Albania's foreign policy, in Albania between East and West. The Proceedings of the International Conference], Tiranë, 2013, p. 261.

⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Tiranë, "Fan Noli", 2019, p. 413; See Martin Gilbert, *Churchill: A life*, London, Minerva, 1992, p. 797; See Hamit Kaba, *Shqipëria dhe të mëdhenjtë; nga Lufta e Dytë Botërore te Lufta e Ftohtë* [Albania and the Great Powers: from the Second World War to the Cold War], Tiranë, Klean, 2015, p. 79; See Lisen Bashkurti, *Diplomacia shqiptare në fillimet e Luftës së Ftohtë* [Albanian diplomacy at the beginning of the Cold War], Tiranë, Geer, 2003, p. 148-49.

⁵ Islam Lauka, Eshref Ymeri, *Shqipëria në dokumentet e arkivave ruse* [Albania in Russian archive documents], Tiranë, Toena, 2006, p. 99-100.

⁶ Ana Lalaj, *Shqipëria nga Traktati i Varshavës në NATO* [Albania from the Warsaw Treaty to NATO], in "Sudime Historike" [Historical Studies], 2008, no. 3-4, p. 176.

led to a flourishing of relations between Albania and the USSR for almost two years, culminating with Nikita Khrushchev's visit to Albania. The mutual aspiration to transform Albania into a castle on the shores of the Adriatic, where the construction of this base would establish the "maritime boundary of the socialist camp"⁷, was short-lived. The Albanian leaders, dissatisfied with the Soviet leaders' views about the West, suspicious of their demands for rapprochement with the Yugoslavs, and disappointed by Khrushchev's disparagement of Stalin's leadership, started to look for a new ideological partner.⁸

China's direct support for Albania, provided at the height of the Soviet-Chinese conflict, provoked a crisis between Albania and the USSR with many repercussions. The USSR used the Warsaw Treaty as a military, economic and political instrument to punish Albania for its ungrateful behaviour. The fiercest battle between the Albanian and the Soviet government occurred at the Vlora Base, which became an apple of discord.

Because of this conflict, Albania was *de facto* outside of the Warsaw Treaty in 1961. This was a collective decision-making of all member countries. The USSR chose the strategy of collegiality to exclude Albania from the most important political and military organisation of the communist bloc, thus formally avoiding personal responsibility. However, although this accountability was avoided through a group decision, the USSR and Khrushchev were always held responsible for the deed.⁹ The communist government opposed the verdict of the Warsaw Pact member countries to close down the Vlora Base and deliberately leave Albania out of the treaty. However, Albanian leaders found an acceptable compromise in a *de jure* participation in the pact and a *de facto* exclusion from it. This would protect them against the domestic Soviet-aided risk of conspiracy. In addition, the communist regime exploited the existing state of affairs to play the victim in the international arena.¹⁰

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

⁸ Bernd J. Fischer, Oliver Schmitt, *Një histori e përmbledhur e Shqipërisë*, [A Concise History of Albania], Prishtinë, 2022, p. 221; See Valentina Duka, *Historia e Shqipërisë 1912-2000* ..., p. 267-268.

⁹ Enver Hoxha, *Ditar për çështjet ndërkombëtare* [Diary of International Affairs], Tiranë, Instituti i Studimeve Marksiste Leniniste, të Komitetit Qendror të Partisë së Punës së Shqipërisë, 1982, p. 63; See Valentina Duka, *Historia e Shqipërisë 1912-2000* ..., p. 273; See Etleva Smaçi, *Shqipëria dhe Traktati i Varshavës* [Albania and Warsaw Treaty], Doctoral Thesis, Tiranë, Institute of History, 2017, p. 139 http://asa.edu.al/site/?page_id=3908.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

On December 3, 1961, the Soviet government officially announced the breakup of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In this context, at the beginning of 1962, on January 9, Beqir Balluku sent a letter to the Warsaw Pact commander, Marshal Grechko, declaring the representatives of the Unified Command and his collaborators *persona non grata* and requesting them to leave Albania immediately.¹¹

From January 30 to February 1, 1962, when the successive meetings of Defence Ministers of the Pact member states were held in Prague, Albania did not receive an invitation, nor did it participate in the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee, or other organisms. The Albanian government did not take any initiative to change the situation except for some formal notes of protest.¹² This conjuncture lasted until November 1964, when another member of the Pact, Romania, began to exhibit signs of wanting to break free from the Soviet Union-dictated decision-making and seek allies. Having the main focus on Albania, and aided by the Chinese, Romania tried to convince Albania to attend the next meeting in Warsaw.

TELEGRAM FROM BUCHAREST FROM NOVEMBER 30, 1964

The next meeting of the Political Consultative Committee was held in Warsaw on January 19-20, 1965. The Albanian government learned about the meeting through a telegram dated November 30, 1964, sent by the Albanian representative in Bucharest.¹³ The telegram reported that the Soviets had decided to bring the European revisionist leaders together, to discuss the formation of the NATO General Force. According to the telegram, Moscow planned to use the meeting to bring "other revisionists under the dictate". This meeting was preceded by that of December 10, 1964, with the participation of deputy defence ministers from Pact member countries.¹⁴

Albania did not receive an official invitation, as had happened in other similar meetings. According to the announcement of the Albanian embassy in Bucharest, the purpose of this meeting was to prepare the next assembly, which

¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive (hereinafter: **MFAA**), Year 1962, file 577 (B/VI-3) *Information on the relations between our country and the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty*.

¹² MFAA, Year 1962, file 575 (B/VI-3), *Note of protest addressed to Marshal Grecko*.

¹³ MFAA, Year 1964, file 588, *Material connected to the Warsaw Treaty*, Telegram No. 945. Dated 17.12.1964, from Bucharest, p. 12.

¹⁴ MFAA, Year 1964, file 588..., p. 13.

would include the first secretaries and heads of government of member states. The issue of Albania's participation in the Warsaw Treaty meetings was mentioned again in this telegram, for the first time since the meeting on August 3, 1961.

The Romanian representative had requested that Albania be included in the next meeting.¹⁵ According to him, Albania, along with nations having observer status, should join the pact as an effective member. The Polish representative opposed the Romanian proposal, claiming that even if invited, the Albanians would not attend and therefore, they should not be invited. In the meeting of deputy defence ministers, Romania failed to convince the member countries to extend an invitation to the Albanian government. The telegram sent by the Bucharest representation highlighted the reasons why Romania, after almost four years of Albania's *de facto* departure, requested its return to the negotiating table. According to the telegram, the Romanians were attempting to challenge the Soviet method of running the organization and did not want to do it on their own.¹⁶

International Cold War researchers believe that the Romanian opposition to Soviet hegemony within The Warsaw Pact was influenced by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba because of a secret decision made by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party without consulting its member countries.¹⁷ When the crisis took the proportions of a nuclear threat, the Soviet Union justified the action claiming to have acted on behalf of the alliance to increase the capability of the Warsaw Pact Unified Forces. Various Cold War researchers have remarked that the Bucharest government, although part of the treaty, managed to clarify its position on the Cuban crisis confidentially to Washington. "If the Cuban crisis were to turn into an open war, Romania would maintain neutrality, while the United States should not attack Romania".¹⁸

This would have led to a one-sided breach of the Warsaw Pact, which did not actually happen. Romania's position on the treaty was no longer that of an unconditional supporter of Moscow's policy. The Declaration of April 1964, also

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Dennis Deletant, Mihail Ionescu, *Romania and Warsaw Pact: 1955-1989*, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 43, 2004, p. 64.

¹⁸ Raymond L. Garthoff, *When and why Romania Distanced itself from Warsaw Pact*, in "The Cold War International History Project Bulletin", Spring 1995, No. 5, p. 111; See Vojtech Mastny, 'We Are in a Bind': Polish and Czechoslovak Attempts at Reforming the Warsaw Pact, 1956-1969, in "The Cold War International History Project Bulletin", 1998, No. 11, p. 232.

called the Declaration of “independence”, marks another turning point for historians dealing with the Warsaw Pact.¹⁹ Following this, the Romanians began to be labelled as “rebellious allies” within the Eastern organization. The statement made by Maurer in May 1964 on the violation of Article Three of the Warsaw Pact, concerning the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba, clearly showed that the situation within the organization was tense. Therefore, on December 10, 1964, the request of the Romanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pompiliu Macovei that Albania participate in the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee was legitimate and pragmatic. Romania was seeking a coalition of opponents within the pact, and Albania had proved to be the one. Romania dared to take this step despite a lack of enthusiasm.²⁰

The movement in Bucharest regarding Albania’s participation in the January meeting was intense. The Romanians also requested the support of the Chinese ambassador to Bucharest, to inform the Albanians and encourage them to accept the invitation. The telegram of January 4 conveys information about the meeting of Emil Bodnaras with the Chinese ambassador.²¹ The Chinese ambassador declared to the Albanian representative in Romania, Rrapi Gjermeni that Bodnaras had persistently asked for the presence of Albania in the meeting. Being familiar with the previous position of the Albanian leadership, Bodnaras asked the Chinese ambassador to be persuasive enough, so that Albania would not decline the invitation. “It would be advantageous for Albania to accept it, but without an active participation”.²²

According to the Albanian archival documentation, the surprise of this meeting is attributed to Bodnaras’ statement that Khrushchev had excluded Albania from the Warsaw Treaty.²³ This was not new to the Albanians, who were aware that decisions in the Political Consultative Committee were reached under

¹⁹ Dennis Deletant, Mihail Ionescu, *Romania and Warsaw Pact...*, p. 69; Petre Oprea, *România în organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia (1955-1991)* [Romania in the organization of the Warsaw Treaty (1955-1991)], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2008, p. 108; Larry L. Watts, *Ferește-mă, Doamne, de prieteni. Războiul clandestin al Blocului Sovietic cu România* [Save me, God, from friends. The Soviet Bloc’s clandestine war with Romania], translated from English by Camelia Diaconescu, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2011, p. 247-251.

²⁰ Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955-1969*, New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 85.

²¹ MFAA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3. Warsaw Treaty, p. 1.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²³ MFAA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3. Warsaw Treaty, p. 3.

the pressure and directives of Moscow. Yet, the proud Albanian communist leaders exploited this declaration as a confirmation of their accusations against Moscow for unfair exclusion. Although Bodnaras did not ask the Chinese ambassador to communicate this conversation to the Albanian side, it is clear that he was looking for a common Romania - Albania - China front for the next meeting. According to this document, he felt that participating in the subsequent meeting alongside China and Albania would forge an opposing front that would call for the treaty's modification.²⁴

The Albanian government most probably felt flattered that someone was finally standing up for it and defending it within the very treaty it was expelled from unanimously at the request of the Soviets. However, Albania's *de jure* stance on the treaty did by no means involve a possible return. It served as a security measure, in the event of an intervention, particularly from the neighbours. The treaty, a legally binding agreement, prevented them from achieving their ambitions. Behar Shtylla, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, recommended that the Albanian embassy in Bucharest exercise caution while responding to the Romanians and "not offend the Romanians."²⁵

Their proposal was to be evaluated but no announcement was to be made. At the same meeting on January 5, 1965, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telegram from the Albanian representative in Poland inviting Albania to participate in the sessions of the Political Consultative Committee on January 19-20.²⁶ The note from the Polish government informed the Albanian government of the purpose of the meeting: consultations at the initiative of the German Democratic Republic to examine the NATO initiative for the creation of the Joint Nuclear Forces, as well as the risk of militarization of West Germany with nuclear weapons. The invitation was sent by the Polish side as the host country.²⁷

The Albanian leadership experienced considerable difficulty. For almost three successive years, they had raised their voice in protest at their unfair exclusion from the Warsaw Treaty meetings and decision-making. The position became all the more difficult, as the meeting required the representation at the rank of first secretary and chairman of the Council of Ministers of treaty member countries, with participation from the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs. The Albanian side was also informed that the commander of the treaty's Unified

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ MFAA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3. Warsaw Treaty, p. 12.

²⁶ MFAA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3. Telegram no. 10, dated 05.01.1965, p. 8.

²⁷ MFAA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3, Note of the Polish government, No. GMO- 22/1/65, p. 9-11.

Forces would present some information at that session. After receiving the official announcement, Behar Shtylla addressed Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu – the most powerful leaders – with a letter dated January 5.²⁸

Foreign Minister Shtylla refused to attend the meeting, citing several reasons. First, he regarded Romania as “the forger of a false unity within the camp”, hence nothing more than a means to enable the Soviet leadership to normalize relations without criticising and reforming itself. The demand for a public apology from the Soviet Union was unfeasible at the time, suggesting an indirect rejection of the invitation. Second, the Romanian-Chinese cooperation was viewed with suspicion. Behar Shtylla assumed that the Romanian proposal was the result of an agreement between Moscow and Bucharest, maybe even with the Chinese. For all the above-mentioned reasons, he proposed that the invitation should come, but then declined.²⁹

The Foreign Minister requested that the right conditions be created for Albania to accept the invitation and participate, but he did not specify them in the letter. The Albanian ambassador to Romania, Rrapi Gërmeni, was summoned to offer a response to the Romanians.³⁰ On the other hand, the Polish government took its political and diplomatic initiative seriously as the host country of the meeting. According to the Warsaw Treaty's custom, the official communiqué calling for the Political Consultative Committee's sessions on January 19–20 was to be released before the sessions began. On May 15, Poland's chargé d'affaires in Albania showed up at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negotiate an agreement with the Albanian side. The Albanian party requested that the name of Albania be omitted from the communiqué.³¹ The decision must not have “surprised” the Polish chargé d'affaires because the Albanians had informed the Romanians of the refusal a month before the Romanians insisted on releasing an invitation to the Albanian government.

THE ALBANIAN COMMUNIST REGIME'S DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE TO THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted rapidly by notifying the Albanian representatives abroad, in particular the delegates in Poland, that if they were to

²⁸ MFAA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3. Warsaw Treaty, p. 12.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

be asked, "*Will Albania participate?*" the answer had to be "*We do not know anything yet*". The Albanian representative in Poland was instructed explicitly not to commit to anything. On January 15, 1965, the Polish chargé d'affaires to Albania delivered an official letter to the Polish embassy in Albania addressed to the Political Consultative Committee. At the request of the Albanian side, the letter had to be read and examined during the sessions that would be held by the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw.³²

The letter echoed the opinion of the communist leaders of Albania who sought justification for what had happened in the past. Albania's *de facto* exclusion from the Warsaw Treaty in 1961 was viewed by the Albanian leadership as an imposed decision of the Soviet government led by Khrushchev [and he was somewhat right here]. However, in terms of why Albania was excluded, Hoxha felt proud about remaining loyal to Marxism-Leninism, which was exactly why he was punished. This was not a very convincing justification, since the Albanian leadership was motivated primarily by personal benefits, rather than principles. They adopted, as researcher Smirnova has remarked, a pragmatic approach exclusively aiming at preserving power.³³

The Romanian attempt to invite the Albanian government to participate was exploited by the latter to render public all the fury accumulated over the years, due to the sheer disregard and neglect manifested by the most important military and political organization of the socialist camp. In its letter, Albania blamed the Soviet government for the deadlock created between it and the organization, without excluding the other member countries, which, according to the Albanian leadership, had supported the Soviet Union in the initiative to expel Albania. This assumption was reasonable since none of the socialist countries had objected to the Soviet Union's discriminatory attitude towards Albania.³⁴ These accusations, although not directly targeted at Romania, actually contained the seed of mistrust, since the communist leadership of Romania had been among the most severe critics of the Albanian communist leadership during the two meetings of the Warsaw Treaty in 1961.³⁵

The Albanian government justified the harsh diplomatic conduct of January 1965, which was reflected in the least diplomatic tone of the letter, by claiming

³² *Ibid*, p. 56.

³³ Nina Smirnova, *Historia e Shqipërisë përgjatë shekullit XX* [The history of Albania throughout the 20th century], p. 379.

³⁴ MFAA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3. Warsaw Treaty, p. 56.

³⁵ Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered...*, p. 70.

that the Albanian authorities possessed seriously compromising documents for groups of people leading a powerful socialist state, a Warsaw Pact member [a direct accusation against Moscow]. According to these documents, as stated in the letter, this state collaborated with Tito's renegades and Greek fascist monarchists, as well as the Sixth American Fleet and Albanian secret services to overthrow the people's power by an armed attack.³⁶

The accusatory tone of the letter was reinforced by imperative tones, in the form of ultimatums. This attitude, manifested in communications with the Warsaw Treaty's highest political body, reflected the Albanian government's unwillingness to keep cooperating with this organisation. The Albanian government also objected, through the letter, to how they were invited, after a long period of nonparticipation in the treaty's meetings. According to Albania, such a decision reached by the other member countries without first consulting it, and even disregarding the agenda and the rank of the participants, was seen as another manifestation of the organisation's indifference towards the Albanian government and was in violation of article three of the treaty, which required consultations between the parties.³⁷ The invitation had been sent to Albania ignoring previous incidents and such an attempt to reconcile the difficult past was unacceptable to the Albanians, justifying their reluctance to attend the next meeting.

In reality, the rejection was more than just a matter of pride. The communist regime was already aware that ratifying the Warsaw Treaty could bring complications, either for the regime's sustainability or in relations with the neighbours, for whom the wind of détente was already beginning to blow. Likewise, the fact that the West had welcomed the withdrawal from the treaty and no longer interfered in the internal affairs of the communist regime, as it had done in the period 1949-53 to overthrow it,³⁸ may have played a role in preventing the Albanian leadership from opening a new front. Of course, the transformations within the organization convinced the communist regime that they would not receive the benefits they expected when they accepted membership in 1955.

THE ALBANIAN LETTER DEBATE

As for the long letter from the Albanian leadership, according to the information coming from diplomatic missions in Eastern European countries, it

³⁶ MFAA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3. Warsaw Treaty, p. 69.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³⁸ John P. Dunbabin, *The Cold War: The Great Powers and their allies*, Routledge, 2014, p. 164.

was not read in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, on January 19-20, 1965.³⁹ The organisers simply handed out a copy of the letter to each delegation, which raised individual awareness of the letter's contents, but no discussion took place. The reasons for not reading it were most likely not simply a disregard for the Albanian government's accusations against the Soviet Union and the Pact member states but it would have undoubtedly generated an unnecessary dispute among the organization's members. The situation in the highest political body of the treaty, the Political Consultative Committee, was no longer that of March 1961, when member countries unanimously voted for Moscow's decisions. Romania had openly become rebellious. The Political Consultative Committee decided to respond formally to the Albanian government's letter. The Albanian ambassador to Warsaw announced, "It turns out that there was a fierce fight between the delegations in the meeting", referring to the dispute between Gomulka and Dej on the Albanian issue.⁴⁰

The Romanians, who initiated the return of the Albanian delegation to the negotiating table, maintained until the very end that the exclusion of Albania from the Warsaw Treaty was illegal and thus had to be reconsidered,⁴¹ inciting strong reactions in other member countries. Thus, Gomulka proposed that the meeting secretariat respond to the Albanian letter sharply. According to the information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dej had taken a different stance, requesting that the Political Consultative Committee provide the response and that the tone be kept moderate.⁴² The telegrams from the Albanian embassy in Bucharest also provided information on the Dej-Gomulka debate over Albania. The Albanian government was greatly pleased by Dej's response to Gomulka. He offered the same justifications for Albania's absence that communist officials in Albania had used against Moscow and its satellites.

According to Dej, Albania could not participate because of its unfavourable or non-existent relations with some of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact. The accusation that most closely matched Tirana's standpoint, though, was that Romanians had supported military activities at the Vlora Base. Almost four years after the Naval Base's closure, Dej said, "The ships, property of the Albanian state were robbed." Only one country closed the Vlora Base without the approval of the

³⁹ MFFA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3, Information on the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee 19-20 January, p. 107.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Dennis Deletant, Mihail Ionescu, *Romania and Warsaw Pact...*, p. 74.

⁴² MFFA, Year 1965, file B/VI-3, p. 107.

Political Consultative Committee!⁴³ The statement made about the withdrawal of Soviet troops without the Political Consultative Committee's approval is an argument that needs further study. The documents on the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of January 19-20, 1965, released so far from various archives of member countries, including Albanian ones, indicate a unanimous vote, except for Albania, which voted against it.⁴⁴

According to the report prepared with materials from the meetings of the Romanian People's Party during the month of February, after the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, among the issues raised by these members was the Albanian Labour Party's position on the Warsaw Treaty.⁴⁵ In fact, according to the telegram of the Albanian representation in Bucharest, it only involved reading the letter and the note that the Albanian Labour Party sent to the Political Consultative Committee, announcing that no comments had been made on them. According to the very telegram, in his report, Dej, focusing on the Albanian problem, had stated that adopting unfair attitudes in the future would be detrimental to the Warsaw Treaty, as it would cause other countries to follow Albania's course of action. Albania had responded appropriately in those circumstances, according to Dej.⁴⁶ All these stances were considered as support by the Romanian government.

Even the Romanian ambassador to Budapest had commented on the letter [that the Albanian Labour Party had sent to the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee on January 19] during a meeting with the Albanian representative in Hungary. According to him, the demands of the Albanian side were completely fair, and very well formulated, but some of them could not be met because the Soviet Union was firm and did not accept responsibility for its actions against the Albanian Labour Party.⁴⁷ The information prepared by a person named Llazar Muço differs from the text of the coded telegram sent from Budapest. The data contained in the telegram is as follows: "The communiqué drawn up at the end of the session was said to have been the result of a long discussion and the compromise that was finally reached among the participants. I spoke to him about

⁴³ MFAA, Year 1965, file D.B/VI-3, Telegram No. 135 of Rrapi Gjermani, representative of Albania in Romania, p. 235.

⁴⁴ MFAA, Year 1961, file 42/V, BI-8-3, Informacion mbi mbledhjen e Komitetit Politik Konsultativ, 28-29 Mars [Information on the meeting of Political Consultative Committee (PCC) on March 28-29], p. 31.

⁴⁵ MFAA, Year 1965, file D.B/VI-3, Warsaw Treaty, p. 260.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Telegram No. 139, p. 258.

⁴⁷ MFAA, Year 1965, file D.B/VI-3, Warsaw Treaty, p. 110.

the main issues raised in our letter directed to the meeting. He told me that the measures you proposed were unacceptable to the participants.”⁴⁸

It is difficult to say what prompted the person who prepared the report to distort the telegram data in this manner. However, the truth is that at the end of the meeting, on January 19-20, the Political Consultative Committee decided to respond to the Albanian Labour Party's long letter very briefly. The reply stated that after examining the letter from the People's Republic of Albania's Council of Ministers dated 15 January 1965, the Political Consultative Committee stated that the People's Republic of Albania refused to participate in the sessions of the Warsaw Treaty. Under these circumstances, Albania's participation in the Warsaw Treaty depends on the decision of its government.⁴⁹

Foreign Minister Behar Shtylla immediately forwarded the response to Enver Hoxha. During this time, information from various sources was collected as to what was really happening with the Albanian issue. Except for Romanians, the Soviet Union and other countries under its tutelage maintained an indifferent approach. A close examination of the press of the Warsaw Treaty member states revealed that they had not printed the letter from the Albanian government.⁵⁰ The letter in question had found a distinct echo in the Western press, following its publication in the official and widely circulated Albanian newspaper “Zëri i Popullit” (Voice of the People) on February 2. On the other hand, the few declarations that were made by representatives of the Pact member countries were in line with the official declaration of the Political Consultative Committee. Thus, János Kádár had declared in the Hungarian parliament that it was up to the Albanian side when its government would participate in the sessions of the Warsaw Treaty bodies.⁵¹

This was the last failed attempt by Hoxha's communist regime, which probably hoped that it could force the Soviet Union to rectify the mistakes of the past. Moscow undertook no such action; on the contrary, it continued to show that Albania was no longer part of its spheres of interest. Enver Hoxha must have understood this very clearly the moment he became acquainted with the Political Consultative Committee's response to the Albanian government's letter. The very epithet “contemptuous” he uttered for the reply received was an expression of

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Telegram no. 322, p. 265.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Political Consultative Committee's Decision on participation of Albania in the meetings of the Warsaw Treaty, 1965, p. 127.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Warsaw Treaty, p. 111.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

anger, since once again the Soviet Union was not paying even the slightest attention to the demands of the Albanian government. Undiplomatically translated, the reaction was "Let them do whatever they want". In the handwritten draft letter prepared by Behar Shtylla, Hoxha wrote "I propose that we respond to their contemptuous response more contemptuously", literally suggesting the following text: "To the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, Your indifferent attitude to the letter from Albanian government, a legal member of the Warsaw Treaty, burdens you with great responsibility. The Government of the People's Republic of Albania remains steadfast in its legal claims and rights based on the articles of the Treaty."⁵²

Romania repeated its efforts to invite the Albanian government to the meetings of the Warsaw Treaty even after the meeting of January 19-20, 1965. This was proved by the telegram of June 4, 1966, received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Albanian representation in Budapest.⁵³ The telegram stated that Romania had proposed some changes in the organization of the Warsaw Pact Unified Command. The essence of the proposal was that the commander of the Unified Command should not be chosen by a single Treaty country. This request opposed the appointment of the commander of the Warsaw Pact's Unified Command solely by the Soviet Armed Forces and brought it closer to the NATO model, where this position alternated among the member countries. The telegram also noted that Romanians had requested during the meeting of the Deputy Ministers of Defence in Moscow that Albania be invited to the Political Consultative Committee's meeting, which was scheduled to take place in Bucharest in July.

Despite the Romanian effort, Albania did not receive an invitation to the meeting of July 4-5, 1966. A note of protest from the Albanian government accompanied this position of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty member states. On July 19, the note from the Albanian government was delivered to the chargé d'affaires of Czechoslovakia and other member countries. The note considered the Political Consultative Committee's meeting illegal. Similarly, the Political Consultative Committee's act was regarded as discriminatory and in violation of the legal rights of the People's Republic of Albania by the

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁵³ MFAA, Year 1966, file B/VII-3, Telegram from representation in Budapest, 4 June, p. 29-30.

Albanian government. The note even labelled the meeting a “great conspiracy”.⁵⁴ This was the last note of protest before Albania’s final act of denunciation of the treaty on September 12, 1968, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops.

CONCLUSIONS

According to the Albanian archives, the communist leadership in Albania sought to portray itself as both inside and outside the Warsaw Pact before and after the January 1965 meeting. It continued to play the “victim”, submitting protest notes for not having been invited to subsequent sessions. The Albanian government refused to cooperate with the initiatives undertaken by the treaty, stating that the Central Committee of the Albanian Labour Party had nothing to do with the revisionist leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Albania required that representatives of the Warsaw Treaty submit these proposals directly to the People’s Republic of Albania. Romania’s efforts to transition from the role of a satellite to that of a small ally, at the beginning of the 1960s, were the first steps towards emancipation within the treaty, which the Albanian government disregarded.⁵⁵ Such movements were viewed as diversions that would overthrow the government and open up Albania to the West by the most repressive Stalinist regime in the Balkans, thus applying the label “revisionist” to the Romanian government, as well. While the Albanian communists’ perception of both the communist bloc and the West remained distorted, the case of Albania served as an experiment for Romania to test its power in an effort to avoid the Soviet dictate.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ MFAA, Year 1966, file B/ VI-3, Note of protest no. 519, 19 July, p. 61.

⁵⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 433.

⁵⁶ Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered...*, p. 85.

ANNEXES

Annexe no. 1

Të rikthehet në organin e shifrës jo më vonë
se 5 minuta ndalohe me nxjerrë kopje

DESHIFRIM

Nr. 12656 Nga BUKURESHTI

TEPËR SEKRET
Nr. Fletës 141

Nr. 35529

PER SHENIME

Mora njoftim

Firma


Nr. 945 Data: _____

M B A R O J

Perfaqesuesi rumun nuk ka qene dakord me Zerinin dhe ka propozuar qe te thiret edhe Shqiperija ne mbledhjen e janarit se eshte antare efektive, te theriten dhe vezhgusit. Polaku qe ishte kryetar i mbledhjes i ka thene rumunit se po te shikosh qendrimin e shqiptareve e kupton se dhe ti ftosh ata nuk vijne per dhe nuk duhen ftuar. Dhe mbledhja nuk pranoj propozimin e rumuneve. Thuhet se rumunet do ta ndjejne vekten ngushte ne mbledhjen e ardheshme prandaj duan qe te shkoj atje dhe Shqiperija.

***Document No. 1** (Top Secret) is the final page of Telegram No. 945, dated December 17, 1964, sent by Rrapi Gjermeni, the Albanian representative in Bucharest. According to the telegram, Romania's invitation to the Albanians was met with hostility by Poland, which held the presidency of the assembly. The Albanian representative analyses the repeated efforts made by the Romanian representative to have Albania included in the upcoming Warsaw Treaty meeting, suggesting that Romania was facing challenges within the treaty framework.*

Annexe no. 2



Document No. 2 (Top Secret) is a telegram from the Albanian representative in Bucharest, Rrapi Gjermani. The photograph constitutes the second part of Telegram No. 135 and sheds light on one of the most debated theories concerning Albania's admission to the Warsaw Treaty during the Cold War. The elimination of Vlorë's naval base, without consultation with the Political Consultative Committee, is attributed solely to the Soviet Union. This document asserts that in his dispute with Gomulka at the Warsaw Treaty meeting on January 19, 1965, when Albania was absent, Dezhi (i.e., Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej) maintained the Albanian communist leadership's strongly supported position.

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‘RUSSIAN WORLD’: INTERPRETATIONS OF A DYNAMIC TOOL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract: *The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of sovereign states on its ruins, including an independent Russia, made the political elite of the Russian Federation reconsider the ideological platform that would clarify the place of the new Russia in international relations. In response to this need, the country's intellectual circles generated the ‘Russian World’ concept, which politicians adopted and employed as a foreign policy tool. Simple and, at first glance, relatively straightforward, the term ‘Russian World’ has not benefited from a coherent definition, as it is a dynamic and constantly expanding concept. Despite this, the specificity of the concept can be identified by analysing its evolution. The central element of the concept is the Russian language, to which another element is added, represented by the idea of the ‘Great Russian Nation’, which would encompass the three nations of the Eastern Slavs (Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian). With the launch of the concept in the political arena in 2007, but especially since 2014, the ‘Russian World’ has become a frequently used term in the speeches of the Russian political elite. Gradually, the concept was permanently enshrined in the architecture of Russian foreign policy, and it was intensively promoted in the Russian Federation's new Concept of Foreign Policy, adopted in 2023.*

Keywords: *Russian World, Russian Federation, international, political concept, foreign policy.*

Rezumat. „Lumea Rusă”: interpretarea unui instrument flexibil al politicii externe a Federației Ruse. *Prăbușirea Uniunii Sovietice, apariția unor state suverane pe ruinele acesteia, inclusiv a unei Rusii independente, au determinat elita politică a Federației Ruse să regândească platforma ideologică care să clarifice locul noii Rusii în cadrul relațiilor*

internaționale. Ca răspuns la această necesitate, cercurile intelectuale ale țării au generat conceptul „Lumea Rusă” care a fost preluat de politicieni și transformat într-un instrument de politică externă. Simplu și, la prima vedere, destul de clar, termenul „Lumea Rusă” nu a beneficiat de o definiție coerentă, fiind un concept dinamic și într-o continuă amplificare. În ciuda acestui fapt, specificul conceptului poate fi identificat analizând evoluția sa. Elementul central al conceptului îl constituie limba rusă, căruia i se adaugă un alt element reprezentat de ideea „marii națiuni ruse” care ar îngloba cele trei națiuni ale slavilor răsăriteni (rusă, ucraineană și belarusă). Odată cu lansarea conceptului în spațiul politic, în anul 2007, și mai ales începând cu anul 2014, „Lumea Rusă” a devenit un termen folosit frecvent în discursurile elitei politice ruse. Treptat, conceptul a fost înscris definitiv în arhitectura politicii externe ruse, fiind intens promovat în noul „Concept al politicii externe a Federației Ruse”, adoptat în anul 2023.

INTRODUCTION

In one of his public speeches, Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, compared Russia to a vacuum cleaner that, throughout history, has absorbed various peoples, ethnicities and nations.¹ This comparison, while lacking the aestheticism of Russia's national poets, faithfully conveys the truth. Today, Russia is the world's largest state, home to over 300 peoples and nations. Throughout history, the Kremlin has sought ideological, sometimes messianic, justifications for its insatiable thirst for war. Thus, Slavism was one of the pretexts for Russia's territorial conquests and expansion of its sphere of influence. Starting from the historical reality that both Russians and most of the Balkans and Eastern Europe nations are Slavs, the Kremlin has constructed and promoted ethnopolitical ideas favourable to its foreign policy.

In the 20th century, Russia collapsed twice, each time having to re-invent itself. First, when the Tsarist Empire fell due to an ideologically motivated revolution, this task was solved by default. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, forced the Russian Federation to rebuild its ideological identity completely. Consequently, the challenges of self-identification and modern Russia's influence on world architecture pushed the country's intellectual and political circles towards new concepts, such as the 'Russian World' (Russian: Русский мир).

Today, the 'Russian World' is an ideological concept that is part of the toolbox of the Russian Federation's foreign policy. Although the term's origin is

¹ *Prjamaja linija s Vladimirom Putiny* [Direct line with Vladimir Putin], 2014, in <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796> (Accessed on 12.02.2023).

much older, no clear and unanimously accepted definition exists. The 'Russian World' is a raw, flexible concept that allows Russian politicians to use it as a foundation for the national vision of post-Soviet Russia. This study explores the origins of the 'Russian World,' following its evolution as a concept and identifying its features.

STAGE I. HISTORICAL PREMISES

The term 'Russian World' was traced to several medieval works in Kievan Rus'. The religious work *Slovo na obnovenie Desjatinnoj cerkvi* (Russian: Слово на обновление Десятинной церкви) from the late 11th to the early 12th century first mentions the term, "(...) we glorify, praise and worship in the Trinity the glorious God, with gratitude to the faithful servant (Clement of Rome -AN) who multiplied his master's talent not only in Rome but everywhere: in Kherson as well as in the Russian World."² Another mention of the term is attested in the early 13th-century work *Poslanie episkopa Simona Polikarpu* (Russian: Послание епископа Симона Поликарпу), "(...) apostles were sent throughout the universe and, as enlightened illuminators, they enlightened the whole Russian land with Holy Baptism. The first of them – Leontie, Bishop of Rostov (...) after many torments, was killed by pagans – he was the third citizen of the Russian world (...)."³

However, the term 'Russian World' is not used as frequently as 'Russkaya strana/strana Russkaya' (Russian: Русская страна/страна Русская); 'zemlya Russkaya' (Russian: земля Русская); 'Rusi' (Russian: Русь)⁴ etc., in the medieval works of the East Slavs, and its mention is sporadic and without a precise definition. Today, Russian and Western scholars believe that the term refers to the Eastern Slavic-inhabited principalities,⁵ such as Kyiv, Chernihiv, Smolensk or

² Aleksandr Nazarenko, "*Slovo na obnovenie Desjatinnoj cerkvi*", ili k istorii počitanija svjatitelja Klimenta Rimskogo v Drevnej Rusi [A word on the renewal of the Church of the Tithes, or on the history of the veneration of St. Clement of Rome in Ancient Rus'], Moskva, Svjato-Ekatrinskij Mužskoj Monastyr', 2013, p. 185.

³ Dmitrij Abramovich, *Paterik Kievskago Pecherskago Monastyrja* [The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery], S.-Peterburg, Imperatorskaja Arheograficheskaja Komissija, 1911, p. 76, <https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/books/original/8292-Киево-Печерский-патерик.pdf> (Accessed on 13.02.2023).

⁴ The terms were written according to current Russian spelling norms.

⁵ John O'Loughlin, Gerard Toal, Vladimir Kolosov, *Who Identifies with the 'Russian World'? Geopolitical Attitudes in Southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria*, in "Eurasian Geography and Economics", 2016, Vol. 57, no. 6, p. 747,

Novgorod. Therefore, despite its ancient origins, the term has only a semantic connection with the concept promoted by the Kremlin today.

According to modern scholars, the term 'Russian World' was (re)discovered by Russian intellectual circles only in the second half of the 19th century,⁶ during a time that witnessed the flourishing of pan-Slavic ideals in the Tsarist Empire. It was also during this time that numerous ancient texts written in Kievan Rus' and other principalities were introduced to the cultural circuit. In particular, the work *Slovo na obnovenie Desjatinnoj cerkvi*, mentioned above, was originally published in 1850 by the archival historian Mikhail Obolensky, who claimed to have found a 14th-century copy of the work and reconstructed the original relying upon it. However, neither the original nor the manuscript was ever found.⁷

Similarly to the Middle Ages, the term 'Russian World' did not take on the characteristics of an ideology throughout the nineteenth century and was rarely mentioned in the works of Russian Slavophiles. Modern research released around the 2007 launch of the political concept 'Russian World' has accentuated its origin and current significance. The term's ambiguity has led to attempts to age and ennoble the 'Russian World' concept. For example, some Russian scholars believe that the modern meaning of 'Russian World' stems from the pan-Slavist Nikolay Danilevsky's *Russia and Europe* (1872).⁸ In his work, considered the most representative of Russian pan-Slavism, Danilevsky expresses his vision of the future of 'Slavic civilisation' whose "cultural-historical core" would be best expressed through the Russian people, positioned in contrast to Western Europe. In this sense, he was firmly convinced⁹ that the Russians would win the

<https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2017.1295275> (Accessed on 19.01.2023); Aleksandr Romenskij, "Ruskij mir" v drevnerusskoj literature: istoričeskij kontekst i semantika termina ['Russian world' in ancient Russian literature: historical context and semantics of the term], in S. I. Posokhov, S. B. Soročan (Eds.), *Laurea I: Antichnyi mir i Srednie veka: chteniia pamiati professora Vladimira Ivanovicha Kadeeva*, Khar'kov, OOO "NTMT", 2015, p. 140, https://khiao.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/laurea_i.pdf (Accessed on 19.01.2023).

⁶ John O'Loughlin, Gerard Toal, Vladimir Kolosov, *op. cit.*

⁷ Aleksandr Nazarenko, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁸ Anastasija Bezrodnaya, *Vlijanie istoriko-kul'turnogo konteksta na funkcionirovanie koncepta "russkij mir"* [The Influence of the Historical and Cultural Context on the Functioning of the 'Russian World' Concept], in "Izvestia Ural Federal University Journal", Vol. 26, 2020, no. 4, p. 71–72, <https://doi.org/10.15826/izv1.2020.26.4.071> (Accessed on 22.01.2023).

⁹ David MacKenzie, Michael W. Curran, *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond*, Belmont – Calif, Wadsworth Pub. Co, 1993, p. 435.

"civilizational war" with Europe and succeed in creating the Slavic federation. However, the term 'Russian World' does not appear in any of Danilevsky's works.

Similar to the above example, other modern Russian scholars have tried to justify the idea that the current concept 'Russian World' originates from the works of Fyodor Dostoevsky.¹⁰ For the most part, this research focuses on the analysis of the writer's diaries in which he, like many other personalities of Russian culture, ponders Russia's role and place in the world, expressing ideas influenced by pan-Slavism. For example, Dostoevsky notes "Russia cannot betray the great idea bequeathed to it for several centuries, which it has followed hitherto steadily. This idea is, by the way, the unity of the Slavs, but this unity is not one of conquest or violence but of service to humankind."¹¹ As with Danilevsky, Dostoevsky never used the term 'Russian World'.

With the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the Kremlin rejected Pan-Slav ideas that Vladimir Lenin considered "an expression of the chauvinist imperialism of tsarism."¹² Although the Soviet Union replaced the tsarist ideological platform with communist internationalism, Russian pan-Slavism experienced a brief revival during World War II. However, during the existence of 'Soviet pan-Slavism' (1941-1947), which was nothing more than Moscow's attempt to unite the Slavic peoples outside the USSR in the struggle against the Axis, there was no mention of the term 'Russian World'. Despite this, some features of Slavic ideas remained veiled in the vocabulary of the USSR's state apparatus even after the demise of Soviet pan-Slavism. Specifically, elements of the modern 'Russian World' concept may be detected in the KGB's strategy towards the Russian diaspora. The Soviet secret police worked to dissolve anti-Soviet organisations abroad while also creating pro-Soviet, so-called 'progressive' organisations¹³ to exercise influence in the

¹⁰ O. S. Soina, V. Sh Sabirov, *Russkii mir v vozzreniiakh F.M. Dostoevskogo. Monografiia* [The Russian world in the views of F.M. Dostoevsky. Monograph], Moskva, Flinta – Nauka, 2015.

¹¹ Fedor Dostoevskij, *Sobranie sochinenij v pjatnadcati tomah* [Complete works in fifteen volumes], Vol. 13, Leningrad, Nauka, 1994, p. 205.

¹² Vladimir Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenij* [Complete works], Vol. 26, Moskva, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1969, p. 329.

¹³ A. Fabrichnikov, I. Ovchinnikov, *Ispol'zovanie vozmozhnostej sovetskogo komiteta po kul'turnym svjazjam s sootchestvennikami za rubezhom v razvedyvatel'noj rabote* [Using the capabilities of the Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad in Intelligence Work], Moskva, Nauchno-izdatel'skij otdel Shkoly No. 101 MVD SSSR, 1968, p. 6, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kbcWaaaEbxz_lIFXHg9BRDtZKfo-xD1e/view (Accessed on 27.01.2023).

capitalist bloc countries. Following the strategy of “who is not with us is against us”, such organisations sponsored by the KGB focused their activities on representatives of the Soviet diaspora. Specifically, they sought to “convert” neutral emigrants, including second and third-generation emigrants, to increase their “patriotic and progressive” spirit, to link them to the USSR through culture or “other ties”,¹⁴ and, finally, to create espionage networks.¹⁵ According to the KGB handbook, *Using the possibilities of the Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with compatriots abroad in espionage activity*, the structure focused its work with the diaspora on ‘Motherland’. Thus, the KGB was counting on the diaspora's patriotism and nostalgia for the homeland.

Later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Slavic/nationalist movements began to emerge in post-Soviet Russia, where attachment to the state, but not to the ‘historical homeland’, was no longer fundamental. Most of these movements focused, like the KGB strategy mentioned above, on the Russian diaspora, particularly those remaining in the former Soviet states. Diaspora, in this case, is a term that includes not only Russian Federation nationals but also Russian speakers or those who consider themselves Russians.

Consequently, the term ‘compatriots from abroad’ appeared in public discourse in Russia as early as the 1990s, and this will be considered the beginning of the ‘Russian World’ concept. Regardless, the term was too vague since it only implied people of Russian nationality or those who also held citizenship of the Russian Federation. However, according to some research, the term was viewed far more generally in the Russian consciousness and it included people who felt an affinity for Russia.¹⁶ The term has an important semantic nuance in Russian. Thus, the English ‘Russian world’ is a translation of *Russkiy mir*. *Russkiy* is a term that refers to everything Russian, including ethnicity, culture, and history, indicating that it includes an ethnic component. In Russian, there is also the term *rossiyskiy*, which refers strictly to everything related to the Russian state, encompassing all inhabitants of Russia, regardless of ethnicity. Likewise, *russkie* are ethnic Russians who do not necessarily live in Russia. At the same time, *rossiyan* are people who are citizens of the Russian Federation but not necessarily ethnic Russians. In English, the two terms are translated the same – Russians.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p.6.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

¹⁶ Valerij Tishkov, *Russkij Mir: Smysly i Strategii* [Russian World: Meanings and Strategies], in <https://mdn.ru/articles/v-a-tishkov-russkij-mir-smysly-i-strategii> (Accessed on 23.01.2023).

Ideas about the existence of a 'Russia' that does not end with the borders of the Russian Federation were expressed in the early 1990s by Boris Mezhuiev, Gleb Pavlovsky, Vadim Tsymbursky and Mikhail Gefter,¹⁷ with their attention directed towards the former Soviet states, especially Ukraine and Belarus. In particular, the philosopher and researcher Gefter argued that the 'Russian question' is of primary importance for the Russian state and that it "has nothing to do with nationality". He proposed the term 'Russian countries', which he characterised as a world in itself that could in no way fit into the Western civilisation. Gefter promoted the idea that the Russian Federation should be reformed into so-called 'Russian countries', which would include both the territories that are currently part of the Russian Federation, for example, 'Russian Caucasus' or 'Russian Siberia', and the former Soviet states. In Gefter's view, the regionalisation of the Russian Federation could be used as a platform to reintegrate territories lost to Moscow following the break-up of the Soviet Union.¹⁸

At the same time, some Slavophile ideas of the Russian intelligentsia began taking political shape. One of the first and most visible political initiatives in this direction was the Congress of Russian Communities (Russian: Конгресс русских общин), founded in 1992. The organisation aimed to unite Russians everywhere in a single state. With a nationalist discourse, the Congress even ran in the 1995 elections but failed to cross the 5% electoral threshold.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the movement managed to bring nationalist and even imperialist narratives back into the political discourse in Moscow, and the founder of the Congress, Dmitry Rogozin, has remained active in Russian public life to this day.

Around the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church became involved in promoting Slavophile imperialist ideas. In 1993, the World Russian People's Council (Russian: Всемирный Русский Народный Собор), led by the Russian Patriarch, was created under the aegis of the Church. From the year of its founding to the present day, the organisation has been involved in numerous social, civic and humanitarian projects. It is omnipresent, even at secular events that range

¹⁷ Svetlana Alejnikova, *"Russkij mir": belorusskij vzgljad. Monografiia* ['Russian world': Belarusian view. Monograph], Minsk, RIVSh, 2017, p. 6, https://istmat.org/files/uploads/58775/russkiy_mir_tekst.pdf (Accessed on 13.02.2023).

¹⁸ *Gefter i Pavlovskij, 1993 god – o budushhem russkih i Rossii* [Gefter and Pavlovsky, 1993 - about the future of Russians and Russia], 2013, in <http://ttolk.ru/?p=19129> (Accessed on 17.01.2023).

¹⁹ Alan Ingram, *'A Nation Split into Fragments': The Congress of Russian Communities and Russian Nationalist Ideology*, in "Europe-Asia Studies", Vol. 51, 1999, no. 4, p. 687, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668139998859> (Accessed on 01.02.2023).

from school graduation ceremonies to international economic forums in Russia.²⁰ It is important to emphasise that, from its founding to the present day, this project has focused its attention not only on the inhabitants of the Russian Federation, as the organisation's charter suggests: "For many centuries Russians have lived on the territory of a unitary state, united by common statehood and common spiritual values. However, since 1991, Russians have become a divided people. During this period, the initiative to unite all Russians, regardless of their country of residence and political views, was taken by the Russian Orthodox Church."²¹ In addition, Russian officials have constantly reinforced this matter. For example, President Putin stated at the 2018 Council Congress that the organisation plays an essential role in the social life of Russia and the 'Russian World', primarily due to its involvement in educating people in the spirit of "patriotic and civic values."²²

STAGE II. GENESIS OF THE 'RUSSIAN WORLD'

A significant step towards the 'Russian World' concept was taken in 1999 with the adoption of the *Law on Policy towards Countrymen Abroad*, an attempt by the Russian Federation to preserve its influence among Russians abroad. The law was enacted after intense debate in the State Duma, where nationalistic and exaggerated justifications were used. For example, MP Nasima Stolyarov, who introduced the bill, claimed that Russians in former Soviet states were subject to "harsh discrimination, formalised at the level of state policy."²³ Despite infatuated statements, the law did not reference concrete policies by which Russia could support its compatriots abroad,²⁴ but it became fundamental to Russian foreign policy. This law contains the first official definition of 'compatriots abroad' and elements later incorporated into the 'Russian World' concept. Thus, for the Kremlin, compatriots abroad were and continue to be primarily Russian

²⁰ Marlene Laruelle, *Russia as an Anti-Liberal European Civilisation*, in P. Kolstø, H. Blakkisrud (Eds.), *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-2015*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2016, p. 292.

²¹ *O VRNS* [About VRNS], in <https://vrns.ru/o-vrns/> (Accessed on 18.01.2023).

²² *Zasedanie Vsemirnogo Russkogo Narodnogo Sobora* [Congress of the World Russian People's Council], 2018, in <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59013> (Accessed on 20.01.2023).

²³ Alla Amelina, *Kto zhe oni, "sootchestvenniki za rubezhom"?* [Who are they, 'compatriots abroad?'], 2018, in https://rapsinews.ru/legislation_publication/20180607/282914322.html (Accessed on 22.01.2023).

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

Federation citizens living abroad.²⁵ In addition to them, compatriots were also persons and their descendants living abroad but who belonged to nations that had lived on the territory of Russia and maintained cultural, spiritual and other ties with it. People whose ancestors lived in Russia are also considered nationals, including citizens of former Soviet states, holders of USSR citizenship and Russian emigrants.²⁶

The late 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium were essential in the crystallisation of the 'Russian World' concept, a process that involved an intellectual circle centred by Mikhail Gefter. Philosopher and Professor Pyotr Shchedrovitsky, Gefter's disciple, along with two other intellectuals, Sergei Gradirovsky and Efim Ostrovsky, were the first to use the term. In a 2000 paper considered fundamental to the 'Russian World' concept, Shchedrovitskiy highlighted Russia's need to adapt to the new geopolitical configuration that had emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. He noted that the previous ten years (1990-2000) should make Russians examine "the processes that have taken place in the CIS countries" and how the Russians in former Soviet states can use their right to self-determination. Without directly using the term globalisation, which had also encompassed the post-Soviet world, Piotr Shchedrovitskiy, analysing economic relations, pointed out that such processes "go beyond the borders of states, and the national boundaries of states lose their economic meaning."²⁷ The author emphasised that the time of national states had passed, and the future belonged to strategic alliances, complex cooperation organisations and diasporas. Shchedrovitskiy concludes that Russia will either create a new development model (including CIS states) or become one of the puppets of the 'global powers'. In his view, one potential answer is the 'Russian World' concept. Pyotr Shchedrovitsky believes that the 'Russian World' was born and formed during the 20th century and is "a network of large and small communities that think and speak Russian", with about half of the population of the 'Russian World' living in the Russian Federation. Therefore, based on the concept (humanistic because it is language/culture based), Russia could enlarge its economic and political

²⁵ *Federal'nyj zakon ot 24.05.1999 No. 99-FZ O gosudarstvennoj politike Rossijskoj Federacii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov za rubezhom* [Federal Law No. 99-FZ of May 24, 1999 On the State Policy of the Russian Federation towards Compatriots Abroad], Art. 1 (2), <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/13875/page/1> (Accessed on 11.02.2023).

²⁶ *Federal'nyj zakon ot 24.05.1999 No. 99-FZ...*, Art. 1 (3).

²⁷ Pyotr Shchedrovitsky, *Russkij mir i transnacional'noe russkoe* [Russian World and Transnational Russian], 2006, in <https://gtmarket.ru/library/articles/2508> (Accessed on 10.02.2023).

borders.²⁸ Consequently, in the beginning, the Russian language was the primary element of the 'Russian World', with the Russian Federation at its core. At this point, the 'Russian World' was seen as including the former Soviet states with a significant focus on the Russian diaspora.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the term 'Russian World' entered Russian political discourse thanks to the new President, Vladimir Putin. He began using the term shortly after he was elected to office. For example, at the World Congress of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad 2001, Putin declared, "Since ancient times, the 'Russian World' has extended beyond the borders of Russia and even beyond the borders of ethnic Russians". He also said that identifying as Russian is "a matter of personal choice. A matter of spiritual self-identification,"²⁹ rather than a matter of citizenship. However, in the following years, the 'Russian World' remained at the level of declarations, with no legislative steps taken to institutionalise the concept.

STAGE III. POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 'RUSSIAN WORLD' IDEA

The Kremlin launched the 'Russian World' political concept only on 21 June 2007 when Vladimir Putin signed the presidential decree on the establishment of the 'Russkiy Mir' Foundation.³⁰ The organisation was placed under the management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education of Russia, and its executive management was entrusted to a board of members directly appointed by the President. Officially, the purpose of creating the Russkiy mir Foundation was "to popularise the Russian language" – considered part of Russia's heritage and an essential element of Russian and world culture – and "to support Russian language study programmes abroad". At the same time, according to the "ideology" of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the 'Russian World' is "a global project" through which Russia acquires "a new identity" and new possibilities for "effective cooperation with the rest of the world". The 'Russian World' would include not

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ Alexander Gronskey, *The Russian World in a Quest for Meaning. Slavic Countries in the Post-Soviet Space*, in "Russia in Global Affairs", 2017, No. 3 (July/September), <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/the-russian-world-in-a-quest-for-meaning/>

³⁰ *Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 21.06.2007g. No. 796 O sozdanii fonda "Russkij mir"* [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 21, 2007 No. 796 On the establishment of the Russkiy Mir Foundation], <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/25689> (Accessed on 08.02.2023).

only *Russians* and *Rossiyane*, compatriots living abroad, emigrants and their descendants but also "foreign citizens who speak Russian" and all those who "are sincerely interested in Russia."³¹ Therefore, it is possible to conclude that both the concept proposed by Shchedrovitskiy and the one promoted by the Kremlin regard the Russian language as essential to the 'Russian World', with the Russian Federation at its core. At the same time, the target audience became the whole diaspora comprised of Russian citizens, ethnic Russians and people who self-identify as such, unlike the focus on the CIS state diaspora proposed by Shchedrovitskiy.

In the following period, the ideological boundaries of the 'Russian World' began to expand, and the Russian Orthodox Church was at the forefront of this process. In 2009, Kiril himself, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, declared that, in the Church's understanding, the core of the 'Russian World' is Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the three states being part of 'Holy Russia'. Furthermore, Kiril argued that, from the Church's point of view, the 'Russian World' is not based on the principle of ethnicity but on the principle of "acceptance of the Russian spirit and traditions" by various peoples, citing as an example the Republic of Moldova, which he considered part of the 'Russian World'. Kiril also mentioned that the Russian Church is "the most multinational Orthodox community in the world" and that it is seeking to "develop" this aspect.³² Academician Valeri Tishkov, a prominent researcher of the 'Russian World', underlined the same thing. He stated that the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in strengthening the 'Russian World' was "immense", pointing out that for a long time (from the Bolshevik Revolution to the break-up of the USSR), hundreds of thousands of Russians all over the world "were cut off" from their homeland and had to "feed spiritually" from the foreign Church. Therefore, after 1991, the Russian Orthodox Church made considerable efforts to strengthen these religious communities' links with the Russian Church and, thus, with Russia.³³ In this regard, the Russian Orthodox Church contributed significantly to expanding the scope of the 'Russian World' concept by signing the Canonical Agreement between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian

³¹ *O fonde* [About the Foundation], in <https://ruskiymir.ru/fund/> (Accessed on 15.01.2023).

³² Patriarh Kirill, *Russkij mir i nashi cennosti* [Russian world and our values], in Vjacheslav Nikonov (Ed.), *Smysly i cennosti Russkogo mira. Sbornik statej i materialov kruglyh stolov, organizovannyh fondom "Russkij mir"*, Moskva, Fond "Russkij mir", 2010, p. 29–30, <https://ruskiymir.ru/events/docs/Смыслы и ценности Русского мира 2010.pdf> (Accessed on 17.01.2023).

³³ Valerij Tishkov, *op. cit.*

Orthodox Church outside Russia based in New York, in 2007. This agreement aims to strengthen Russians' national identity abroad. Accordingly, with the signing of this act, all dioceses, monasteries and other Church-related facilities of the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia came under the canonical subordination of the Russian Orthodox Church.³⁴

The institutionalisation of the 'Russian World' concept has led to changes in the Kremlin's view of Russian (*russskih*) self-definition. The shift is visible in the 2010 amendments to the Law on Policy towards Compatriots Abroad. According to the new Law, citizenship is the primary evidence of Russian nationality.³⁵ At the same time, the Kremlin will regard as a compatriot living abroad any person who declares to be Russian who engages in professional or public activities related to Russian interests, such as the preservation of the Russian language or the languages of the Russian Federation, promotion of the Russian culture, contribution to the development of relations between Russia and the state of residence.³⁶ Among the noteworthy aspects of the Law relevant to this research, is that Russia guarantees support to Russian nationals in the establishment of associations (cultural, religious, etc.) and media sources,³⁷ as well as support to existing cultural institutions (theatres, libraries, etc.) that preserve Russian identity and values.³⁸ The Kremlin is committed to minimising the number of non-citizens abroad.³⁹ According to the same law, discrimination against Russians living abroad can influence the Russian Federation's policy towards that state.⁴⁰

In the following years, the Kremlin took steps to popularise Russian culture and thus the 'Russian World' concept abroad. Hence, the Russkiy Mir Foundation created a network of branches in almost all world countries, which are active mainly in higher education institutions. In addition, the Foundation assumed patronage of religious, cultural, commercial, media and educational organisations outside Russia, whose official aim was to popularise the Russian language and culture abroad and to support the Russian diaspora.⁴¹ The Foundation's work

³⁴ *Akt o kanonicheskom obshchenii* [Act of Canonical Communication], 2007, in <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/155920.html> (Accessed on 19.01.2023).

³⁵ *Federal'nyj zakon ot 24.05.1999 No. 99-FZ...*, Art. 3 (1).

³⁶ *Federal'nyj zakon ot 24.05.1999 No. 99-FZ...*, Art. 3 (2).

³⁷ *Federal'nyj zakon ot 24.05.1999 No. 99-FZ...*, Art. 4.

³⁸ *Federal'nyj zakon ot 24.05.1999 No. 99-FZ...*, Art. 17 (4).

³⁹ *Federal'nyj zakon ot 24.05.1999 No. 99-FZ...*, Art. 11 (2).

⁴⁰ *Federal'nyj zakon ot 24.05.1999 No. 99-FZ...*, Art. 14 (4).

⁴¹ *Russkie centry* [Russian centres], in <https://russkiymir.ru/rucenter/> (Accessed on 26.01.2023).

corresponds to the foreign policy programme developed by the Russian Government in 2014 (and updated in 2021). The programme charges the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture to undertake a series of wide-ranging actions abroad. Essentially, it aims to expand the network of Russian science and culture centres abroad,⁴² promote the Russian language,⁴³ establish Russian-language schools⁴⁴ to disseminate Russian scientific and cultural achievements,⁴⁵ cultivate cooperation in various fields (such as culture, science, media, economy, and education) with NGOs and government structures of other countries⁴⁶ to create and monitor policies promoting Russia's image.⁴⁷

In this regard, the visibility of the 'Russian World' concept has increased significantly, including internationally, since 2014, with the Kremlin's aggression against Ukraine. In the immediate aftermath, 'Russian World' became a frequently used term in political and media discourse in Russia. Thus, various Russian officials' statements have become important sources for tracing the evolution of the 'Russian World' concept. In particular, Vladimir Putin stood out as the leading political promoter of the concept. In this regard, in his speech on the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation in the spring of 2014, Putin compared the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea to the unification of Germany in 1989, supported by both Western European states and the USSR. Furthermore, the Russian President expressed his firm belief that European nations, especially the Germans, would support "the aspirations of the Russian World and historic Russia towards the restoration of unity".⁴⁸ President Putin's statement during the televised political event "Direct Line with Vladimir Putin" in April 2014 is noteworthy. When asked what the Russian people mean to him, Putin did not use

⁴² *Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii ot 15.04.2014 No. 325-10 (vypiska) Ob utverzhdenii gosudarstvennoj programmy Rossijskoj Federacii "Vneshnepoliticheskaja dejatel'nost'"* [Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of April 15, 2014 No. 325-10 (extract) On approval of the state program of the Russian Federation "Foreign policy activity"], Art. 3(1), in <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201404240006> (Accessed on 12.02.2023).

⁴³ *Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii ot 15.04.2014 No. 325-10...*, Art. 3(3).

⁴⁴ *Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii ot 15.04.2014 No. 325-10...*, Art. 3.

⁴⁵ *Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii ot 15.04.2014 No. 325-10...*, Art. 3(2).

⁴⁶ *Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii ot 15.04.2014 No. 325-10...* Art. 3(5).

⁴⁷ *Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii ot 15.04.2014 No. 325-10...* Art. 3(9).

⁴⁸ Vladimir Putin, *Obrashhenie Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii* [Message from the President of the Russian Federation], 2014, in <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603> (Accessed on 28.01.2023).

the phrase 'Russian people' but "person of the Russian world", citing the characteristics that justify co-opting a person into the great community of the 'Russian World'. Putin stated that, in his view, representatives of the Russian world are united by language, values, shared history, a "cultural code", and a genetic code formed over time. Besides, the most significant difference between the "person of the Russian world" and the Western one is due to the system of moral norms. Most of the answer was devoted to the comparison between the West and the 'Russian World'. He insisted that the West is materialistic and lacks values, while the "person of the Russian World" keeps to the traditional family, does not crave material values, is ready anytime to die for the homeland and has a "big soul"⁴⁹ (a reference to spiritual/traditional values).

Putin was even more explicit at the meeting of ambassadors and permanent representatives of the Russian Federation, which took place several months later. In his speech, the Russian President spoke of 'Russian people' being in danger in Ukraine, saying that by 'Russian people' he meant not only Russian citizens or ethnic Russians but also "Russian speakers and people who identify themselves as part of the so-called extended Russian World, without necessarily being ethnic Russians". He noted that Russia would continue "to vigorously defend the rights of Russians and compatriots living abroad, using the full arsenal of instruments available: from political and economical to humanitarian operations and the right to self-defence, provided for by international law".⁵⁰ Coincidentally or not, Putin's speech subsequently focused on presenting the "failure" of the unipolar world, the expansion of NATO to Russia's borders, the imposition by "some states" of its civilizational models. According to Putin, Russia's response is to promote the Eurasian economic and political project, the core of which is Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan,⁵¹ considered part of the 'Russian World'. Thus, the 'Russian World' is a civilizational project that coexists with the Eurasian project. The two are not mutually exclusive but complement each other, demonstrating one of Russia's ambitions to be a bridge between Europe and Asia. The aim of both projects is the same: to destabilize the unipolar international system and position Russia as one of the power centres of the modern world.

Another speech relevant to the topic was delivered at the Russian World

⁴⁹ *Prjamaja linija s Vladimirom Putinyom*.

⁵⁰ *Soveshchanie poslov i postojannyh predstavitelej Rossii* [Meeting of Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of Russia], 2014, in <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46131> (Accessed on 21.01.2023).

⁵¹ *Prjamaja linija s Vladimirom Putinyom*.

Congress 2016 by Magomedsalam Magomedov, Deputy Head of the Apparatus of the President of the Russian Federation. He specified that "unity through diversity is fundamental for the «Russian World», which is meant to preserve the features of all peoples and ethnicities [that are part of it], where the Russian language has a primary role as an instrument of interethnic cooperation".⁵² These statements confirm that for the Kremlin, the 'Russian World' is not strictly about ethnicity, let alone citizenship, as the Russian language is considered the central element of this concept. It is symbolic that the inaugural speech delivered on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation at the most important meeting of the 'Russian World' was entrusted to a non-Slav official born in Dagestan and a follower of the Islamic religion.

Putin's mention of the 'Russian World' alongside the Eurasian Union and the symbolism of Magomedov's speech are not surprising. Ideas of unity between the 'Russian World' and the Eurasian project are circulating in modern Russia. In this context, the well-known philosopher Alexandr Dugin's view deserves special mention. Orthodoxy and Slavism, in his opinion, are only parts of a larger project that Moscow should promote, namely the Eurasian Union. Dugin believes that the fundamental idea of Eurasianism is that the Slavs and Turkic peoples should create a joint strategic project capable of confronting the Western and Asian states.⁵³ By 'Slavs', Dugin does not only mean Russians or inhabitants of the Russian Federation. In his opinion, "Ukrainians are a West-Russian ethnic group", naturally oriented towards Russians (whom he calls the 'Velikorus'), who are the centre of gravity for all East Slavs (and thus also Belarusians) and the creators of a "strong Slavic and Orthodox state".⁵⁴

Major shifts in the Kremlin's vision of the 'Russian World' may be seen in Vladimir Putin's extensive July 2021 article. Previously, only the Russian Federation was the core of the 'Russian World', but the Kremlin leader revealed a new vision in this article. The core of the 'Russian World', named "historic and spiritual space", is made up of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine because the 'Velikorus' (Russian), the 'Malorus' (Ukrainians) and the Belarusians allegedly are three

⁵² *Magomedsalam Magomedov prinjal uchastie v jubilejnoj Assamblee Russkogo mira* [Magomedsalam Magomedov took part in the anniversary Assembly of the Russian World], 2016, in <http://kremlin.ru/events/administration/53208> (Accessed on 21.01.2023).

⁵³ Aleksandr Dugin, *Evrazijskij revansh Rossii* [Russia's Eurasian revenge], Moskva, Algoritm, 2014, p. 44.

⁵⁴ Aleksandr Dugin, *Ukraina: moja vojna. Geopoliticheskij dnevnik* [Ukraine: my war. Geopolitical diary], Moskva, Tsentrpoligraf, 2015, p. 63.

branches of the “great Russian nation”.⁵⁵ Putin was trying to convey the idea that Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians are the same people who have been divided by external enemies on the principle of “divide et impera”. At the same time, the Russian President is convinced that Ukrainians and Belarusians have become separate peoples because of the Soviet Union, which established the policy of a “triplet nation” at the state level in exchange for the concept of the Great Russian People. Putin disputes not only the ethnic identity of Ukrainians and Belarusians but also their culture, languages (which he calls Russian language dialects) and statehood. “Modern Ukraine is the creation of the Soviet era,” Putin argues, making an inventory of the territories he considers to have been Soviet and which were given to Ukraine by “historical Russia” (Northern and Southern Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, Eastern Ukraine, Snake Island, Crimea). Finally, Putin notes with regret that, in 1991, the inhabitants of the USSR, following its fall, were separated from their historical homeland (Russia). Regarding the Ukrainians, he suggests that if people want to consider themselves a separate nation, this decision must be respected. However, there is a big *but*: “Leave with what you came with”, says Putin, referring to the territories of Ukraine in 1922, when it became part of the USSR. At the same time, it is also worth noting that Putin stated that Moscow would not give up on Ukrainians and considers the country's elite a threat, considering that it forced its own (geopolitical) vision on the population.⁵⁶ Summing up the Russian President's approaches, Putin wanted to send the message that Moscow does not give up on Ukraine and will never accept the existence of an ‘anti-Russian’ Ukraine, believing that Ukrainians have been manipulated and are tyrannically ruled by Western-controlled elites. This conclusion has been confirmed by Russia's waging a full-scale war against Ukraine, starting on 24 February 2022.

The war against Ukraine has lasted much longer than the few days or weeks Moscow had planned for the ‘special military operation’. The quasi-isolation of the Russian Federation internationally, which Putin did not expect, and the ‘selfishness’ of the powers (China, India, etc.) on whose support the Kremlin counted, have led the Russian leadership to update and adapt to the new international context a new foreign policy concept.⁵⁷ The new version of the policy

⁵⁵ Vladimir Putin, *Ob istoricheskoy edinstve russkikh i ukraincev* [About the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians], 2021, in <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> (Accessed on 10.02.2023).

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁷ The previous version of the document was adapted in 2016.

was adopted on 31 March 2023, and it became the first document of its kind that intensively featured the 'Russian World' concept. Therefore, after 16 years, the 'Russian World' concept has finally anchored into Russian foreign policy.

The document states that the Russian Federation has brought together "the Russian people and other peoples who make up the cultural-civilizational community of the 'Russian World'".⁵⁸ It is significant, therefore, that the Kremlin has replaced the collocation 'Russian nation' (used until now) with 'Russian World'. This confirms the multi-ethnic character of the 'Russian World' project, where the "people of the Russian World" are not the people of the "great Russian nation", but where the Russian people (*russkie*) continue to play a major role. At the same time, in Moscow's view, cultivating "good-neighbourly relations and uniting potentials in various areas" with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other neighbouring states is "the most important goal for the security, stability, territorial unity and socio-economic development" of the Russian Federation. Russia would be linked to these states by "the centuries-old tradition of common statehood, deep interdependence in different areas, common language⁵⁹ and close cultures".⁶⁰ Last but not least, the Kremlin has set out to form a "single humanitarian space" between the Russian Federation and the CIS states⁶¹ and to promote Russian as a "language of inter-ethnic communication" primarily in the CIS.⁶²

Article 46 of the Foreign Policy Concept is a further section that refers to the "Russian World." Again, this reference was made in the context of Moscow's need to cultivate and develop relations with its compatriots living abroad, which, as previously mentioned, together with the Russian language, are edifying elements of the 'Russian World' concept. According to the document, Moscow must support its diaspora since "the Russian Federation is the core of the civilizational community of the 'Russian World'".⁶³ First of all, this definition confirms the ideas that have been circulating in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union that the 'Russian World' extends beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. Secondly,

⁵⁸ *Koncepcija vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii 2023* [The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2023] Art. 4, <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/udpjZePcMAycLXOGGAgmVHQDIoFCN2Ae.pdf> (Accessed on 02.02.2023).

⁵⁹ Only Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are official Russian-speaking nations among the former Soviet Union states.

⁶⁰ *Koncepcija vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii*, Art. 49.

⁶¹ *Koncepcija vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii*, Art. 43 (5).

⁶² *Koncepcija vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii*, Art. 43 (2).

⁶³ *Koncepcija vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii*, Art. 46.

the quoted passage is the first 'demarcation' of the boundaries of the 'Russian World' in a programmatic document.

CONCLUSIONS

The term 'Russian World' is several centuries old, but its current interpretation differs from the historical one. The modern 'Russian World' concept originated in the 1990s as a response to the Russian Federation's need to update its ideological platform. Three factors directly caused this need. Firstly, the collapse of the USSR left many ethnic Russians outside the borders of the Russian Federation, as well as people who felt closer to Russia than to their new homeland because of certain factors (linguistic, political, economic, and cultural). Secondly, the Kremlin desires to maintain its influence in the CIS and the countries of the former communist bloc. Thirdly, like most of the world's states, Russia has assumed the protection of its compatriots living abroad but did not have any legislative instruments or ideological justification.

Thus, the Russian intelligentsia's notion of a 'Russia' existing beyond the borders of the Russian Federation has permeated post-Soviet Russian politics and materialised in the 'Russian World' concept launched in 2007. Later, in 2023, the 'Russian World' was mentioned for the first time in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept. Although the 'Russian World' has not received a clear definition and, in the last decade, has demonstrated its dynamic character, the three components of the concept have remained unchanged from the beginning to the present day. These three elements are the Russian language, the Russian-speaking culture (Russian or Soviet) and the affinity towards Russia (which includes people who oppose the current Kremlin regime).⁶⁴ The 'Russian World' has two dimensions: a) factual – it exists, and consists of those who are Russians or militant pro-Russians; b) ideological – it is used as a tool in Russia's foreign policy to put pressure on states where ethnic Russian communities exist and, internationally, to try to increase the Kremlin's influence by connecting its support for Russians living abroad with European (and other) policies to protect minorities and defend human rights.

A closer look at this concept also revealed that, unlike Tsarist pan-Slavism or socialist internationalism, it is based on the Russian element, which replaces the Slavic or Soviet one. At the same time, the Russian language is seen as the foundation of the 'Russian World' and its primary catalyst.

⁶⁴ Valerij Tishkov, *op. cit.*

Under these circumstances, it may seem that the 'Russian World' is a local concept limited to the confines of the Russian language. In reality, however, the 'Russian World' is intended to be a global concept since an essential feature is that it is addressed not only to Russian citizens or ethnic Russians but also to all people who feel part of the 'Russian World'. Thus, the 'Russian World' does not have linguistic, cultural or geographical boundaries, but ideological ones, since the emphasis is on self-determination as a 'Russian' or 'person of the Russian World'.

The orientation of the concept towards Slavic and former Soviet states shows, firstly, that it is these regions that Russia claims as its sphere of influence, and secondly (given Russia's strategy of exploiting vulnerabilities), that these states are considered the most vulnerable and susceptible to Russian influence. To promote the 'Russian World' concept, the Kremlin has created a network of organisations whose aim is to support and promote Russian culture, particularly through the concept's main instrument, the Russian language.

In conclusion, the launch and promotion of the 'Russian World' concept at the highest levels by Russian politicians indicate that it is part of Russia's overall objective to reshape the spheres of influence created by the collapse of the USSR and the socialist bloc and, consequently, to create a multipolar world in which Russia is a global leader. In this sense, the 'Russian World' as a foreign policy tool serves to promote the Kremlin's vision of the Russian Federation as a distinct civilisation that cannot be integrated into the West.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S OFFICIAL ANTI-UKRAINE DISCOURSE (2014-2022)

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Abstract. *The article focuses on the evolution of the Russian Federation's official discourse concerning Ukraine, from the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 to the official decision to invade the Ukrainian state on February 24, 2022. During this period, various official messages were launched in the public sphere to prepare Russian society for the next phases of the hybrid war or were designed to shape a series of social attitudes on the territories of other states that would favour political leaders in Moscow. The Kremlin resorted to a plethora of specific communication tactics: the launch of several official narratives at the same time, some of which were subsequently discarded; challenging the legitimacy of Kyiv authorities; fostering the idea that Ukraine was an artificial state created by Russia; launching certain debates in the public sphere regarding the historical unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples as well as the build-up of neo-Nazi tendencies on Ukrainian territory. Official narratives endorsed by the Russian Federation were a special mix of international law and historiography topics. Russian media outlets disseminated them as part of disinformation and fake news campaigns. This paper is an analytical effort to organize official Russian narratives about Ukraine promoted over 2014-2022, before the large-scale invasion.*

Keywords: *Russia, Ukraine, hybrid warfare, disinformation, fake news, narratives.*

Rezumat. Evoluția discursului oficial anti-Ucraina în Federația Rusă (2014-2022). *Articolul se concentrează asupra evoluțiilor narațiunilor oficiale din Federația Rusă privind Ucraina de la anexarea peninsulei Crimeea în 2014 până la anunțarea deciziei de a invada statul ucrainean pe 24 februarie 2022. În această perioadă, diverse mesaje oficiale au pregătit societatea rusă pentru noi faze ale războiului hibrid sau au încercat să forneze*

o serie de atitudini sociale prielnice liderilor politici de la Moscova pe teritoriul altor state. Kremlinul a recurs la diverse tehnici comunicaționale specifice: lansarea mai multor narațiuni oficiale concomitent, la unele dintre care s-a renunțat ulterior, punerea sub semnul întrebării a legitimității autorităților de la Kiev, promovarea ideii că Ucraina ca stat a fost artificial creată de Rusia, lansarea unor dezbateri în spațiul public despre unitatea istorică a popoarelor rus și ucrainean, cât și despre consolidarea tendințelor neonaziste pe teritoriul Ucrainei. Narațiunile oficiale din Federația Rusă reprezentau un amestec selectiv de subiecte din domeniul dreptului internațional și istoriei. Acestea au fost distribuite de rețeaua de presă guvernamentală rusă în cadrul campaniilor de dezinformare și diseminare de fake news. Articolul reprezintă un efort analitic de sistematizare a narațiunilor oficiale ruse privind Ucraina în anii 2014-2022 care au precedat invazia la scară largă.

INTRODUCTION

Following the Cold War, world politics underwent groundbreaking transformations. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered an abrupt shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system of governance. As its regional influence grew, the Russian Federation attempted to implement a general overhaul in its political system patterned upon Western politics. Instead, a series of overlapping economic, social, and political crises ensued. In the early 2000s, Soviet nostalgia gained momentum in Russian society,¹ which was longing for Moscow's long-forgotten superpower status. Following the election of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia, local elites began to emphasize the need for Russia to reclaim its position as a global power.

In his 2005 address to the Russian Federation's Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century, stating that millions of Russians suddenly found themselves outside their country's borders.² Two years later, on the verge of the Munich Security Conference, the Russian president criticized the United States' domination in international relations. The Kremlin leader pointed out that a unipolar system of global order does not serve the best interests of world states, while NATO expansion poses a major threat to the Russian

¹ Levada-Center, *Nostalgia po SSSR* [Nostalgia for the USSR], in <https://www.levada.ru/2021/12/24/nostalgia-po-sssr-3/> (Accessed on 20.02.2023).

² *Poslanie Federalnomu Sobraniyu – 2005* [Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation – 2005], in <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931> (Accessed on 20.02.2023).

Federation's national interests.³

The 2013 *Foreign Policy Concept* reflected Russia's dissatisfaction with its regional power status. According to this official document, international relations have shifted from a unipolar system towards a multipolar global structure. At the same time, the concept outlined a new alternative Russian understanding of international relations. Russian foreign policy founding document referred to Ukraine as a "priority partner within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)". Moscow's goal in Ukraine was stated as contributing to this country's "participation in extended integration processes" launched by the Russian Federation in the context of growing challenges to the unipolar system of international politics.⁴

As American political scientist, Zbigniew Brzezinski suggested in his influential volume *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, the Kremlin's ambition of restoring its global power status cannot happen without turning Ukraine into a territory under Russia's control. "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire",⁵ Brzezinski wrote, highlighting the existence of an independent Ukrainian state.

In this context, the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war launched in 2014 resorted to an array of information and psychological warfare narratives and operations. From the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 to President Vladimir Putin's declaration of a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation's leadership promoted various official narratives.⁶ In his book, *Russia's Hybrid Aggression. Lessons for Europe*,⁷ Ukrainian political theorist Yevhen Mahda analysed the discourse of political leaders of the Russian Federation concerning Ukraine, arguing that Moscow-based decision-makers have studied the reactions and expectations of their peers in Kyiv and Western states. In the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, the Kremlin kept a close eye on the reactions of Western leaders and

³ *Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy*, in <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034> (Accessed on 20.02.2023).

⁴ *Kontseptsiiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii – 2013* [The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation – 2013], in <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d447a0ce9f5a96bdc3.pdf> (Accessed on 03.03.2023).

⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, Basic Books, 1997, p. 45.

⁶ Anastasia Lejepekov, *Putin obyavil o provedenii specoperacii po zashchite Donbassa* [Putin announced a special operation to protect Donbas], in <https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022/02/24/17336791.shtml> (Accessed on 03.04.2023).

⁷ Yevhen Mahda, *Hibrydna ahresiia Rosii. Uroky dlia Yevropy* [Russia's Hybrid Aggression. Lessons for Europe], Kyiv, Kalamar, 2017, p. 8.

specific information processes in ex-Soviet space. Examining narratives publicized by Russian media as well as by political leaders in Moscow, Marian Voicu's *Matryoshka of Liars: Fake News, Manipulation, Populism* outlines the anti-Western character of the Kremlin's information policies, starting with the so-called "Euromaidan"⁸ pro-European protests in Ukraine (2013-2014). According to the author, Russia's narratives operated with a limited number of themes and approaches systematically promoted at several levels of Russian official media.

Political scientist Joanna Szostek of the University of Glasgow points to a rivalry between "pro-Western and anti-Russian" narratives projected by Kyiv, on the one hand, and "pro-Russian and anti-Western" narratives endorsed by Moscow, on the other.⁹ Andreas Kappeler of the University of Vienna also investigates narratives fostered by the political class in the Russian Federation through the lens of political history and the imperial legacy in Russian-Ukrainian relations. According to the author, these relations are characterized by an asymmetry of narrative discourse, which reflects Russia's hegemony over Ukraine.¹⁰ Researcher Eva Claessen of The Leuven Center for Global Governance Studies examines how official narratives popularized by the Russian Federation regarding Ukraine took on an increasingly aggressive tone after Kyiv shifted towards European integration as the defining element of its foreign policy.¹¹

It is worth mentioning that research in recent years has provided a comprehensive picture of particular connections between Russian official discourse and media narratives. This paper examines these connections in the wider context of the hybrid war when conventional military actions are accompanied by non-military initiatives¹². It was additionally necessary to structure official Russian narratives about Ukraine from the 2014-2022 period while keeping disinformation and *fake news* campaigns¹³ in view. In this study, the

⁸ Marian Voicu, *Matrioșka mincinoșilor: fake news, manipulare, populism* [Matryoshka of Liars: Fake News, Manipulation, Populism], Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2018, p. 87.

⁹ Joanna Szostek, *The Power and Limits of Russia's Strategic Narrative in Ukraine. The Role of Linkage*, in "Perspectives on Politics", Vol. 15, 2017, No. 2, pp. 379-395.

¹⁰ Andreas Kappeler, *Ukraine and Russia. Legacies of the imperial past and competing memories*, in "Journal of Eurasian Studies", Vol. 5, 2014, No. 2, pp. 107-115.

¹¹ Eva Claessen, *The making of a narrative: The use of geopolitical othering in Russian strategic narratives during the Ukraine crisis*, in "Media, War and Conflict", Vol. 14, 2021, No. 1, pp. 1-18.

¹² Marian Voicu, *Matryoshka of Liars...*, p. 12.

¹³ Marin Gherman, *Narațiuni ale dezinformării și fake news utilizate de Rusia până la invadarea Ucrainei* [Narratives of disinformation and fake news used by Russia prior to the

term “official narrative” refers to the narrative structures represented by statements, discourses, documents, and articles published by Russian political leaders in state-controlled media and on various websites. It also investigates the statements of political leaders who dictate the foreign policy of the Russian Federation according to the Constitution,¹⁴ as well as presidential decrees.¹⁵ The analysis focused on the president of the Russian Federation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, their spokespersons, and the Russian government media channels that helped disseminate official messages about Ukraine. These official narratives were researched using a set of methods and tools specific to the field of political communication¹⁶ and language analysis.¹⁷

OFFICIAL NARRATIVES ABOUT THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA

After the pro-European protests in Ukraine, known as “Euromaidan”, and the flight to Russia of President Viktor Yanukovich, on March 4, 2014, Vladimir Putin said Ukraine witnessed “an anti-constitutional coup and a military takeover”. The Kremlin leader said Viktor Yanukovich “surrendered the power”, although he remains Ukraine’s legitimate president. Vladimir Putin pointed out that the new regime in Ukraine does not represent the people, simply adding that only the Supreme Rada (the Parliament of Ukraine), which also included a pro-Russian majority parliamentary group, was a “partially legitimate” entity.¹⁸ It was the first official sign of Moscow’s unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian authorities after Viktor Yanukovich stepped down following his

invasion of Ukraine], in “Polis: Revistă de Științe Politice”, X, 2022, nr. 2, p. 106.

¹⁴ *The Constitution of the Russian Federation*, in <http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm> (Accessed on 27.01.2023).

¹⁵ *Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 11.07.2004 g. N. 865. Voprosy Ministerstva inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii* [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 11, 2004, No. 865. Issues of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation], in <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/21107> (Accessed on 27.05.2023).

¹⁶ André Gosselin, *La communication politique. Cartographie d'un champ de recherche et d'activités*, in “Hermès”, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 1995, No. 3, pp. 17-33.

¹⁷ Michael Toolan, *Narrative: A Critical Linguistic Introduction* (2nd Edition), London, Routledge, 2001, 276 p.

¹⁸ Serghei Smirnov, *Putin: My ne rassmatrivaem variant prisoedineniya Kryma* [Putin: We are not considering the annexation of Crimea], in “Vedomosti”, <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2014/03/04/putin-nachal-press-konferenciyu> (Accessed on 03.04.2023).

refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement in Vilnius in the autumn of 2013.¹⁹

When referring to the events in Ukraine as a “coup”, Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted the fact that the only legitimate entity on the territory of Ukraine is the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The Kremlin leader gave assurances that Moscow is not considering the possibility of “annexing” the peninsula to Russia. “The situation is tense in Crimea, and the possible use of armed force is simply out of the question”,²⁰ the Russian president went on to say.

It is worth mentioning that in 1996, Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov wrote for “Izvestia”²¹ that the Crimean Peninsula must be returned to Russia, and that Sevastopol is historically a Russian city. What followed was a series of statements from the mayor of Moscow and the supporters of this idea, which were criticized by the Ukrainian authorities at the time. The idea of Russia annexing Crimea did not become the official rhetoric of Moscow, but various Russian nationalist leaders now and then reiterated it in the public sphere.

On March 18, 2014, two weeks after the Russian president had announced Crimea would not be annexed to the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin signed an agreement with the self-proclaimed leaders of the peninsula. A new subject of the Russian Federation thus emerged – the Republic of Crimea.²² Moscow annexed Crimea despite protests from the Ukrainian authorities and the international community. Vladimir Putin’s statement on March 4, 2022, when he promised Russia would not occupy Crimea, also included an out-of-character acknowledgement of the Crimean Parliament’s legitimacy amidst ongoing talks about the “coup” in Ukraine. Two weeks later, the narrative was used to justify Russia’s illegal annexation of the Ukrainian region. The March 18, 2014, agreement was at its core based on the principle of legitimacy of political institutions in Crimea, which had allegedly decided on its own to join the Russian Federation.

Breaking the verbal promise not to annex Crimea was dismissed as a topic for

¹⁹ *Ukraine Protests After Yanukovych EU Deal Rejection*, in <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25162563> (Accessed on 11.04.2023).

²⁰ Serghei Smirnov, *Putin: My ne rassmatrivaem....*

²¹ Yury Luzhkov, *Sevastopol rossiiskii gorod na krymskom poluostrove* [Sevastopol is a Russian city on the Crimean Peninsula], in “Izvestia”, 1996, Nov. 1, p. 3.

²² *Dogovor mezhdru Rossijskoj Federaciej i Respublikoj Krym o prinyatii v Rossijskuyu Federaciju Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave Rossijskoj Federacii novyh subjektov* [Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the formation of new subjects within the Russian Federation], in <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20605> (Accessed on 04.04.2023).

debate in the Russian public sphere and was subsequently used by Vladimir Putin as a smokescreen. A year after the annexation of Crimea, the Russian TV channel Rossiya 1 broadcast the documentary *Crimea. The Way Home*,²³ in which the Russian president described the occupation of the peninsula as a planned operation. The annexation of the Ukrainian territory was presented as a “historical necessity”. Vladimir Putin argued he had issued a secret decree to annex the peninsula, ordering a group of servicemen to take control of the administrative buildings. The Russian president confirmed that every action aimed at capturing Crimea had been planned, claiming that the peninsula is “historically a Russian territory”.

Official Russian narratives concerning Crimea are both interrelated and divergent. At the start of the crisis in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin claimed that a military intervention on the peninsula was out of the question. Two weeks later, the Russian president and the self-proclaimed leaders of Crimea signed an agreement on the annexation of this territory. A year later, Vladimir Putin went public to provide a more detailed explanation, saying that he had coordinated a secret military operation to annex the Ukrainian region over the course of several months. Concerning the Russian president’s statements about Crimea, the scenarios that did not play out or the political promises that remained unfulfilled were ignored in official communications as if they had never existed in the first place.

The pattern behind the evolution of the Russian president’s statements regarding Crimea reveals a certain ambiguity as well as some hidden messages. The official narrative launched on March 4, 2014, was meant to convey a message that might have seemed of secondary importance at the time. Vladimir Putin tried to convince the public that only the Crimean Parliament was legitimate so that he could subsequently justify the annexation of the peninsula. The 2015 official narrative, addressed to all Russian citizens, was designed to consolidate popular support for the Russian Federation’s foreign policy. The authorities continued to refer to the annexation of Crimea as a historical act of reunification of this peninsula with Russia.

THE LEGITIMACY OF UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES IN OFFICIAL NARRATIVES IN RUSSIA

After the annexation of Crimea, Moscow launched an official narrative portraying Ukraine as a state “artificially created” by Russia, to cast additional

²³ Krym. Put na Rodinu. Dokumentalniy film [Crimea. The Way Home], in <https://smotrim.ru/video/1188898> (Accessed on 04.04.2023).

doubt on the legitimacy of Ukrainian authorities. In his address to the Federal Assembly on December 4, 2014, Vladimir Putin stated that Prince Vladimir the Great, who converted to Christianity in the land of Crimea, christened the Russian people in 988. "Crimea is where our people live, and the peninsula is of strategic importance for Russia as the spiritual source of development of a multifaceted but solid Russian nation and a centralized Russian state. It was in Crimea, in the ancient city of the Chersonesus or Korsun, as ancient Russian chroniclers called it, that Grand Prince Vladimir was baptized before bringing Christianity to Rus."²⁴

With support from the Russian state media, Russian officials engaged in various discussions in the public sphere about Russia's "historical regions" which were passed on to Ukraine by Soviet leaders. Aside from Crimea, the discussions invoked various Ukrainian regions, which Vladimir Putin described as part of Novorossiia (New Russia). "I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiia back in the tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa – were not part of Ukraine back then. These territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows", Vladimir Putin said on April 17, 2014.²⁵ He added that Russia's "historical territories" remained under Ukraine's control, although Russian people continue to live here. Challenging the legitimacy of authorities in eastern and southern Ukraine, the Kremlin leader launched the idea of federalizing the Ukrainian state.²⁶

Drawing on arguments of historical origin, Vladimir Putin pointed out that Ukrainian authorities have no historical right over territories "given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government". According to the logic of this narrative, Ukraine is supposed to become a federation where regions populated by Russians should gain broad political self-governance.

After the signing of the Minsk peace agreements²⁷ by representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the leaders of the self-proclaimed Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk designed to settle the conflict in Donbas, the issue of Ukrainian authorities' legitimacy was

²⁴ *Poslanie Prezidenta Federalnomu Sobraniuu – 2014* [Address of the President of Russia to the Federal Assembly – 2014], in <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173> (Accessed on 08.02.2023).

²⁵ *Priamaia liniia s Vladimirom Putinyim* [Direct line with Vladimir Putin], in <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796> (Accessed on 08.02.2023).

²⁶ *Priamaia liniia s Vladimirom Putinyim...*

²⁷ OSCE, *Memorandum of 19 September 2014 outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments of the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014*, in <https://www.osce.org/home/123806> (Accessed on 07.03.2023).

not abandoned by official Russian rhetoric. In February 2015, the Federation Council and the State Duma in Moscow described Viktor Yanukovych's dismissal as president of Ukraine by the Supreme Rada in Kyiv as an unconstitutional move. According to Leonid Slutsky, the chairman of the CIS State Duma Committee, Viktor Yanukovych was illegally deposed. "Yanukovych is no longer president after a military coup actively supported by the West a year ago", the Russian official said. Slutsky also argued that the Federation Council believes Viktor Yanukovych was forced to flee Ukraine in February 2014, when his life was threatened by "mobs of nationalists."²⁸ Andrey Klishas, the Chair of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Construction said that by robbing Viktor Yanukovych of the Ukrainian presidency, the Supreme Rada thus confirmed that an unconstitutional coup had taken place in Ukraine. "He was invested with both the office and the title of president by the Ukrainian people, in the wake of general democratic elections",²⁹ Klishas said.

In an article published in the journal "Russia in Global Affairs" in March 2016, Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, wrote that Moscow grounds its foreign policy on the observance of international law: "We are trying to do our best to overcome obstacles on this way, including the implementation of the Minsk accords to settle the Ukraine crisis provoked by the coup in Kiev in February 2014."³⁰ In the 2014-2022 period, the head of Russian diplomacy repeatedly stated that Ukraine was at the stage of a civil war. The Russian Foreign Minister called on Kyiv to sit down for talks with separatist leaders from Donbas and discuss peace terms as well as plans to federalize Ukraine. In April 2015, Sergey Lavrov called on Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko live on the public TV broadcaster "Russia Today" to "annihilate the

²⁸ *V Sovete Federatsii i v Gosdume nazvali nelegitimnym lishenie Viktora Ianukovicha zvaniia prezidenta Ukrainy* [The Federation Council and the State Duma called Viktor Yanukovych's deprivation of the title of President of Ukraine an illegitimate move], in <https://www.pnp.ru/in-world/2015/02/04/v-sovete-federacii-i-vgosdume-nazvali-nelegitimnym-lishenie-viktora-yanukovicha-zvaniya-prezidenta-ukrainy.html> (Accessed on 07.02.2023).

²⁹ *Sovfed: Rada priznala antikonstitutsionnyi perevorot* [Federation Council: Rada recognized anti-constitutional coup], in <https://www.vesti.ru/article/1740665.html> (Accessed on 09.01.2023).

³⁰ Sergey Lavrov, *Russia's Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective. Musings at a New Stage of International Development*, in "Russia in Global Affairs", 2016, No. 2, <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/russias-foreign-policy-in-a-historical-perspective/>.

parties engaged in the civil war in Ukraine if he wants to prove he is truly a president of peace, as he professes to be.”³¹

Despite several rounds of talks held as part of the peace-making process in Minsk and the signing of several agreements for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas, Russia chose to use double standards in terms of legitimacy and the international recognition of Ukrainian authorities after the Euromaidan protests. On the one hand, Russia does not recognize the full legitimacy of the new Ukrainian authorities. On the other hand, Russia had addressed political leaders in Kyiv several requests, which was an indirect recognition of their full international legitimacy. According to official narratives Russia promoted over 2014-2022, Eastern Ukraine is at the stage of a “civil war” involving the new authorities in Kyiv and Russian speakers in Donbas. Moscow never admitted to being a belligerent party in this conflict. It was only in February 2022 that Russia posed as a saviour of the local population oppressed by “Kyiv’s hostile policies”.

In November 2016, the Russian Federation introduced a new foreign policy doctrine, institutionalizing the viewpoints previously endorsed by Russian political leaders in connection with the war in Donbas. According to Article 56 of this new document, the Russian Federation was interested in building mutually beneficial political, economic, cultural and spiritual relations with Ukraine. “Russia will take the necessary actions, along with all interested governments and international organizations, to reach a political and diplomatic resolution to Ukraine’s internal conflict.”³² The document does not refer to the conflict in Donbas as a “civil war”, while Moscow describes it as an “internal conflict”. Russia’s foreign policy doctrine mentions nothing of the illegitimacy of Ukrainian authorities. This thesis gradually lost importance in official communications and was gradually adopted by Russian government media.

At the end of December 2021, two months before the launch of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Sergey Lavrov told the RIA Novosti national news agency that “the eight-year civil war on the territory of Ukraine is far from over.”³³ Following

³¹ *Lavrov: Poroshenko nado neutralizovat tekh kto khochet grazhdanskoi voiny* [Lavrov: Poroshenko must neutralize those who want a civil war], in <https://crimea.ria.ru/20150412/283671.html> (Accessed on 14.02.2023).

³² *Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii (utv. Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 30 noyabrya 2016 g. N 640)* [Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation (Approval of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of November 30, 2016, N 640], in <https://base.garant.ru/71552062> (Accessed on 14.02.2023).

³³ *Sergey Lavrov: grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine daleka ot zaversheniia* [Sergey Lavrov: the civil war in Ukraine is far from over], in <https://ria.ru/20211231/lavrov->

Kyiv's firm refusal to negotiate agreements with separatist leaders in Donbas, significant shifts occurred in official narratives conveyed by Russian political elites. Both Ukrainian and anti-Western discourses started to surface progressively.

THE "NEO-NAZISM" IN UKRAINE IN OFFICIAL RUSSIAN FEDERATION NARRATIVES

Starting in 2021, high-ranking politicians in Moscow abandoned several typical narratives Russia employed around the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas. Instead, Russian officials began to increasingly accuse Ukrainian authorities of neo-Nazism and radicalism. The first claims of neo-Nazi support made against Ukrainian authorities occurred in 2014. After the removal of Ukraine's president, Viktor Yanukovych, Russian political leaders accused Ukrainian authorities of relying on various neo-Nazi movements, whereas TV stations in Moscow broadcast images of young men protesting on the streets of Ukrainian cities wearing Nazi insignia. In 2014, Sergey Lavrov repeatedly accused Ukraine of being led by radical leaders who had derailed the traditional pro-Russian orientation of Ukrainian lawmakers. "To Russia, Ukraine is a brotherly people, not the Nazis marching in Kyiv",³⁴ the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation said.

By mid-2021, narratives about "neo-Nazism" in Ukraine and the West's "aggressive policies" towards Russia were integrated into a unified political discourse. At the same time, government media narratives gradually lined up with those promoted by high-ranking politicians. Politicians, in turn, picked up themes spread by media outlets as part of the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war. Much like in 2014, when Crimea was annexed, Vladimir Putin himself took on the role of opinion leader. On June 13, 2021, the Russian president spoke live on the "Russia 1" TV station, arguing that Ukraine is a neo-Nazi state, used by the West as a tool against Russia. The Russian leader added that Ukrainians do not want any real rapprochement to NATO. "At least 50% of Ukraine's inhabitants do not want their country to join NATO. Smart people. And I'm not being ironic at all. These people who stand against NATO accession do not want to end up in the line of fire, do not want to be used as a bargaining chip and cannon fodder"³⁵, Vladimir Putin said. In

1766234596.html (Accessed on 14.02.2023).

³⁴ Maksim Nikitin, *Lavrov: dlia Rossii Ukraina - eto bratskii narod, a ne marshiruiushchie v Kieve natsisty* [Lavrov: for Russia, Ukraine is a fraternal people, not Nazis marching in Kyiv], in "TASS", <https://tass.ru/politika/1517687> (Accessed on 22.01.2023).

³⁵ *Interviu Putina po Ukraine. Efir ot 13.06.2021* [Putin's interview about Ukraine. Air from

fact, according to a survey conducted in spring 2021, the idea that 50% of the population opposed Ukraine's NATO accession was by no means factual. A study carried out by the International Republican Institute at the time Vladimir Putin made this statement showed that 48% of Ukrainian citizens wanted Ukraine to accede to NATO, whereas only 28% opposed the idea of NATO accession.³⁶

Vladimir Putin accused Kyiv of ignoring the real will of Ukrainians in Donbas, just as it had disregarded the Crimeans' civic will back in 2014. "Ukraine is now shaping up to counterbalance Russia, which is why no one notices a thing, not even the swastika neo-Nazis display on the streets of Ukraine", the Russian leader pointed out. Russian diplomats also developed Neo-Nazism as a topic of Moscow's official rhetoric. In November 2021, Sergey Lavrov praised the Republic of Belarus for complying with the standards of international law in the context of the refugee crisis outside its borders with the EU, while criticizing Ukraine. "To accuse us of attacking the territorial integrity of Ukraine is immoral and incorrect. It is actually ruined by those trying to create a super unitarian state, with no minority languages, Russian in particular, with no education in Russian and other languages. It is a neo-Nazi concept of organizing society",³⁷ the head of Russian diplomacy said.

It is also worth mentioning that in the context of decreasing the Russian Federation's linguistic and cultural influence in Ukrainian society by diminishing the role of the Russian language in Ukraine, the political class in Kyiv introduced certain restrictive pieces of legislation that went too far. This was highlighted by Democracy through Law experts of the European Commission.³⁸ Non-compliance with international and European legislation in the field of national minorities'

06/13/2021], in <https://smotrim.ru/video/2307998> (Accessed on 14.01.2023).

³⁶ *Opytuvannia MRI v Ukraini svidchyt pro nezminnu pidtrymku yevropeiskoi intehratsii na tli pandemii COVID-19* [The MPI survey in Ukraine shows the unchanged support for European integration against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic], in <https://iri.org.ua/survey/opytuvannya-mri-v-ukrayini-svidchyt-pro-nezminnu-pidtrymku-yevropeyskoyi-intehratsiyi-na-tli> (Accessed on 14.01.2023).

³⁷ *Interviu Ministra inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii S. V. Lavrova telekanalu Rossiia 24, Moskva* [Interview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to the Rossiya 24 TV Channel, Moscow], in https://archive.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4921162 (Accessed on 09.11.2021)

³⁸ European Commission for Democracy through Law, *Opinion on the provisions of the Law on Education of 5 September 2017 which concern the use of the state language and minority and other languages in education*, in [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad\(2017\)030-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2017)030-e) (Accessed on 15.02.2023)

rights to education in the mother language was widely speculated by Russian political elites, who accused Ukraine of endorsing neo-Nazism. This theme as well as other fissures in Ukrainian society were used by the Kremlin to construct other anti-Ukrainian narratives as part of the hybrid war.

Russian politicians claimed that the “Azov” regiment, which fought independently against separatist groups in Donbas, was a neo-Nazi military unit. Russian government media featured several articles about the mass actions of “Ukrainian Nazis”. In August 2021, the Moscow-based “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” wondered how neo-Nazis could march freely on the streets of Kyiv, chanting “Glory to Ukraine.”³⁹ According to the aforementioned source, Ukraine has become a neo-Nazi state, and the extremist ideology of the “Azov” regiment has become increasingly widespread in the ex-Soviet republic.

It is equally worth noting that in 2015 Ukraine banned the Nazi and communist ideologies in addition to symbols of totalitarian regimes from the past.⁴⁰ Ukrainian authorities also introduced measures to integrate the “Azov” regiment into the Ukrainian Armed Forces. According to Israeli researcher Vyacheslav Likhachev, there is no scientific basis for calling “Azov” a neo-Nazi regiment. The Israeli expert examined contacts “Azov” representatives had with communities of Jews and Muslims in Mariupol, arguing he had not identified any misunderstanding or any other source of conflict.⁴¹

Concurrently, a study carried out by the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University concludes that, unlike the regiment bearing the same name, the “Azov” movement is bound by an extremist and nationalist ideology.⁴² Some Western political analysts have warned against the

³⁹ Pavel Dulman, *Po ulitsam ukrainskikh gorodov marshiruiut natsisty* [Nazis march through the streets of Ukrainian cities] in <https://rg.ru/2021/08/23/po-ulicam-ukrainskikh-gorodov-marshiruiut-nacisty.html> (Accessed on 14.02.2023).

⁴⁰ *Zakon Ukrainy pro zasudzhennia komunistychnoho ta natsional-sotsialistychnoho (natsystskoho) totalitarnykh rezhymiv v Ukraini ta zaboronu propahandy yikhnoi symboliky (Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady), 2015, № 26, st. 219* [The law of Ukraine on the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the prohibition of propaganda of their symbols (Information of the Verkhovna Rada), 2015, No. 26, Art. 219]] in <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/317-19> (Accessed on 16.01.2023).

⁴¹ Vyacheslav Likhachev, *Polk „Azov” ne ye neonatsystskym: vidpovidi na naiposhyrenishi zapytannia* [The “Azov” regiment is not neo-Nazi: answers to the most common questions], in <https://zmina.info/columns/polok-azov-ne-ye-neonacystskym-vidpovidi-na-najposhyrenishi-zapytannia> (Accessed on 15.02.2023).

⁴² Center for International Security and Cooperation, *Azov Movement*, in

risk of hate speech expanding to target various vulnerable social categories, including national minorities.⁴³ Hate speech has become an issue, particularly against the backdrop of military campaigns in Donbas and the consolidation of nationalist ideologies across Ukraine. Russian politicians took full advantage of that, proving to the public back home that neo-Nazism and radicalism are widespread phenomena in Ukraine. They also claimed that a military intervention was warranted in Eastern Ukraine to protect the local population.

In February 2022, shortly before Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Sergey Lavrov expressed dismay at Kyiv's refusal to discuss directly with separatists in Donbas, saying that the statements of Ukrainian leaders were echoes of Nazi propaganda. "This is Goebbels' school of thought, or perhaps a case exceeding the skill of the greatest propagandist of the Third Reich",⁴⁴ Lavrov said. Russian political elites accused Kyiv of refusing to talk to separatists in Donbas based on the Minsk peace agreements and UN requests, describing these political actions as neo-Nazi. Kyiv and Moscow had different interpretations of the Minsk agreements, which did not describe the sequence of steps that needed to be taken to ensure sustainable peace in Donbas. The parties did sign a general agreement, which included a schedule for talks about the future of the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as part of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which included Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE.⁴⁵ The absence of direct contact between Kyiv and separatists provided a good opportunity to disseminate fake news about the neo-Nazi ideology of political leaders in Kyiv. Ukrainian authorities refused to discuss with the leaders of the self-proclaimed republics the developments in Eastern Ukraine, saying they would not legitimize the Russian aggression.

Official Russian narratives about Ukraine grew in aggressiveness in the context of Moscow recognizing the independence of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in February 2022. In Vladimir Putin's message to Russian citizens, the Russian president spoke about nationalism, Russophobia and neo-Nazism in Ukrainian society, tendencies encouraged by the West and targeted

<https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/azov-battalion> (Accessed on 15.02.2023).

⁴³ Josh Cohen, *Commentary: Ukraine's neo-Nazi problem*, in "Reuters", <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cohen-ukraine-commentary-idUSKBN1GV2TY> (Accessed on 15.02.2023).

⁴⁴ *Lavrov sravnil zaiavleniia Kieva o dialoge s Donbassom s propagandoi Gebbelsa* [Lavrov compared Kyiv's statements about dialogue with Donbas with Goebbels' propaganda], in TASS, <https://tass.ru/politika/13669219> (Accessed on 16.02.2023).

⁴⁵ OSCE, *Package of Measures for the Implementation...*

against the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. "Ukrainian authorities started shaping their statehood by denying the very thing that unites us. They sought to distort the conscience and historical memory of millions of people, whole generations living in Ukraine. It is not surprising therefore that Ukrainian society was faced with a surge of extremism and nationalism, which swiftly escalated into an aggressive strand of Russophobia and neo-Nazism",⁴⁶ Vladimir Putin said. The Russian president underscored the need to recognize the independence of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern Ukraine to support Russian speakers in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin said Ukrainian politicians were nationalists, radicals, and neo-Nazis who "organized a campaign of terror against those who opposed anti-constitutional actions."⁴⁷ Vladimir Putin said that "following the 2014 coup", a civil war broke out in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian state is deeply divided by the illegitimate authorities in Kyiv.

From mid-2021 to the announcement of the decision to invade Ukraine, Russia turned up the aggression of its official narratives, presenting Ukraine as a state swept by total chaos, with pogroms and acts of physical violence committed by "extremist nationalists" against the civilian population that Russia needs to protect. At the same time, anti-European and anti-American rhetoric gained increased momentum.

THE CONCEPT OF "ANTI-RUSSIA" IN KREMLIN-BACKED NARRATIVES

On July 12, 2021, the Kremlin's website published the article *On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians*,⁴⁸ written by President Vladimir Putin. Narratives launched by Russian politicians and government media after the publication of this article were quick to reflect the Kremlin leader's political theses. To Vladimir Putin, a Europeanized Ukraine is an "anti-Russia" force that the Russian president seeks to combat. Vladimir Putin's article raised a series of new elements in the context of the hybrid war, justifying the upcoming large-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian president outlined the history of the Ukrainian people from the

⁴⁶ *Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 21 fevralia 2022* [Address of the President of the Russian Federation, February 21, 2022], in <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828> (Accessed on 17.01.2023).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Vladimir Putin, *Ob istoricheskom edinstve russkikh i ukraintsev* [On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians], in <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> (Accessed on 17.01.2023).

official viewpoint of Russian historiography, claiming Ukraine is a “periphery” of Russia, and that Zaporizhzhian Cossacks were fervent Orthodox Russians. Vladimir Putin challenged the very existence of Ukrainians as a nation, calling them “Little Russians”, who as such do not have a historical claim to a state outside Russia. The Russian president also says Ukraine in its entirety is a Soviet product, created by historical Russia. “Suffice it to compare which lands had been reunited with the Russian state in the XVII century and which territories the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic withdrew from the Soviet Union”, Vladimir Putin wrote. Vladimir Putin accused Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin of offering national republics the right to leave the USSR. “But in 1991, all those territories, and, more importantly, people, found themselves abroad overnight, taken away, this time indeed, from their historical motherland”,⁴⁹ Vladimir Putin pointed out. The Russian president argues that Moscow has a political and historical right to participate in international negotiations regarding Ukraine's borders.

Vladimir Putin again accused the West of directly interfering in Ukraine's domestic affairs and supporting a “coup” with the help of radical nationalist groups, which have turned Russophobia into a state policy. Kyiv was accused of destroying Russian Orthodoxy, which acted as a major bond between Russia and Ukraine. “Even extensive autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church while maintaining spiritual unity with the Moscow Patriarchate strongly displeases them. They must destroy this prominent and centuries-old symbol of our kinship at all costs”⁵⁰ Vladimir Putin pointed out.

The Kremlin leader lashed out at the West, accusing it of turning Ukraine into an “anti-Russia” territory and creating a climate of terror, “a neo-Nazi, aggressive rhetoric”. Vladimir Putin wrote that “foreign advisers who supervise Ukrainian authorities, special services and the armed forces” lead Ukraine, and that NATO infrastructure has drawn too close to Russian borders. “Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia. Inevitably, there came a time when the concept of ‘Ukraine is not Russia’ was no longer an option. There was a need for the ‘anti-Russia’ concept which we will never accept”,⁵¹ the Russian president further wrote.

Following the publication of this article in Russian and Ukrainian, Russia's official rhetoric regarding Ukraine underwent several structural changes. The

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Ukrainian state described by Vladimir Putin as an “anti-Russia” posed a threat to the Kremlin, so anti-Ukrainian narratives were intertwined with narratives about the West (anti-European, anti-American, anti-NATO, etc.). It should also be noted that Vladimir Putin published the article in Ukrainian, stressing the linguistic and historical similarity between Russians and Ukrainians. From the very outset, this confirms we are referring to a linguistic community other than Russian. To justify the need for Russia’s direct intervention in the conflict in Donbas, the Russian president avoids using arguments of international law but instead refers to the history of the Russian people. Vladimir Putin’s theses represent a personal political vision of Russia’s national history. They however ignore tragic chapters from this country’s past, such as the persecution of the Ukrainian people under the Russian Empire, the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine, Ukrainians’ contribution to the victory against Nazism, and so on.

Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian Federation's deputy chairman of the Security Council, published an article in "Kommersant" in October 2021 in which he advanced official narratives about Ukraine becoming an "anti-Russia" state. “The United States want nothing else from Ukraine except a confrontation with Russia, total containment of our country and the creation of what has been rightfully called ‘anti-Russia’. This means that such an alliance is extremely fragile and, at some point, will crumble to dust. Hopes for NATO and European Union membership are also short-lived for obvious reasons”,⁵² Dmitry Medvedev wrote. The Russian official argued Kyiv politicians are puppets used by the USA and NATO to destroy Russia. The Kremlin-linked media further developed this official narrative around the launch of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. In January-February 2022, while the Russian Federation was building up an army on the Ukrainian border, the Russian government media wrote that the political leadership in Kyiv might launch a conflict in Donbas with support from the West. Government-controlled publications tried to persuade the public that Russia would have no choice but to defend Russian speakers.⁵³

Vladimir Putin’s address in the early hours of February 24, 2022, when he

⁵² Dmitry Medvedev, *Pochemu bessmyslenny kontakty s nyneshnim ukrainskim rukovodstvom* [Why contacts with the current Ukrainian leadership are meaningless], in “Kommersant”, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5028300> (Accessed on 18.01.2023).

⁵³ Vasilii Stoiakin, *Kto smenit Zelenskogo na postu prezidenta. Rol Ukrainy v bolshoi sdelke Rossii i SSHA* [Who will replace Zelensky as President. The role of Ukraine in the “big deal” between Russia and the United States], in “Ukraina.ru”, <https://ukraina.ru/20220131/1033179042.html> (Accessed on 17.02.2023).

announced the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, observed the same narrative line and political logic of his article published in July 2021. The Kremlin leader criticized NATO expansion towards Eastern Europe, highlighting that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is “a tool of US foreign policy”. The Russian leader compared the geopolitical context of 2022 to World War II. Vladimir Putin said Ukrainian nationalists “will undoubtedly try to bring war to Crimea just as they have done in Donbas, to kill innocent people just as members of the punitive units of Ukrainian nationalists and Hitler’s accomplices did during the Great Patriotic War”.⁵⁴ According to Vladimir Putin, Russia’s goal is to defend the people of Ukraine against the “genocide organized by Kyiv”. The Kremlin leader gave assurances Russia would not occupy Ukrainian territories and would not use force against the civilian population.

The reasons behind the “special military operation” on the territory of Ukraine included a series of official narratives, promoted and developed in the 2014-2022 period, which intertwined anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. Additionally, the question of “Ukrainian Nazism” was also tied to NATO expansion. Ukraine described as an “anti-Russia”, which is supported and armed by the West, was the last narrative construct Russian authorities launched in the public sphere around the large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

CONCLUSIONS

Official narratives permeating the public sphere in the Russian Federation over 2014-2022 concerning Ukraine are a constituent of the hybrid war Moscow launched in the context of the illegal annexation of Crimea and its support for separatist movements in Donbas. The Kremlin’s favourite topics concerning Ukraine were the illegitimate character of Ukrainian authorities; the West’s support for a “coup” in Kyiv, which the Russian-speaking population of Crimea and Donbas did not endorse; Ukraine’s refusal to comply with the Minsk peace agreements; Kyiv’s unwarranted refusal to talk to the political leaders of Donbas; the start of a civil war in Eastern Ukraine; a surge in radicalism, extremism and neo-Nazism on the territory of Ukraine; the organization of genocide against the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine; the persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate; the unity of the

⁵⁴ *Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 24 fevralia 2022 goda* [Address of the President of the Russian Federation of February 24, 2022] in <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843> (Accessed on 18.02.2023).

Russia and Ukrainian people; Russia's right to negotiate the borders of Ukraine; the emergence of the Ukrainian state in the wake of reckless decisions taken by Soviet leaders.

During these years, Vladimir Putin took it upon himself to influence public opinion with support from various high-ranking Russian politicians, such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the chairman of the Federation Council and other MPs. More often than not, Moscow-backed narratives were an eclectic mix of international law and historiography topics, which were reinterpreted to fit the Kremlin's geopolitical interests.

In the early stages of the hybrid war of 2014-2022, official Russian narratives described Ukraine as an independent state captured by a group of radicals. Ukraine's Western rapprochement, Kyiv's refusal to talk to pro-Russian separatists in Donbas so as not to officially recognize their legitimacy and the implementation of certain measures designed to mitigate Moscow's influence in Ukrainian society generated a series of changes in the Russian Federation's official discourse. According to the Kremlin's official narratives, Ukraine is an independent state led by illegitimate authorities, which the West turned into a tool to combat Russia around the large-scale invasion. In mid-2021, Vladimir Putin coined the term "anti-Russia", claiming the West supports Ukraine to destroy the Russian state. At the same time, the Russian government media amplified this rhetoric, disseminating *fake news* and disinformation discourses with a view to intoxicating public opinion.

The official narratives regarding the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine also underwent major changes. From 2014 to 2018, Crimea was described as a historical territory of Russia, and the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as "people's republics" that needed to be reintegrated into Ukraine and granted extended autonomy. The conflicting interpretation of the Minsk peace agreements by Russian and Ukrainian leaders and Kyiv's rejection of Moscow's plans to federalize Ukraine also prompted certain modifications in official Kremlin rhetoric. By 2020-2021, the official narratives promoted by the Russian Federation had stopped depicting Donbas as a Ukrainian territory with a Russian-speaking population, but rather as a historical Russian region illegally controlled by Ukraine.

In mid-2021, a new series of changes occurred at the level of official discourse targeting both the public at home as well as the international community ahead of the large-scale invasion. In early 2022, high-ranking Russian politicians launched more aggressive narratives blaming the West for supporting Nazi ideology in Ukrainian society and planning to destroy Russia. As Russia progressively

built a new myth of the citadel under assault, anti-Ukrainian narratives were combined with official discourse against NATO and the European Union.

At the same time, the narratives disseminated by Russian government media gradually fell in line with those spread by the political elites. Press articles in the early stages of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war were picked up by the Kremlin's official discourse. Starting January-February 2022, media narratives completely overlapped with the statements of high-ranking politicians. By announcing the "special military operation" on the territory of Ukraine on the morning of February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin finalized the process of integrating anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric into a single narrative construct. His discourse tied the "Ukrainian Nazism" issue to "the illegal NATO expansion" and the Kremlin's need to defend itself.

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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF EASTERN EUROPE: A HISTORY OF THE ROMANIAN CONSULATE IN CZERNOWITZ

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Abstract: *The author provides a historical overview of the Royal Consulate of Romania in Czernowitz (Cernăuți, now Chernivtsi), as it appears in the work **A Royal Consulate in Chernivtsi...: The Royal Consulate of Romania in Chernivtsi – 130 years since its establishment 1892-2022**. The Royal Consulate of Romania in Czernowitz was the third Romanian diplomatic institution in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, after the legation in Vienna and the consulate in Budapest. Established in 1892 during an era marked by significant political and national movements, it experienced a gradual evolution from consulate to consulate general in 1905. Its establishment would serve the ethnic communities of Bukovina, located at a great distance from the political-administrative centre of the empire, as well as the development of cultural and economic relations in this part of Eastern Europe. This review summarizes the activities of the Romanian diplomatic service in Chernivtsi throughout two periods of operation: 1892-1916 and 1999-2022.*

Keywords: *Bukovina, Royal Consulate of Romania, Czernowitz, international relations, Austro-Hungarian Empire.*

Rezumat: *Scurtă privire asupra istoriei estului european: o istorie a Consulatului României la Cernăuți. Autorul prezintă o schiță istorică a Consulatului Regal al României de la Cernăuți, așa cum este ea redată în lucrarea **Un Consulat Regal la Cernăuți...: Consulatul Regal al României la Cernăuți – 130 de ani de la înființare (1892-2022)**. Consulatul Regal al României de la Cernăuți a fost cea de a treia instituție diplomatică românească în Imperiul Austro-Ungar, după legația din Viena și consulatul din Budapesta. Înființat în anul 1892, într-o vreme marcată de mari mișcări politice și*

naționale acesta a cunoscut o evoluție treptată, de la statutul de consulat la cel de consulat general, în anul 1905. Înființarea acestuia avea să servească intereselor comunităților etnice din Bucovina, aflate la mare depărtare de centrul politico-administrativ al imperiului, precum și pentru dezvoltarea relațiilor culturale și economice din această parte a estului european. Recenzia surprinde datele esențiale ale activității personalului diplomatic românesc de la Cernăuți, în cele două perioade de funcționare: 1892-1916 și 1999-2022, prezentate de autori.

On the 130th anniversary of the establishment in 1892 of the Royal Consulate of Romania in Chernivtsi, some history enthusiasts – Irina-Loredana Stănculescu, Florin C. Stan, Maria Toacă-Andries and Stefan Hostiuc – published in 2022 a book dedicated to this event: ***A Royal Consulate in Chernivtsi...: The Royal Consulate of Romania in Chernivtsi – 130 years since its creation (1892-2022)***.¹ The volume contains a “Foreword” by Dr. Irina-Loredana Stănculescu, Consul General of Romania in Chernivtsi and a “Note on the edition”.

The work is divided into two parts: the first summarizes historical events that occurred during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, i.e., from 1892 to the First World War; the subsequent part focuses on the institution’s activity, re-established after the fall of the USSR.

The historical sketch “Bukovina – «a small homeland» of European standards” illustrates the evolution of the northern part of Moldavia, from part of the Moldavian historical territory to that of the Austrians in the years 1774-1775, which they called Bukovina. The Austrians thus severed the newly created province’s geographical, economic, social, and cultural ties from the land of its historical genesis, causing significant alterations over the 144-year rule. According to the authors, this region “concentrated in amazing way steps of voivodes, impetuous sovereigns, simple toilers of the place, travellers and foreigners, faiths and believers who bowed their heads for a clearer sky, regardless of whether they belonged to the majority or the minority.” Such notions define the multi-ethnic and multilingual territory known as Bukovina during the Austrian domination and, currently, “as a legacy of Romanian history or part of the Ukrainian state”. To properly tell the history of Bukovina, part of which is in Ukraine, it is essential to understand Bukovina’s values, and the past that should

¹ Irina-Loredana Stănculescu, Florin C. Stan, Maria Toacă-Andrieș, Ștefan Hostiuc, *Un Consulat Regal la Cernăuți...: Consulatul Regal al României la Cernăuți - 130 de ani de la înființare (1892-2022)*, București, Pro Universitaria, 2022, 376 p.

encourage partnership rather than conflict, as well as to acknowledge the contributions of each ethnic group.

An important part of this chapter is devoted to the presentation of the territory of Moldavia, from its beginnings to the fateful years of the struggle for supremacy between Moldavia's neighbouring great powers, the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Austria. A substantial section examines in this context the historical events that led to the convention of April 6 / May 17, 1775, signed in Constantinople on May 1 / 12, 1776, reflecting the understandings between the two signatory parties regarding northern Moldavia. The work mentions the province's organizational measures during the Austrian rule, the demographic reports from 1775 to the middle of the 19th century, the events of 1848-1849, the activity of some hierarchs of the Orthodox Church in Bukovina, the institutions and the evolution of the administrative organization of Bukovina, the affirmation of national movements in the province, the development of education and the role of the University of Chernivtsi, the union of Bukovina with the Kingdom of Romania, etc.

To help the reader form a better picture of the Royal Romanian Consulate in Chernivtsi, the authors have included the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the era of the Old Kingdom (1881-1918)" analysis. It includes a passage taken from the "Appeal to the Voters", published by the Conservative Party on January 4, 1892, set as the chapter's motto: "In friendly relations with all foreign governments, Romania cannot have any other policy than that which guarantees the independence and integrity of its territory". The authors included in their survey the provisions of Romania's 1883 treaty with the Triple Alliance, then the gradual detachment from the Central Powers alliance, the participation in the second Balkan war and the peace of Bucharest (1913), the proclamation of neutrality (1914) and the 1916 world war entry on the side of the Entente.

Following the proclamation of the Kingdom of Romania, Carol I and his governments focused more on the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The authors highlighted Law 1216 / May 1, 1882, in this context, followed by a series of amendments aimed at adapting diplomatic and consular operations to the requirements of constantly changing realities. Later amendments (1881) increased diplomatic personnel's powers, specified the terms of their activity, the internal organization of the ministry, the structure and operation of the ministry's archives, etc. These and other organizational reforms were included in the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs Reorganization Act", published on February 13, 1894. The authors briefly present the organisational aspects of the ministry, the minister's exclusive powers, the diplomatic and consular offices, the ministry's

central administration, the diplomatic missions and their structure in different countries, the organization of consulates (including the one in Chernivtsi), the personnel structure of the central administration and the diplomatic and consular offices, etc. With some amendments on April 1, 1898, and March 15, 1912, the law remained in force until World War II. This chapter provides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff list as of the reorganization in 1894.

A brief review of foreign relations concludes the chapter, whose defining passage refers to the assessment made, at the time, by Princess Maria of Romania: "Berlin and Vienna were in the first row, the behaviour towards France was courtly, and Russia, though untrustworthy, was treated with the most thorough consideration and politeness, but the politeness was due more to concern than to benevolence. England at that time was a distant nation, had no close connections with Romania, both countries shared few common interests" (p. 65-66). When discussing the transition from an alliance with the Central European powers to one with the Entente, the authors acknowledged that Romania was forced to prioritize "supporting the national interest" in its foreign policy (p. 67) after the rise of "Austro-Hungarian offensive plans".

The chapter "Historical Overview of the Royal Romanian Consulate in Chernivtsi" contains essential information about the "Establishment of the mission". Such information concerns Lascăr Catargiu's conservative government (November 1891 – October 1895), which took important steps towards normalization when there were many obstacles to good relations both within the country as well as with Austria-Hungary. The Consulate in Chernivtsi was part of this policy of improving Romanian-Austro-Hungarian relations. Let us recall, in this context, that on October 9 / 21, 1893, the two states granted each other the status of the most favoured nation and that, on October 30, 1891, the secret treaty of alliance, which had been concluded on October 18 / 30, 1883, had expired and had to be renewed. Alexandru N. Lahovary, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, and Emil I. Ghika, Minister Plenipotentiary in Vienna, were the ones who took the necessary steps to establish the consulate. Temporary obstacles were overcome during the various stages of the negotiations thanks to the skill and tenacity of those involved. It has mainly been argued that the establishment of a Romanian consulate in Chernivtsi was a matter of reciprocity since 16 Austro-Hungarian consular offices operated on the territory of the Kingdom of Romania (p. 71) – while Romania had only three diplomatic offices in the empire, including that of Chernivtsi. The Chernivtsi consulate was necessary in the context of an intense anti-Semitic policy of the Tsarist Empire, which caused the transit of a large number of Jews from Bukovina to Romania, as well as to promote trade relations

in this part of Europe. At first, the Austrian side formulated the idea of an Honorary Consulate, as an intermediate form, but they finally accepted a General Consulate in Chernivtsi (p. 74). The hesitations of the government led by Taaffe were linked to the 'nationalist' activity of some of the people proposed for the posts of honorary consuls. They were Nicolae Cârste, Mihai Pitei, Alecu Grigorcea. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, Count Kálnoky, suggested to the Romanian side that if a person was refused the position of consul, the Romanian government could appoint another candidate "beyond current political passions". This was related to the political struggles determined by the trial of the Romanian Memorandum authors in Transylvania. Agenor Gołuchowski, on December 1/13, 1892, sent the approval to establish a Romanian consulate in Chernivtsi. On December 18, 1892, King Carol I signed Decree 4073, which officially created the consulate (p. 76).

Sub-chapter "The activity of the mission during the first consul, Stamate Stamatiadi (1893-1897)" reveals new information on the exchange of official documents concerning the establishment of the consular mission, the first headquarters ("Schwarzer Adler" Hotel in Czernowitz), the oath taken by the head of the consular office, the archives of the mission, information concerning the social and political life of the Duchy of Bukovina, the Chernivtsi press, etc. Important historical information can be found in the sub-chapter "Aspects of the activity of the Consular Office during the tenure of Consul Constantin M. Kogălniceanu (1897-1908)" concerning the Romanian National Party, the passage through Bukovina of King Carol I, the "Unirea" Society, the activity of the governors of Bukovina - Konrad Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürts and Oktavian Regner von Bleyleben, the 1904 national celebrations that took place at Putna, the Diet of Bukovina, the Society for Romanian Culture and Literature in Bukovina, the Society of Romanian Ladies, the "Romanian School" Society, the electoral campaigns in Bukovina, the Chernivtsi consulate raised to a higher rank of Consulate General (1905), etc.

The 30th anniversary of the student society "Junimea"'s founding on April 26 / May 10, 1908, the 500th anniversary of Chernivtsi's first documented attestation, initiated by Raimund Friedrich Kaindl, the Romanian press in the Duchy of Bukovina, and operational communications during the First World War were all topics covered in-depth by the authors. The consulate ceased operation when Romania joined the war.

The section "Consuls General. Biographical data" includes biographies of consuls and other categories of diplomatic service personnel in Chernivtsi:

Stamate Stamatiadi, Constantin M. Kogălniceanu, Dimitrie Georgescu, Gheorghe D. Gallin, Ștefan Mărgăritescu-Grecianu et al.

Twenty-two documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive are reproduced in the "Annexes". Among these, the document contained in Annex 10, dated February 23 / March 4, 1898, is of particular importance because it concerns the history of the Romanian National Party in Bukovina (pp. 174-181): "Report of the interim manager Gh. D. Gallin sent to Dimitrie A. Sturdza, president of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs".

Part II contains relevant data about the Consulate General of Romania in Chernivtsi, Ukraine during 1999-2022. In the context of establishing diplomatic relations between Romania and Ukraine, the Romanian Embassy in Kyiv was established on February 1, 1992, and Decree No. 588 of the President of Romania created the Consulate General of Romania in Chernivtsi on November 12, 1997. The need to represent the Romanian State's diplomatic interests in a region where the Romanian community is indigenous arose as a result of Chernivtsi and a piece of Bukovina becoming part of Ukraine in the new geopolitical reality, which accepted after World War II the borders drawn by the USSR in 1940. The pages of this work recall the establishment of the consulate, the visit of Romanian President Emil Constantinescu to Chernivtsi and some data about the activity of the first Romanian Consul General, Ilie Ivan, in Chernivtsi. In the section "Consuls General of Romania in Chernivtsi (1999-2022)" readers are offered biographical references of the Consuls General of Romania in Chernivtsi, as follows: Ilie Ivan (1999-2002), Romeo Săndulescu (2002-2008), Dorin Popescu (2008-2009), Tatiana Popa (2009-2012), Eleonora Moldovan (2012-2018) and Irina-Loredana Stănculescu (since 2018).

Interviews taken from the media or unpublished, illustrating aspects of the activity of Chernivtsi consuls general and diplomatic personnel during their service, complemented, in some cases, the biographical section. Beyond the naturalness of the related events, primarily aimed at assisting the Romanian community in the Chernivtsi region, what stands out is the evolution towards the Europeanization of the inhabitants of this province, the many hopes they had with the fall of the USSR, the national cultural events, the struggle for the preservation of the Romanian language and the Romanian language school.

Undoubtedly, the volume is a commendable work in that it presents general information about the history of the Romanian Consulate in Chernivtsi. Written in the spirit of political correctness, the authors – some of whom are active in the diplomatic service – avoided, even for the years 1892–1918, the topics that divide the national histories of the ethnic groups residing in the Bukovina region. The

national projects of the Romanians and the Ukrainians of Bukovina then came into sharp conflict over issues relating to historical law, the division between the Romanians and the Ukrainians of the Archdiocese of Bukovina into two bishoprics, the equal rights and representation in the Bukovina diet, the educational policy of the Bukovina imperial authorities, Bukovina Ausgleich, etc. The archive of the Royal Consulate in Chernivtsi contains diplomatic reports that could supplement the data used up to this point in writing the history of this region and Eastern Europe, and this volume could benefit from the publication of documents that have been unused or unpublished.

Given the private nature of the diplomatic discourse, only cultural or ethnic celebrations supported by or attended by the aforementioned diplomatic employees have been documented. The future will come with new findings when the opening of archives reveals information currently prohibited by law. The path travelled by the diplomats of Chernivtsi was surely not only one of cordial companionship and openness to Europeanism, with concern for the respect of rights, as they are mentioned in the "Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms", of Rome on November 4, 1950, and other documents that serve as the foundation of international relations. One could argue that for as much information as there is about cultural and national events in the Chernivtsi region in which diplomatic personnel participated, there could be as much more and equally stimulating information about events known at the time that is still secret, indicating a not entirely continuous upward trajectory of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the Chernivtsi region.

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- ³ Stelian Tanase (coord.), *Cioran si Securitatea* [Cioran and Securitatea], Iasi, Editura Polirom, 2009, p. 14.
- ⁴ Christine Sylvester, *Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR*, in "Millennium: Journal of International Studies", 1994, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 315-334.
- ⁵ Richard Little, Barry Buzan, *Sistemele internaționale...*, p. 79.
- ⁶ *Australia-NATO Joint Political Declaration*, in http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_94097.htm (Accessed on 12.11.2012).
- ⁷ A. I. Denikin, *Put' russkogo ofitsera* [The Way of a Russian Officer], Moskva, Sovremennik, 1991, p. 58.

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